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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses the impact of the United States' foreign economic 
policy on the legal and political systems of Taiwan. Its focus is the bilateral 
negotiations between Taiwan and the United States and the evolution of the legal 
and political systems on Taiwan. 
The widely acknowledged economic miracle of Taiwan has been combined, 
in recent years, with a deliberate attempt to transform the country's political 
structures in a democratic direction. Paradoxically, Taiwan's move towards 
democracy has seriously strained Taiwan / United States relations. For many 
years, the special relations between the two countries were characterised by 
Taiwan's almost total dependency on the United States both as a market for its 
products as well as a protector of its territorial integrity. The end of the Cold 
War, the new role of the People's Republic of China and the globalisation of the 
international economy have brought this special relation to an end. The changing 
nature of the relationship between the United States and Taiwan has not, 
however, brought an end the traditional behaviour of the United States towards 
Taiwan which was characterised by aggressive unilateralism. 
This thesis argues that in the changing context of the 1990s as the 
negotiating agenda between the two countries expand, the aggressive 
unilateralism of the United States is undermining the process of democratisation 
and eroding the rule of law on Taiwan. In order to comply with American 
pressure, the government of Taiwan is forced to resort to authoritarian measures 
based on the old corporatist framework that the transition to democracy 
is meant 
to supersede. Interestingly, the implications of the undemocratic consequences 
of these pressure do not seem to concern the United States, as short term 
economic advantage takes precedence over other considerations. For 
Taiwan, the 
way out of this vicious circle of external pressure - undemocratic response - 
external pressure is to diversify its international economic 
links. The problems 
and implications of this policy options are discussed in the thesis. 
The specific policy areas analysed in this thesis are commodity trade, trade 
in services and intellectual property protection. 
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1 
PART I. INTRODUCTION 
It has become routine to tell the story of Taiwan's 
economic and political "miracles". Scholars have little to 
add except digesting the so-called "Taiwan experience" 
to fit into their theories; while journalists continue to 
report on recent "developments". And yet, after so 
many years, it is still possible to speak of a major 
constitutional and legal failure. 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND ABOUT TAIWAN 
Taiwan, an island situated beside the Chinese Mainland and close to Japan 
and the Malayan Archipelago, catches the world's attention by its shining 
economic performance. All sorts of Western economic indicators have shown that 
Taiwan is more than just a developing country. It is the world's twelfth biggest 
trading nation' producing diversified products such as computers, integrated 
circuits, textiles, electronics, machine tools and toys etc. 
2 Due to the success 
3 
of state-led, export-oriented policies and strategies to accumulate capital, it has 
1 
GATT Focus, No. 108, p. 2 (June, 1994). 
2 
The Guardian, "Taiwan: A Special Report", p. 12 (22 June, 1992). 
3 
It is agreed among traditional liberal and statist economists that the basic 
driving force 
of Taiwan's economic development was largely due to the government's export policies and various 
strategies. Some of the most authoritative writings include Alice Amsden, "The States and 
Taiwan's 
Economic Development, " in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (ed. ), BRINGING THE 
STATE BACK IN pp. 79-106 (1985); Barrett Richard E. & Chin, Soomi, "Export-oriented Industrialising 
States in the Capitalist World System, " in Federick Deyo (ed. ), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EAST 
ASIAN INDUSTRIALISATION pp. 23-43 (1987); Robert Wade, GOVERNING THE MARKET: THEORY AND THE ROLE OF 
GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALISATION (1990); and Tang, Foh-tsrang, "Economic Reforms and 
Changes in the Role of the State: The Taiwan Experience, " in Claude Amoi (ed. ), THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
IN DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES pp. 135-154 (1992). For an orthodox liberal explanation of Taiwan's success, 
see World Bank, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY pp. 
293-338 (1993). Among 
the academic contributions, the "developmentalist" or "statist" analyses seem to carry more 
insight 
than the traditional liberals. 
2 
had no negative rates of growth during the past four decades. Intensive 
external trade has contributed to a huge accumulation of wealth. Today, Taiwan 
has more than US$90 billion of foreign reserves, the second highest in the 
world, 
5 
and virtually no foreign debts. Its per capita GNP topped $10,000 in 
1991 and, at the current projected rates of growth (around 6% annually), it will 
not take long for Taiwan to catch up with the British per capita GNP. 
6 In sum, 
as noted by a commentator, Taiwan has the most remarkable development among 
all the newly industrialising countries (NICs). 7 
Historically, this magnificent economic performance owes much to the 
support of the United States. Large amounts of United States aid in the 1950s 
and the early 1960s, 
8 the signing of Mutual Defense Treaty to ensure the 
security of Taiwan, 
9 
and the provision of a huge market for Taiwanese exportsly 
4 
Gerald Segal, RETHINKING THE PACIFIC p. 319 (1991). 
The total amount of foreign reserves in January 1995 reached US$ 93.2 billion. The 
Economist (London), p. 132 (10-16 June, 1995). 
6 
See supra note 2, p. 10. 
1 
Segal, supra note 4. 
8 
From 1950 to 1965 the United States provided Taiwan with an aid programme that reached a 
total of US$ 1.5 billion. This has provided a significant push to Taiwan's early economic growth. 
Greenhalgh even calls this "aid dependency" in the sense that Taiwan was heavily dependent on United 
States aid for political and economic survival. Susan Greenhalgh, "Supranational Process of Income 
Distribution, " in Edwin A. Winckler & Susan Greenhalgh (ed. ), CONTENDING APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF TAIWAN p. 78-79 (1988). See also Stephan Haggard & Tun-jen Cheng, "State and Foreign 
Capital in the East Asian NICs, " in Frederic C. Deyo (ed. ), supra note 3, p. 87. 
9 
The United States-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty was signed on 2 December 1954 against the 
background of the end of the Korean War. The treaty pledged that in the event of armed attack against 
the territory of one signatory in the West Pacific, the other would act to meet the common danger 
in accordance with its constitutional process. The treaty thus showed a positive United States 
commitment towards ROC on Taiwan. The treaty was terminated following the severance of 
diplomatic 
relations between the two countries in 1979. Hsieh, Chiao Chiao, STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL: THE 
FOREIGN 
POLICY AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN, 1949-1979 p. 85 (1985). For text 
of the treaty, see United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 248, I. No. 3496, pp. 214-216,226,228 
(1956). 
3 
are all significant factors that contribute to Taiwan's prosperity. Even after 
United States de-recognition of the ROC in 1979, trade between the two countries 
remains intensive. 
11 This was largely due to the enactment of the Taiwan 
Relations Act which guaranteed economic and other "non-official" ties with 
Taiwan. 12 The significance of these facts is evident: Taiwan relies to a very 
large extent, politically, militarily, and economically on the United States. As 
such, maintaining co-cperative relations with the United States in all aspects has 
always been Taiwan's diplomatic priority. 
In recent years, Taiwan has also become a target of Western political 
scientists in their study of Third World democratisation. Its second-class 
international status 
13 
and constant military threats from the People's Republic 
10 
According to Segal, Taiwan clearly depended on Japan for a push-start into the 
international trading economy, but it was the United States that took the leading role. In 1977, for 
instance, the United States took 39% of Taiwan's export and 25% of imports. Segal, supra note 4, 
p. 320. 
11 
in fact, trade and economic relations between the two countries grew even stronger after 
de-recognition to the extent that American politicians joked it took de-recognition to double the 
United States trade volume. Chien, Frederick F., "The Role of the Coordination Council for North 
American Affairs in the Context of the United States-- Republic of China Relationship, " 6 N. Y. L. 
Sch. J. Int'l L., p. 122 (1984). 
12 
The Taiwan Relations Act [U. S. C. A. 3303] came into effect on 1 Jan., 1979. For a history 
of the enactment and implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act, see 
Lori Fisler Damrosch, "The 
Taiwan Relations Act After Ten Years", 3 J. Chinese L., pp. 157-183 (Fall 1989); C. J. Gable, "Taiwan 
Relations Act: Legislative Re-recognition, " 12 Vanderbilt J. of Transnat'l L., pp. 511-532 
(1979); 
Hsiao, Gene T., "The Legal Status of Taiwan in the Normalization of Sino-American Relations", 
14 
Rutgers L. J., pp. 839-913 (1983); Chen, Chi-di, "Taiwan Relations Act: Legislative 
Re-recognition 
of Taiwan After De-recognition, " 11 Nat. Taiwan Uni. L. J., pp. 
87-96 (Dec. 1981). For text of the Act, 
see 18 I. L. M., pp. 873-877 (1979). 
13 
Taiwan's minor international status is a result of the China 
issue. The Republic of China 
(KMT government) was once a member of the United Nations. 
But its seat was replaced by the PRC in 
1971 according to a United Nations Resolution [Res. 2758 
(XXVI), 25 Oct., 1971]. This also brought 
about a series of chain effects. The PRC succeeded almost every position 
in international conventions 
and organisations previously held by ROC. These 
included IMF, World Bank, and the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes etc. More, most of the countries 
(including the West) 
began to turn their back against ROC on Taiwan and recognised the 
PRC as the only government 
representing China. On the other 
hand, they only maintain "non-official" relations with Taiwan. 
Today, only about thirty countries, most African and South 
American countries, recognise the ROC on 
Taiwan as a sovereign nation. See YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS 1971, Vol. 25, pp. 126-133; William 
M. Bueler, "Taiwan: A Problem of International Law or Politics? " 
27 World Today pp. 256-266 (1971); 
4 
of China (PRC)14 did not seem to have shaken the determination of the KMT 
government to pursue constitutional democracy. Indeed, in many ways, the 
democratisation is remarkable. It is characterised by a period of political 
liberalisation since the mid-1980s, the lifting of martial law in July 1987, the 
formation of opposition parties, the ending of the "Period of Suppression of 
Rebellion" in April 1991, and subsequent constitutional amendments in 1991 and 
1992.15 In this period, the authoritarian KMT government extended a measure 
of civil and political rights to individuals and groups, and conducted 
comprehensive, open and fair parliamentary and local elections. A representative 
government was thus established. Western commentators seem to be happy with 
the process. One American scholar even wrote a book claiming that Taiwan's 
16 democratic process was a "quiet revolution". Other similar academic works and 
conclusions can also be found, notably in the United States and Taiwan. 
" 
Moreover, Francis Fukuyama argues with confidence that Taiwan's "market- 
Richard M. Goodman, "Chinese Participation in the United Nations: the Imperatives of a Negotiated 
Settlement, " 65 Am. J. Int' L. pp. 9-16 (1971); Tan, S. H., "Representation of China in the United 
Nations, " 65 Am. J. Int'l L. pp. 20-30 (1971); Quincy Wright, "The Chinese Recognition Problem, " 49 
Am. J. Int'l L., pp. 320-338 (1955); D. P. O'Connell, "The Status of Formosa and the 
Chinese 
Recognition Problem, " 50 Am. J. Intl L., pp. 405-416 (1956); Ma, Ying-jeou, "Two Major Legal 
Issues 
Relating to the International Status of the Republic of China, " 6 Chinese Yb. Int'l 
L. & Aff., 
pp. 171-180 (1986-1987). 
14 
Legally speaking, Taiwan and the PRC were at war before 1991 -- the year 
Taiwan ended the 
"Period of Suppression of Rebellion (communists)". However, today, 
PRC is still the potential enemy 
of Taiwan. It claims that Taiwan is part of China and will not 
hesitate to use force should Taiwan 
choose to become an independent state. The KMT government skilfully 
announces the policy of 
unification to avoid stimulating the PRC. For a 
discussion of the relationship between Taiwan and 
the PRC, see Chiu, Hungdah, "The New International 
Order and Intra-Chinese (Taiwan-Mainland) 
Relations, " 10 Chinese Yb. Int'l. L. & Aff., pp. 8-26 (1990-91). 
15 
See Appendix I. 
16 
J. F. Copper, A QUIET REVOLUTION: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1988). 
17 
See for instance, Chu, Yun-han, CRAFTING DEMOCRACY IN TAIWAN 
(1992); and Cheng, Tun-jen 
& Stephan Haggard (ed. ), POLITICAL CHANGE IN TAIWAN 
(1992). Professor Chu is a young scholar 
presently teaching at the National 
University of Taiwan. His viewpoint, however, largely 
follows the 
theme of Huntington. Chen and Haggard are 
American based scholars. The book is actually a collection 
of articles written by contemporary 
Chinese (Taiwan) experts. 
5 
oriented authoritarian regime" has successfully transformed into a liberal 
democracy, and thus presented a perfect case for his theory of "the end of 
history". 18 Finally, "democratic Machiavelli" Samuel Huntington concludes that 
Taiwan is undergoing a "direct transition from a stable authoritarian system to 
a stable democratic system", 
19 
and that liberal democracy based on pluralism is 
in an irreversible ongoing process. 
20 
In sum, Taiwan seems to be successful in both its economic development 
and political democratisation. So, what is the problem? 
B. STATEMENT OF PROBLEMS AND THE PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
Behind the veil of economic success and the seemingly ongoing democratic 
process, Taiwan is facing many unprecedented and chronic problems; its trade 
relations with the United States being perhaps the most tense. In fact the past 
decade has witnessed deepening trade frictions between the two countries. As 
noted above, trade relations between the two countries are intensive and it is 
precisely because of trade with the United States that Taiwan achieves its high 
economic growth. On the other hand, mainly due to its worsening domestic 
economy, the United States has become keen to eliminate its trade deficits with 
Taiwan. To remedy the situation, the United States has unilaterally demanded 
Francis Fukuyama, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN, pp. 14,111,123,125 
(1992). 
19 
Samuel P. Huntington, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATISATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY p. 43 
(1993). 
20 
Words of Huntington in the Preface of the book Cheng & Haggard, supra note 
17, p. xi. 
6 
Taiwan open its market and liberalise its economy. It also requires Taiwan to 
enact some legislation to protect the market order. All these messages are 
conveyed through bilateral negotiations -- the only channel of communication for 
the two countries. To ensure success, American pressures are exerted including 
threats to retaliation according to its various Trade Acts. 
21 The intensity of 
America's trade unilateralism has become too familiar to the average citizen of 
Taiwan to the extent that it is no longer big news that Taiwan is "blacklisted" 
in United States Trade Representative's (USTR) "Priority Countries" or "Priority 
Watch Countries". Predictably, due to its lack of bargaining power, Taiwan has 
to bow to American threats, and accommodate American demands. This is also a 
well-known fact to Western journalists and commentators. 
Yet all the studies and comments seem to stop at this juncture. It seems 
to those journalists and commentators that when the United States has 
successfully pressured Taiwan (and, in fact, other countries as well) to open its 
markets, the story ends. For academic lawyers, however, this cannot be enough. 
What is ignored is how Taiwan reacted to American pressures through its political 
and legal measures. Or how does the KMT government adjust its policies and 
laws to resolve these immense foreign economic pressures? The issues are 
further complicated when we associate them with Taiwan's democratisation which 
is taking place at roughly the same time. In other words, the question we 
intend 
to ask is what is the impact of American trade pressures on 
Taiwan's legal and 
democratic processes? To what extent have American trade pressures affected 
21 
See Chapter 2 for the definition and scope of United States Trade 
Acts. 
Taiwan's democratisation and law? Can constitutional democracy be built under 
America's trade unilateralism? What lesson can be learnt from Taiwan's 
experience? Since there exists a strong relationship between economics and the 
political-legal system, 
22 
we have reason to believe that the questions we raise 
are of constitutional and legal significance. If this is the case, then 
contemporary studies of Taiwan's democratisation efforts certainly miss something. 
This thesis intends to fill the gap. 
As a matter of categorisation, the subject matter of this thesis covers the 
areas of both international economic law as well as law in development. With 
regard to the former, it discusses United States government's trade unilateralism 
-- a hot topic of international economic scholars, 
23 from the angle of the 
"recipient" country. This is a totally new approach, although Professor Jadgish 
Bhagwati has hinted that American unilateralism can only be successful in 
undemocratic countries. 
24 With regard to the latter, this thesis tells the 
distinctive process of how the democratisation and law of a relatively affluent 
country are affected by an economic hegemony. In other words, it discusses a 
nation's legal and political development in terms of its involvement 
in the 
international market economy. 
22 
An excellent elucidation of this relationship can be 
found in Yash Ghai, Robin Luckham, 
& Francis Snyder (ed. ), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW: A THIRD WORLD READER 
(1989). Admittedly, this 
book has profound influence on the shaping of my thinking. 
23 
See for instance, Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick (ed. ), AGGRESSIVE 
UNILATERALISM: 
AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 
(U. S.: Michigan Uni. ) (1990) ; Judith H. 
Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Unilateral Action to Open Foreign Markets: 
The Mechanics of Retaliation 
Exercises, " 22 Int'1 Lawyer, pp. 1197-1207 (1988); M. P. Ryan, 
"Strategy and Compliance with Bilateral 
Trade Dispute Settlement Agreement: USTR's Sec. 301 Experience 
in the Pacific Basin, " 12 Mich. J. 
Int'l L., pp. 799-827 (1991). 
24 
Jadgish Bhagwati, "It's the Process, Stupid! " The Economist 
(London), p. 89 (21 March-2 
April, 1993). 
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This thesis dwells on some serious United States-Taiwan trade conflicts 
which took place in the last decade, namely, issues regarding commodity trade, 
trade in services, and intellectual property protection -- all significant issues of 
contemporary world trade. Note that none of them is settled today. By 
analyzing in detail each and every event, we shall see the scope of United States 
pressures on Taiwan's democratisation and law. In addition, this provides a good 
opportunity for understanding the actual trade relations between the two 
countries as well as the legal-political system of Taiwan. 
A broad argument of this thesis is that, under the United States trade 
threats, a domestic political cycle on the part of Taiwan was formed to resolve 
the trade tensions between the two nations. The political cycle functioned to 
open its domestic markets to American firms and to coordinate the various 
branches of the government (legislative, judicial and the enforcement) to achieve 
the objectives as demanded by the United States. This political cycle was built 
on the authoritarian corporatist framework of the KMT government developed 
in 
the martial law era. As the United States pressures proved to be so immense 
and frequent, 
25 it became difficult for the KMT government to review its 
undemocratic nature. Worse, more often than not, it squeezed out many of the 
past democratisation efforts by undermining the proper functioning of the 
legislature and the judiciary, and re-established the omnipotence of the one- 
party state. Intriguingly, the United States implicitly supports the operation of 
25 
According to an official report of the United States citing the comment of 
Taiwan's 
business, Taiwan negotiates with the United States every two to three months 
for different issues. 
United States International Trade Commission (USITC), THE 
PROS AND CONS OF ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS 
ON FREE TRADE AREA AGREEMENTS WITH TAIWAN, THE REPUBLIC 
OF KOREA, AND ASEAN, OR THE PACIFIC RIM 
REGION IN GENERAL: REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE 
ON FINANCE ON INVESTIGATION NO. TA-332-259 UNDER 
SECTION 332 OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930, p. [1-7] 
(March, 1989). 
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such a political cycle. As a consequence, constitutional democracy was impaired 
even before it was fully established. In the widest sense, the research outcome 
also carries some theoretical implication; that is, as long as America's aggressive 
unilateralism remains a trade policy tool of the United States, smaller countries 
can never achieve the goals of economic integration and constitutional democracy. 
C. ACADEMIC WRITINGS ON THE SUBJECT 
While there are no academic writings on this topic, some Western scholars 
and commentators do touch upon aspects of the issue examined in this thesis. 
Drawing on different theories, Western political scientists have already noticed 
the link between foreign economic coercion and domestic political process. Georg 
Sorensen, for instance, claims that external factors which include economic, 
political, ideological and other elements that constitute the international context 
often have profound influence on the democratic process. 
26 The conclusion he 
has drawn is, however, quite vague, 
"(t)he dynamics of dependence and interdependence in 
the international system directly affect the scope of 
democratic decision-making at the- national level. In 
general, one must expect large and socioeconomically 
strong countries to be much less susceptible to 
international pressures and challenges than is the case 
with smaller, socioeconomically weak countries. " ' 
In comparison with SOrensen's view, Robert Pinkney's comment 
is more 
conclusive. While recognising "external pressures" as a possible conducive 
26 
Georg Sorensen, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION pp. 21,22,158 (1993). 
27 
Id. , p. 
22. 
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condition for democracy --- a point no author has ever made according to him, 
24 
Pinkney holds the view that they can as well "quite easily topple a democracy, 
through means such as economic sanctions". 
29 Yet, no detailed discussion as to 
what kind of economic sanctions or how democracy is "toppled" is offered. 
Another observer Peter Ferdinand, after several case studies on different 
countries, concludes that, 
"(i)t is an irony that as the goals of spreading 
democracy become a more prominent element in the 
foreign policies of the United States and a number of 
other Western States, and as multi-party systems are 
seen as evidence of greater democracy, domestic and 
international economic forces make ihmore difficult for 
stable parties to form and operate. " 
Instead of discussing the general effects on the democratisation process, 
Ferdinand places more emphasis on the formation and operation of new political 
parties. True, in a democracy, new political parties play an important role. But 
still the attitude and power of the old ruling party remain the core issue. A 
more analytical, but rather radical viewpoint is provided by dependency 
theorists. Peter Evans, for instance, argues that, due to the "triple alliance" of 
state, local, and foreign capital which constitute the so-called "dependent 
development", "the need for repression is great while the need for democracy is 
28 
Here Pinkney gives several examples of the "external influences": President 
Carter had 
more scruples in his dealings with authoritarian rulers; American 
Presidents have had to face a more 
critical lobby opposed to "aiding the dictators"; and even the ending of 
the Cold war has raised 
questions as to whether there are any practical reasons 
for supporting Third World despots. See, 
Robert Pinkney, DEMOCRACY IN THE THIRD WORLD pp. 32-33 (1993). 
29 
Id. ,p. 33. 
30 
Peter Ferdinand, "The Party's Over -- Market liberalisation and the Challenges 
for One- 
Party and One-Party Dominant Regimes: 
The Cases of Taiwan and Mexico, Italy and Japan, " 1 
Democratisation, No. 1, p. 149 (1994). 
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small". 
31 Evans' argument is, in fact, a subtle elucidation and modification of 
Fernando H. Cardoso's point made in the 1970s. Cardoso's argument is that due 
to the inequalities and distortions of the economies and societies of the Third 
World brought about by their dependent positions in the world economic system, 
democracy is difficult to grow. 
32 
Despite their theoretical and ideological discrepancies, it is obvious that all 
the above-mentioned scholars assume the significance of external forces, both 
economic and political, on the internal democratic development in Third World 
states. But to what extent is their conclusion relevant to Taiwan is not known. 
This is perhaps due to the fact that this topic is too new for Taiwanese scholars 
and studies. The reasons are not difficult to comprehend. First, as a civil law 
nation, academic works are devoted much to the elucidation of foreign code laws 
(notably, German and Japanese laws). On the other hand, while there are a 
handful of constitutional and administrative law writings in Taiwan and in the 
United States, most of them are descriptive. This does not mean that they are 
not useful, only that critical analyses are rare. 
There are, however, three academic works which are relevant to the main 
theme of this thesis. The first was written by Liu, Lawrence in 1990.33 By 
31 
Peter Evans, DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT: THE ALLIANCE OF MULTINATIONAL, STATE, AND 
LOCAL 
CAPITAL IN BRAZIL p. 35 (1979). 
32 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Dependent Capitalist Development in Latin America, 
" 80 New 
Left Rev., pp. 83-95 (1973). 
33 
Liu, Lawrence S., "Legal and Policy Perspectives on United States 
Trade Initiatives and 
Economic Liberalisation in the Republic of China, " 11 Mich. J. 
Intni L., pp. 326-367 (1990). 
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describing some of the legal issues between Taiwan and the United States, he 
discreetly and briefly implies that the legislative and judicial functions of Taiwan 
were influenced. 
34 Mr. Liu's reserved position is understandable. As a 
successful attorney with many American clients, including the United States 
government, he should not appear to be too critical. Apart from this point, his 
arguments resonate with those "GATT believers", notably Jadgish Bhagwati. No 
reference to Taiwan's democratisation is made. The second is contributed by Dr. 
Lou, C. F., presently on the teaching staff of a Taiwan university. His short 
article was written in Chinese and published in a domestic intellectual property 
journal in 1991.35 Dr. Lou concludes that legislative and judicial sovereignty of 
Taiwan was violated when Taiwan was forced to amend its Copyright Law and told 
to impose severe penalties on intellectual property violators. 
36 Unfortunately, 
he fails to make an in-depth study by drawing on the issue of constitutional 
democracy. Note that as his focus is placed on intellectual property protection, 
the issue of constitutional or legal integrity is not meant to be the centre of his 
writing. 
Most recently, two American-based Taiwanese intellectuals published an 
article entitled "United States Industries and Government Interaction on Trade 
34 
Id. pp. 366-367. 
35 
Lou, C. F., "An Analysis of Sino-American Negotiations on Intellectual Property and 
Related 
Legal Issues, " 6 Wan Ban Intellectual Property Rev., pp. 1-20 
(1991). 
36 Id. pp. 14-15. 
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and Intellectual Property Legislation. "37 Originally, this contribution was written 
in Chinese and financed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the ROC on 
Taiwan. As such, it can be treated as a quasi-official report. 
' When 
commenting on the effects of section 301 on Taiwan, Sun and Liu only have this 
to say, "(t)he USTR apparently took a two-step legalistic strategy in levelling the 
playing fields with the ROC. First, it pushes the ROC to commit a series of 
legislative reforms... Second... it turns to the enforcement of these laws and put 
the ROC constantly in check. This is generally done without the concerns over 
the political reality and social economic impact to the local society. "39(Emphasis 
added) Nothing is related to Taiwan's "quiet revolution" which has been so hot 
a topic in recent years. In sum, no systematic and comprehensive studies 
regarding the conflicts between resolving American pressures and Taiwan's effort 
of building a constitutional democracy can be found. 
D. METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS 
1. Research Materials 
The main sources that I have used in this thesis include: (1) government 
publications from both the United States and Taiwan; (2) secondary sources such 
37 
Sun, Andy Y. & Liu, Paul C. B., "United States Industries and Government 
Interaction on 
Trade and Intellectual Property Legislation, " 12 Chinese 
Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., pp. 87-125 (1992-94). 
38 
In Taiwan, all those government financed research projects must 
be examined by an ad hoc 
committee consisting of the officials of the "competent authorities". 
Should they find the result 
of the research incompatible with the government standing, 
they would require certain modification 
before publication. I have two experience 
handling government projects. It was simply impossible to 
insist on a certain opinion which the officials 
found inappropriate. 
39 
Sun & Liu, supra note 37, p. 117. 
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as books, journals and periodicals; (3) newspapers; (4) three informal interviews 
with some officials and ex-officials who had participated in United States-Taiwan 
bilateral negotiations; and (5) public hearings held by the Legislative Yuan 
(parliament) of Taiwan. 
Several remarks can be made in the course of collecting these materials. 
First, with regard to government publications, several difficulties and limitations 
in obtaining Taiwan's official documentations were encountered. As a nation 
which is still haunted by the remains of martial law, one finds the existence of 
a repressive internal security apparatus. As such, freedom of information is a 
concept yet to be developed. Particularly in the area of United States-Taiwan 
trade relations which involve so many sensitive issues, many important materials 
are - circulated among certain 
"competent authorities" only. Formal 
enquiries about or applications for some documents normally ended up fruitless. 
Under the circumstances, one has to rely on some special relations to retrieve 
them. The 1989 Trade Consultation Report is such a document. 
4 
tr '''= remely 
valuable material tells an almost entirely different story about United 
States- 
Taiwan relations. ýý ".,. 
40 
The full title of the document is BOFT, Wuo-Kuo 78 Nien Tuei-Wai 
Mao-Yi Tsu-Shang Tan-Pan 
Chi-Yiao (A SUMMARY OF ROC'S EXTERNAL TRADE CONSULTATION 
IN 1989) (June, 1990). 
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Yet, it would be wrong to think that there are other similar reports. I had 
tried to ask my other friends whether there were other trade consultation 
reports of different years, and the answer was no. There could only be two 
possibilities. First, there really were none because the 1989 report contained an 
overall review of United States-Taiwan trade relations until 1989 -- the year 
Taiwan had most troubles with the United States. Second, they lied to me 
(probably because our relations were not strong enough), fearing that I might 
expose the materials in a way they did not appreciate. 
Many publications by the Board of Foreign Trade (BOFT) of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs are also used for two reasons: (1) they reveal the standpoint 
of the government; and (2) they also contain some useful information (particularly 
statistics). Interestingly enough, when viewed from a different perspective, as 
this thesis does, this information provides a good factual basis to debunk the 
government's policies. 
As Taiwan is so economically successful in the eyes of Western nations, 
English contributions concerning Taiwan are not lacking. In fact, some of them 
are written by "world-class" scholars such as Samuel Huntington. In addition, 
many articles were written in English by Taiwanese legal scholars who received 
education in the United States. In an outward-looking society like Taiwan, the 
phenomenon is that those who can publish their works in English are regarded 
as "real" or "heavyweight" scholars. Indeed, the trend is so evident that even 
those who hold Ph. D. s from German or Japanese universities have tried to write 
their papers in English. One way of doing this is to translate their 
Chinese 
16 
works into English or vice versa. This saved me a lot of work and time because 
I did not need to spend too much efforts pinpointing and analysing Chinese 
works. Nevertheless, I still included some important books and articles which I 
thought should not be neglected. 
As this thesis involved United States-Taiwan trade negotiations, I thought 
it might be helpful to talk to some officials and ex-officials of Taiwan who had 
the experience of participating in the trade negotiations. Three persons were 
interviewed and they have also provided me with valuable information. The first 
one is Mr. Lu, Y. L. who used to be an official of the Ministry of Interior in 
charge of copyright affairs. He has been one of the major negotiators of Taiwan. 
The second one is Mr. Kao, Y. C., a senior official of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. Both Mr. Lu and Mr. Kao resigned several years ago, and are now in 
private practice. Their choice of career more or less reflects their frustration 
over the trade talks. The last one is Ms. Wu, Julian, senior project manager of 
the Institute for Information Industry (III). Recently, III was assigned the work 
of promoting the policy of the government with regard to intellectual property 
protection. She was in charge of planning and coordinating this. It was also 
Julian who revealed that the head of Taiwan's negotiating team fell asleep 
during 
one of the negotiations, and woke up looking for documents to sign. 
Of course, 
apart from this story, she, Mr. Lu, and Mr, Kao also provided much useful 
material. 
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2. The Text of ROC Laws 
This thesis includes the analysis of more than forty ROC laws, regulations, 
and administrative orders. Most of them are collected in the Hsin-pien liu-fa 
chuan-shu (Complete Book of Six Laws), published in Chinese by San Ming 
Publishing Company, Taipei. The Complete Book of Six Laws also contains, in 
abstract form, relevant court precedents and judicial interpretations. As such, 
it is the most widely used law book in Taiwan. However, some of the 
administrative orders can only be found in the Ching-hua-min-kuo hslen-hsing 
fa-kuai hui-pien (A Collection of Current Laws and Regulations of the ROC; 
CCLRRC), published by the Taiwan government. The CCLRRC is a loose-leaf set 
with a total of thirty seven volumes, updated quarterly. Unlike the Complete 
Book of Six Laws, it contains no court precedents or judicial interpretations. 
Instead, it provides thousands of administrative orders issued by the "competent 
authorities". 
For the sake of clarity, unless otherwise stated, all laws, regulations, 
administrative orders, court cases, and judicial interpretations as used in this 
thesis are cited from the Complete Book of Six Laws. 
3. Chinese Ideographs 
As there are at least four romanization systems (Wade-Giles, Yale, Kuo-yu- 
chu-in-fuhao, and Pinyin) actually in use, rendering Chinese 
ideographs into a 
18 
romanized form has been problematical. In this thesis, the Wade-Giles 
romanization system is used unless a Chinese word has been conventionally 
rendered in another system or it is the name of a person who has adopted a 
particular romanization for his or her name. The choice of the Wade-Giles system 
is twofold. First, it is the system generally employed in Taiwan. 
'' Second, the 
English version of the REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK uses this system. 
Accordingly, it seems sensible to choose the Wade-Giles romanization system as 
this thesis is concerned with the study of Taiwan. 
E. ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 2 clarifies the definition 
of terms and the analytical framework. By agreeing with some prominent scholars 
that Taiwan is characterised as an authoritarian corporatist state in transition 
to the Western-based constitutional democracy, our theoretical setting is thus 
established. This is extremely useful in the understanding of all kinds of policy 
and legal responses on the part of Taiwan to United States pressures. 
Chapter 3 studies Taiwan's policy changes as a means to resolve American 
pressures. Emphasis is placed on the "top-down" formation of policies -- a 
process in which democracy plays no part. Despite 
Taiwan having lifted the 
41 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 1989, p. 1. 
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martial law and thus entered a rapid democratic transformation, the party- 
executive par excellence with regard to trade policy and measures is still 
obvious. Two special traits can also be found in the newly enacted Foreign 
Trade Law, they include the "bilateralisation" of the Law, and the "managed 
trade" conception. As such, the policy of trade liberalisation is still far from 
being substantiated. This chapter concludes that even until the 1990s, the 
authoritarian corporatist policy and practices remained intact. 
Chapter 4 is an analysis of major commodity trade issues which took place 
in the last decade. Issues selected include agricultural trade, wine, beer,. and 
tobacco, government procurement, voluntary restraint arrangements (VRAs) on 
textiles and machine tools, and the tariff system. A common point among all these 
issues is that they appeared as single, individual trade matter from the start, 
but then developed into some kind of political issue and even unrest on the part 
of Taiwan. Here, one sees the direct thrust of American pressures on Taiwan. 
The KMT government was, on many occasions, forced to violate, manipulate or 
bend its own laws, and improvise in the name of administrative discretion 
in 
order to accommodate United States demands. In the end, markets were open, 
but at the expense of cost-inefficiency and the legal system. 
Chapter 5 discusses how Taiwan opened its service markets, namely, the 
banking and the insurance sectors, under the pressures of United 
States 
government. Different from commodity trade issues, United 
States pressures were 
not unwelcome by the public in general. 
The reason was partly due to the 
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public's growing discontent toward the KMT government's long and protective 
banking and insurance policies, and partly due to the rapid accumulation of 
capital as a result of continuous trade surplus. But such a liberalisation of 
Taiwan's financial markets by no means credited the KMT government, because 
the process of market opening under American pressures had projected an image 
of the KMT government as not only vulnerable, but also unpopular. In addition, 
one finds the old practices of "black-box" decision making and massive 
manipulation of laws by means of regulatory discretion. All these further expose 
the functioning of the authoritarian regime. 
Chapter 6 deals with Taiwan's intellectual property law and institutional 
"reform" conducted under the Special 301 threats. The reform can be 
comfortably characterised as an imposed one for it is not difficult to perceive the 
reluctance and even resentment of the legislative organ during the whole 
process. On the other hand, the KMT party machine was fully mobilised to the 
extent that even the courts were required to take uniform actions. The 
undemocratic nature of the reform is obvious. The outcome was that IPR laws 
gave up its traditional "low standards" of protection and followed the so-called 
"high standards". Enforcement organs and actions were also impressive in that 
disproportional personnel and resources were involved. These actions saved 
Taiwan from trade retaliation. Yet, a close look at Taiwan's IPR regime will soon 
discover that it has achieved neither "high standard", nor "low standard", but 
"no standard" at all. 
2I 
Chapter 7 studies the impact of American pressures on Taiwan's 
democratisation by drawing on constitutional and administrative law theories. It 
shows that after so many years of facing United States pressures, a political 
cycle built on the remains of the old authoritarian framework is eventually 
formed. The operation of this political cycle undermines the constitutional design 
of separation of powers, encourages unchecked delegated legislations and 
administrative discretion, and disregards the individual's right to judicial 
protection. It also strengthens the role of the KMT in the decision-making 
process. This political cycle is thus hostile to the establishment of constitutional 
democracy -- the most important task of Taiwan's democratisation as committed 
by President Lee, Teng-hui. 
Chapter 8 demonstrates the efforts of Taiwan to resolve (avoid) American 
pressures by appealing to the international level. It also reveals how Taiwan 
seeks to find a place in the new international order. It is the official belief that 
by forming an Free Trade Area (FTA) with the United States, and/or rejoining 
GATT, Taiwan would be free from United States trade threats. The first proposal 
was formally dead as the United States showed little interest. The second one 
received a positive response from the United States government. But as the 
United States is still not ready to give up its hegemonic unilateralism, rejoining 
GATT helps little in avoiding the application of United States trade laws to 
Taiwan. 
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Chapter 9 summarizes all the arguments by presenting them in an orderly 
form. The main argument is that since the 1980s, parallel to the democratisation 
efforts, a strong political cycle aiming at resolving American pressures has 
formed and operated at the expense of democratic participation and the rule of 
law. In the long-run, the continuation of this political cycle would render the 
building of constitutional democracy a contradictory effort. Several implications 
based on this conclusion are also made. 
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CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
As the subject matter of this thesis covers a very wide area of law 
(international economic law and domestic law), and politics (democracy and 
democratisation), it is necessary to define clearly some of the important terms 
and establish an analytical framework. True, in the world of social science, 
defining terms is not an easy task, but is essential to ensure clarity for the 
reader. The construction of an analytical framework is important because it 
necessarily affects the postulation of goals and the performance of intellectual 
tasks. As this thesis involves significantly the democratisation process of 
Taiwan, inevitably, we need to identify two issues. First, what kind of 
government Taiwan was before its democratic transition? Second, what is the 
ultimate goal of Taiwan's democratisation? The last issue is evident, for the 
President of Taiwan Dr. Lee, Teng-hui has already made it clear that he wants 
Taiwan to be a constitutional democracy free from the tangled legal inventions 
which have kept the KMT in power since 1949.1 In other words, Taiwan is to 
transform into the Western-based constitutional democracy, for which the 
Constitution of 1947 was originally designed. 
The first issue is more problematic, and thus requires us to borrow the 
works of political scientists. Indeed, the KMT government's authoritarian rule 
has its unique features, and therefore requires a framework to explain 
it. The 
I 
"Rough Ride to Reform, " Far Eastern Economic Rev., No. 151, pp. 
22-24 (11 April, 1991). 
Recently, President Lee, during his "private" visit to the 
United States, re-asserted his 
determination. He said, " ... what people concern most 
is democracy and development. Democracy must 
include respect for individuals' freedom and social 
justice, and the feeling of direct participation 
in national affairs.... " (translated 
by this writer) Central Daily News (Chung-yang jih pao), p. 1 
(11 June, 1995). 
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theory chosen as the analytical framework of this thesis is "authoritarian 
corporatism". It is chosen not only because it is widely recognised as an 
appropriate "model" for Taiwan by many Western and Taiwanese scholars, but also 
because it reflects quite satisfactorily the functions of law and the legal system 
under such a political system. The last idea is based on my knowledge as a legal 
academic in Taiwan. In brief, Taiwan is transforming itself from an authoritarian 
corporatist state to the Western-based constitutional democracy. Based on this 
framework, we shall see the extent to which American pressures has borne 
impacts on the whole democratisation process. 
A. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
1. Democracy and Democratisation 
Democracy, an immensely popular political theory, can have a very complex 
and different meanings. To one, "democracy" means a Christian society; to 
another, a society with liberty and justice for all; still to others, an economic 
system of private enterprise or of socialism; or even a "way of life". 
2 Precisely 
because of its inflationary use, its common meaning "government or rule by the 
people" is often neglected. I do not wish to argue further about the "real" 
definition of the term "democracy" here. Instead, for the purpose of our 
analyses, it will suffice to confine the term as referring to a form of government 
2 
H. B. Mayo, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY p. 23 (1960). 
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in which the people rule. 
3 In addition, as noted by Samuel Huntington, implicit 
in the concept of democracy are limitations on power. 
4 In democracies, elected 
decision makers do not exercise total power, they share power with other groups 
in society. It is this belief of limitations on powers that gave rise to modern 
constitutionalism -- a system designed to control the exercise of governmental 
power. 
5 In other words, democracy has its institutional concerns, it must be 
accompanied by a constitution committed to the separation of powers and, of 
course, the rule of law. Thus, when discussing Third World countries' democratic 
development, democracy is often identified positively by the existence of 
developed representative institutions and by the establishment of "constitutional 
government" .6 
The term "democratisation" stands for a rather dynamic notion. It means 
the process of change toward more democratic forms of rule which guarantee the 
above functions and rights. It thus involves the breakdown of non-democratic 
rules set up by previous authoritarian regimes and the establishment of a 
democratic order .7 It should 
be noted here, that the process of democratisation 
must involve the end objective of establishing Constitutionalism or the rule of 
law. In other words, democratisation is viewed as complete only when democratic 
3 
Georg Sorensen, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATISATION p. 3 (1993); B. K. Nehru, "Western 
Democracy 
and the Third World, " 1 Third World Quarterly, No. 2, p. 53 
(1979). 
4 
Samuel Huntington, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATISATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY p. 10 
(1993). 
E. C. S. Wade & A. W. Bradley, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW p. 
8 (1993). 
6 
David L. Sills (ed. ), INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES p. 
113 (1968). 
1 
Sorensen, supra note 3, p. 158. 
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procedures, rights, and rules of the game of the democratic process have been 
clearly delineated and widely accepted-8 As mentioned above, this is exactly the 
blueprint of Taiwan's democratisation according to President Lee, Teng-hui. In 
other words, his notion of democratisation can be completely interpreted in terms 
of this Western definition. 
2. Authoritarian Era and Democratisation Era 
The term "authoritarian era" and "democratisation era" are used many times 
in this thesis for the purpose of identifying the background of our study. Here, 
authoritarian era refers to the period before the lifting of martial law in July 
1987. Although one may have witnessed a certain political liberalisation before 
1987, legally speaking, the nation was still in the state of emergency, and was 
ruled by a one-party state (the KMT). It was not until July 1987 when the KMT 
government had planned and started to substantiate its democratisation 
commitments that we may say Taiwan had entered a new era. Note the term 
"authoritarian era" is used interchangeably with "martial rule era" in this thesis. 
Democratisation era refers to the period from July 1987 till today. It is 
still an unfinished task. In this period, a series of political and legal reform 
were conducted. They include, inter al a, comprehensive re-election of 
parliamentarians, ending of the "Period of Suppression of Rebellion" (thus 
8 
Adam Przeworski, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN 
EASTERN EUROPE 
AND LATIN AMERICA p. 26 (1991). 
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repealing many special laws), and constitutional amendments restructuring 
governmental institutions. 9 
3. American Trade and Economic Pressures 
Generally speaking, American trade and economic pressures denote the kind 
of force imposed on Taiwan according to its various Trade Acts by the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR). The most notable one being the so-called 
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 which gives the President greater authority 
to retaliate against foreign "unfair trade practices". 
10 Subsequent amendments 
to the law further provided a mandate to the President to conduct bilateral 
negotiations, and granted the power to retaliate. The most recent amendment to 
section 301 was the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. The Act 
contains more than a thousand pages of legislation, but the centrepiece is to give 
"teeth" to section 301. It expanded the definition of unfair trade and created 
the so-called Super 301 and Special 301 to strengthen the implementation of 
United States laws against unfair trade and violations of intellectual property 
rights (IPR). The Act requires the USTR to conduct investigations, establish a 
"priority list" of countries and detail their unreasonable practices or absence of 
adequate and effective protection of IPR, then set deadlines for their compliance 
by the foreign countries. Should they fail to comply, mandatory retaliation would 
9 
See Appendix I. 
10 
The Trade Act of 1974 19 U. S. C. 2101 (central to international trade policy). 
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be imposed-" As the Act makes the United States play the role of both the 
judge and jury, it is termed "aggressive unilateralism", 
12 
which places greater 
emphasis on trade retaliation than reciprocity. 
In addition, although there are certain laws which do not authorise the 
President to retaliate, they still constitute immense pressures on Taiwan due to 
Taiwan's special relations with the United States. For instance, the International 
Banking Act of 1978,13 which requires foreign countries to grant American banks 
"equality of competitive opportunity" in similar circumstances, does not have the 
coercive powers of the Trade Acts. Nonetheless, it is as effective as the Trade 
Acts when applied to Taiwan. 
An issue that needs to be clarified concerns the relationship between the 
United States and Taiwan. Despite the fact that no formal diplomatic relations 
have existed between the United States and Taiwan since 1979, there is no 
difficulty with regard to the application of United States trade laws to Taiwan. 
The Taiwan Relations Act14 -- a municipal law of the United States made to 
maintain "unofficial" relations with Taiwan, expressly states that for the purpose 
of United States laws, Taiwan is treated as a sovereign nation[Section 4]. 
11 
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,19 U. S. C. A. 2242. 
12 
The term was invented by Professor Jadgish Bhagwati. He opined that section 
301 trade 
policy was basically GATT-illegal and had no place 
in a world trading regime reflecting the rule of 
law and a necessary symmetry of rights and obligations. He strongly opposed 
the United States playing 
the role of a self-appointed "trade cop" and "trade czar". 
Jadgish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick (ed. ), 
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND TEH WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM p. 37 (1990); 
Jagdish Bhagwati, "Multilateralism at Risk: The GATT is Dead. Long Live the 
GATT, " 13 World Economy, 
p. 158 (1990); see also Pierre Martin, "The Politics of 
International Structural Change: Aggressive 
Unilateralism in American Trade Policy, " in Richard Stubbs & Geoffrey R. D. 
Underhill(ed. ), POLITICAL 
ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER pp. 439-452 (1994). 
13 
12 U. S. C. ý3lO1 (1978). 
14 
See Chapter 1, n. 12 and accompanying text. 
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B. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK -- FROM AUTHORITARIAN CORPORATISM TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
Western and Taiwanese political scientists generally agree that the KMT 
government was an authoritarian regime on Taiwan before it committed itself to 
democracy. They do, however, have different views as to the kind of 
authoritarianism it was-15 Recently, however, more are convinced that the state 
of Taiwan can be explained in terms of the notion of authoritarian corporatism. 
Before discerning their insights, perhaps it is appropriate to know more about 
the concept of corporatism. According to Philippe Schmitter, 
"Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest 
representation in which the constituent units are 
organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
uncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally 
differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not 
created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective 
category in exchange for observing certain controls on 
their selection of leaders and articulation of demands 
and supports. The organised interests of civil society 
are ligJed with the "decisional structures" of the 
State. " 
Robert Wade, after making a resourceful study of Taiwan's economic policy-making 
and development, suggests that Taiwan fits quite well into the corporatist 
framework. 
"Taiwan's economic bureaucracy fits into a wider set of 
political arrangement of an "authoritarian corporatist" 
kind. The rules for selecting the rulers give little 
scope for the expression of popular preferences, and 
15 
Edwin Winckler prefers to use the term "soft authoritarianism" to 
describe KMT; while some 
suggest that it was a military regime, emergency regime, 
Leninist regime or corporatist regime. See 
for instance, Edwin A. Winckler, "Institutionalisation and participation on Taiwan: From Hard to 
Soft 
Authoritarianism, 11 The China Q., No. 99, pp. 482-499 (Sept., 1984); and Chou, Yangsan 
& Andrew Nathan, 
"Democratising Transition in Taiwan, " 27 Asian Survey, No. 3, pp. 277-299 
(March, 1987); Edwin A. 
Winckler & Susan Greenhalgh (ed. ), CONTENDING APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF TAIWAN (1988). 
16 
Cited by Andrew Cox & Noel O'Sullivan, THE CORPORATE STATE: CORPORATISM AND 
THE STATE 
TRADITION IN WESTERN EUROPE p. 49 (1988). 
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specifically, do not allow competition between political 
parties (prior to 1987). Interests groups are not 
voluntary associations, but are chartered or even 
created by the government. They function more as 
dependent auxiliaries of government than as autonomous 
aggregators of member's interests. This type of political 
system enables the political leaders to articulate a 
public philosophy and broker political demands within 
the framework of that philosophy. In particular, it 
enables them to exercise mucg7 influence over public 
investment and policy choices. " 
Cheng, Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard also employ the concept of 
corporatism to characterise the KMT regime. They even provide an explanation 
for the emergence of corporatism in Taiwan. It was the defeat of the KMT regime 
on the mainland which motivated a thorough political reform in 1950-1951, through 
which the party increased its organisational capacity and developed a semi- 
corporatist structure. 
is Professor Tien, Hung-Mao also agrees with this view by 
adding "(t)he structural configuration and functional relationship of the KMT, the 
state, and organized groups in the Republic of China's political system are 
essentially corporatist. "19 All these suggest not only the interlocked ties 
between the party and the state, but also that the party-state creature serves 
as the main actor that directs the organisation and activities of various civic 
groups. As such, the model of authoritarian corporatism comfortably explains the 
11 
Robert Wade, GOVERNING THE MARKET: THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
IN EAST ASIAN 
INDUSTRIALISATION p. 228 (1990). 
18 
Cheng, Tun-jen & Stephan Haggard, "Regime Transformation in Taiwan: 
Theoretical and 
Comparative Perspectives, " in Tun-j en Cheng & Stephan Haggard (ed. ) POLITICAL 
CHANGE IN TAIWAN p. 4 
(1992). 
19 
Tien, Hung-Mao, "Taiwan's Evolution Toward Democracy: A Historical Perspective, 
" in Dennis 
Fred Simon & Michael Kau, Y. M. (ed. ), TAIWAN: BEYOND THE ECONOMIC 
MIRACLE P. 6 (1992). 
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"developmentalist" or "state-led" character of Taiwan in its economic 
development. 2U 
What is lacking in their study is the impact of this state structure on law 
and the legal system of Taiwan. To be more precise, how did law and the legal 
system function under authoritarian corporatism? What are their special 
characteristics? Unfortunately, legal academics on Taiwan are not able to answer 
these questions with their traditional comparative law approach as suggested by 
Roscoe Pound. 21 Nor is the explanation that the ROC on Taiwan was originally 
a constitutional state, but troubled by internal commotion, a comforting one. 
22 
To put it simply, their problem is the lack of a political theory to explain the 
relationship between political structure and law. More to the point, legal studies 
regarding Taiwan fail to realise that the very difference in the political power 
structure means that law must function differently. 
20 
Gordon White, for instance, argues that Taiwan is a capitalist economy with a Leninist 
state which has acted as a key agent in the process of capitalism accumulation. 
Gordon White, "The 
Developmental State, " in Yash Ghai, Robin Luckham & Francis Snyder (ed. ), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
LAW: A THIRD WORLD READER p. 436 (1989). 
21 
During his stay in China between 1945 and 1946, Roscoe Pound was convinced that the new 
legal system of China was in line with Western ideas of law, and that if a 
favourable environment 
was given, China would eventually see the operation of a Western 
legal system in the country. He 
therefore expressed his strong confidence in the future progress of new 
Chinese legal system. 
Undoubtedly, Pound's influence on Taiwan's legal academics is profound. Yet, the comparative approach 
has become very rigid in the authoritarian era. Roscoe Pound, "Progress of the 
Law in China, " 23 
Washington L. Rev., p. 345 (1948); 'Comparative Law and History as Bases 
for Chinese Law, " 61 
Harv. L. R., pp. 749-762 (1948). 
22 
For instance, a European scholar suggests that Taiwan was a constitutional state, 
but in 
an emergency situation. He claims that, due to the 
internal commotion of the nation, the Constitution 
was prevented from being entirely put into effect, and 
"(t)he prevalence of Executive power in 
political life has turned out to be a constitutional reality 
in Taiwan". Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, 
SUN, YET-SEN: FOUNDER AND SYMBOL OF CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY NATION-BUILDING pp. 
143-172 (1982). 
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The adoption of the theory of authoritarian corporatism thus suggests a 
new approach to understanding Taiwan's law and the legal system. It does not 
emphasise the significance of comparative law, although Taiwan does emulate laws 
from other countries. Rather, it assumes the existence of a strong link between 
the authoritarian corporatist structure and law. By the same token, 
democratisation on Taiwan certainly bears significant meaning to law and the legal 
system as a whole. Accordingly, we are able to comprehend whether the law 
changes as democratic transformation takes place. 
This approach of the study of law and the legal system provides us with 
interesting insights on the law of Taiwan. This can be viewed from three 
aspects. 
First, authoritarian corporatism assumes the prevalence of state over 
individuals. Accordingly, the state runs as a planned, organised and corporatist 
system, justified by its ability to achieve collective ends. In the circumstances, 
the legal system must, by necessity, be operated to serve the national goals. 
The biggest impact of this belief is on the institutional design of the 
Constitution. Thus, the party-state of Taiwan was provided with special powers 
either through the making of many "special laws" (which normally bore the title 
of "XYZ Law for the Duration of Suppression of Rebellion"), or through deliberate 
suppression of the legislative and judicial branches. The latter was done by 
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making the legislative organs a rubberstamp of the party-executive; 
23 
and 
subjecting the courts under the Executive branch. 
24 Important policies are 
decided by the so-called "Tang-cheng-kao-tseng" ("High Level Party- 
government"; ;, \j ) which is composed of senior KMT members, big 
businessmen, and technocrats. In fact, it is this composition of top policy makers 
that prompt Wade to regard Taiwan as an extreme example of economic 
corporatism. 
25 As such, the meaning of the separation of powers, a deliberate 
adoption of Western Constitution, has totally changed. 
Second, authoritarian corporatism favours the expansion of party-state 
power. In Taiwan, one way of achieving this was to allow the government to 
exercise power through delegated legislations and, if not, regulatory discretion. 
In fact, the government was often free to create administrative orders without 
proper statutory basis. As noted by a commentator, this has become one of the 
23 
This was, in turn, accomplished in two stages. First, by directing the National Assembly 
to make a special law called "Temporary Provisions for the Duration to Suppress the 
Rebellion", most 
of the members of the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control 
Yuan elected in 1947-48 
on the mainland were able to retain their offices permanently. Second, to 
have the Grand Justice 
Council confirmed such a law. On 29 January, 1954, Council Interps No. 
31 was delivered (Ssu-Fa Yuan 
Ta-Fa-Kuan Hui-Yi Chieh-Shih Di 31). The main reason provided by the Grand Justice Council was that 
it was factually impossible to hold re-election of members of the National 
Assembly, the Legislative 
Yuan and the Control Yuan due to the illegal occupation of mainland 
China by the communists. Yet 
in order to maintain the constitutional system of the nation, presently members of 
these three 
parliaments must be allowed to hold their offices until the mainland was recovered. 
Lin, Chi-tung, 
Ta-fa-kuan hui-yi hsien-fa chieh-shih shi-luan (AN ANALYSIS OF GRAND JUSTICES 
COUNCIL'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS) pp. 44-55 (1983). 
24 
This was achieved through several ways: (1) the post of Grand 
Justice has been used as a 
reward to those loyal but old KMT members; (2) 
district court decisions were subject to the review 
and correction of the Chief Judge of that court 
before announcement; (3) decisions made by the courts 
were not open to the public. This avoided the possibility of public and academic 
criticisms; (4) the 
Judicial Yuan and the Ministry of Justice were keen to give "letters" recommending 
trial judges and 
prosecutors in handling certain kind of cases; 
(5) bar associations are controlled by those lawyers 
who have served as military judges or prosecutors 
in the martial court. 
25 
Wade, supra note 17, pp. 294-295. 
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biggest problems in the democratic transition. 26 A consequence of this almost 
unlimited power of the party-state is that the distinction between public law and 
private law became vague. In addition, since the legislature had already become 
a rubberstamping body, legislative control of delegated legislations virtually did 
not exist. 
27 
Third, authoritarian corporatism prefers order, harmony, and seeks to avoid 
open conflict. Accordingly, laws were largely punishment-centered to suppress 
non-conformist human behaviour. Police pcwer was significantly expanded. 
28 
More dramatically, this notion of severe punishment was applied to economic and 
financial activities. The most notable example being that the drawer of a 
"bounced" cheque could be sentenced up to three years imprisonment according 
to Article 141 of the old Law of the Negotiable Instruments. 
29 Control was 
indeed pervasive. 
26 
Edwin A. Winckler, "Taiwan Transition, " in Cheng & Haggard, supra note 28, p. 234. 
27 
Legislative control of delegated legislations in Taiwan will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 7B. 
28 
For instance, according to the old Police Offence Law, a person maybe placed under 
detention or fined if, inter alia, he "engages in commercial activities in violation of 
laws", "sells 
goods at a price higher than the one fixed by the government", "sells restricted publications", 
"forces people to buy or sell goods", "(as a landlord or manager of a 
house) fails to report to the 
police about the moving in or out of the residents", fails to pay respect to the national 
flag, the 
picture of the Founding Father (i. e. Dr. Sun, Yet-sen) or the Head of 
State, "dresses indecently", 
"loiters about in the streets, has "no proper job", "singing or performing 
in an obscene or inhuman 
manner", and "speaking obscene language or act to provoke opposite sex". 
(Art. 54-78) The Police 
Offence Law was promulgated on 3 Sept. , 1943, amended on 
19 June, 1946,16 July, 1947,18 Jan. , 1949, 
and 23 Oct., 1954. The Law was abolished in 1991, 
but a similar law named Social Security 
Maintenance Law was promulgated on 29 June, 1991. For a discussion of Taiwan's enormous police power, 
see Tao, Lung-sheng, "Reform of the Criminal Process 
in Nationalist China, " 19 Am. J. Comp. L., 
pp. 747-765 (1971); and Heinrich Scholler & Barbara Wagner, 
"Police Power in the Republic of China, " 
Third World Leg. Stud., pp. 153-165 (1990). 
29 
This article was abolished in 1986. 
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For the sake of understanding, these attributes of Taiwan's law reflect 
Fuller description of law as "a one way projection of authority". In fact, more 
often than not, it is more like managerial direction. 
30 In the circumstances, one 
is bound to conclude that Taiwan's law existed in a very rudimentary form under 
the camouflage of an adopted code law system, and this is due to the existence 
of an authoritarian corporatist regime. 
Note the difference between the functions and purposes of law under 
authoritarian corporatism and constitutional democracy. The former places more 
emphasis on the consolidation of state power, social order, and national goals; 
while the latter lays more stress on separated powers, judicial protection of 
individuals' rights, and the rule of law. As such, democratic transformation or 
democratisation not only involves political reforms, but also a comprehensive 
review of the role of law. 
In sum, the so-called democratisation process of Taiwan means the 
transformation from an authoritarian corporatist state to a Western-based 
constitutional democracy. As a matter of law, it means the dismantling of the 
party-state regime, and the realisation of the separated powers system and the 
rule of law as originally designed by the Constitution of 1947. Based on this 
analytical framework, we shall see what the impact of American economic 
pressures has been on such a transitional process. 
30 
Lon L. Fuller, THE MORALITY OF LAW p. 207 (1969). 
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PART II. POLICY AND LEGAL CHANGES UNDER UNITED STATES PRESSURES 
CHAPTER 3. TAIWAN'S TRADE POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO UNITED STATES 
PRESSURES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One of the main outcomes of the expanding United States-Taiwan trade 
since the 1980s has been Taiwan's large trade surplus. In an era which scholars 
and commentators have branded as "neo-protectionist", 1 this bilateral trade 
imbalance is intolerable, and the economic logic is that the bigger the trade 
surplus, the bigger the degree of intolerance. Indeed, a glance at the United 
States - Taiwan trade figures is sufficient to understand why the United States 
government has been so obsessed with using bilateral negotiations as a means of 
trimming its trade deficits. 
Trade surplus with the 
United States (US$ 100 
million) 
Foreign reserves of Taiwan 
(US$ 100 million) 
1981 34 72.4 
1982 42 85.3 
1983 66.9 118.6 
1984 98.3 156.6 
1985 100.3 225.6 
1986 135.8 463.1 
1987 160.4 767.5 
1988 104.6 739 
I 
The so-called neo-protectionism is characterised by rising trade restrictions, subsidies, 
explicit or tacit exemptions from competition or antitrust 
laws for the purpose of protecting 
domestic industries. I draw this concept mainly from Jan Tumlir. For a discussion of Tumlir's neo- 
protectionism, see Jan Tumlir, PROTECTIONISM: 
TRADE POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES pp. 38-55 (1985). 
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1989 120.3 732.2 
1990 91.3 724.4 
1991 82.1 824.1 
1992 78 823.1 
1993 67.6 835.7 
iao-Le L. uniiea ocaces - Taiwan iraae statistics 19 i-1993. 
Source: CEPD, INDUSTRY OF FREE CHINA, Vo1. LXXXII, No. 1, p. 10 (1994). 
From the above table, it is easy to conclude that Taiwan is getting rich 
and benefiting more than the United States in terms of its accumulation of 
foreign reserves, and the main reason is United States - Taiwan bilateral trade. 
This is not totally true. American scholars have repeatedly argued that trade 
imbalance reflects only a small part of a much more complex set of links between 
the two countries, and that therefore it tells nothing of a nation's economic well- 
9 
being and the character of its international economic interactions. ` Yet, American 
politicians have made the issue of trimming trade deficits its main objective .3 
To ensure the achievement of this objective, the American Congress granted the 
Executive a broad negotiating mandate, and gave teeth (such as section 301) to 
its Trade Act to ensure the reaching of agreement. They believed that bilateral 
agreement was the best way to achieve this objective because the GATT 
mechanism had failed, bilateral negotiation facilitated the reaching of an 
T. J. Pempel, "The Trade Imbalance Isn't the Problem, " 22 Cornell Int'l L. J., pp. 439,444 
(1989); See also, John Greenwald, "Protectionism and U. S. Economic Policy, " 23 Stan. J. Int'l L., 
pp. 232-261 (1987). 
3 
For instance, in 1987, the United States House Ways and Means Committee decided that if 
any of America's trading partners had a trade surplus with the United States of 
75%, and that there 
existed a pattern of unfair trade practices, the United States must 
initiate negotiations. If those 
negotiations failed, or if an agreement was reached but did not bring any result, the 
President must 
take action to reduce the surplus, in essence, by the value of other nations' unfair trade practices. 
Representative Richard Gephart even proposed an amendment which required a reduction in the surplus 
of 10% a year as long as the pattern of unfair trade practices continued. 
Gephart's view was also 
made clear during the 1988 Democratic primary election. See Sander 
M. Levin, "The Need and the 
Prospects for a Trade Bill in 1987, " in Claude E. Barfield & John H. Makin, TRADE POLICY AND 
U. S. 
COMPETITIVENESS p. 59 (1987). 
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agreement in a shorter time, bilateral agreements provided a flexible forum for 
addressing economic problems, and so bilateral agreements guaranteed success. 4 
Taiwan has, on several occasions, expressed its reservation about America's 
Trade Act, 5 but also expressed its willingness to cooperate. There are reasons 
to explain this ambivalence. First, let us consider the official standpoint. 
Vincent Siew, Vice Chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and 
Development of Taiwan, whilst attending an official luncheon meeting in the 
United States once said, 
"(w)e in Taiwan, I can assure you, are acutely aware of 
just how critical an issue the trade deficit is to the 
United States and how anxious your country is to 
resolve it. I can also assure you that we are just as 
determined as you are to find a solution, not only 
because we feel obliged to help an old friend in 
difficulty-- and we do consider the United States a 
very good friend-- but also because the persistent 
surpluses in our overall trade as well in our bilateral 
trade have given rise to a number of very serious 
problems in Taiwan, problems that threaten the long- 
term health and stability of our economy. " 
4 
Max Baucus, "A New Trade Strategy: The Case for Bilateral Agreements, " 22 Cornell Int'l L. 
J., pp. 1-24 (1989). Max Baucus was a senator in the United States when he wrote this article, in 
which, interestingly enough, with the exception of Taiwan, all America's trading partners that 
enjoyed trade surplus with the United States (notably Japan, South Korea, Brazil, India, Mexico etc. ) 
were under attack. Even when he mentioned the NICs (newly industrialising countries), he omitted 
Taiwan. The word "Taiwan" appeared only once in the section "Other Bilateral Candidates". This, 
of course, was a deliberate omission because Baucus was a long-term close friend of Taiwan. Senator 
Baucus was a successful politician no doubt. This also reflects, more or less, the friendly 
relationship between Taiwan and American Congress. For more about Baucus's support of Taiwan, see 
Chapter 8C, n. 13. 
5 
For instance, Mr. Chiang P. K., the then Vice Minister of the Economics Ministry, once said 
in a conference, "(m)y own experience of holding consultations with the United States 
indicates that 
some issues, such as trade in certain items with a small trade volume, ought not to 
become a concern 
for the United States. However, issues of such kind have been raised often, and in some cases, have 
pushed the two sides into a corner, with resulting harm to the relationship of the two countries. 
It could have been even worse when section 301 was wielded as a weapon to seek compromise 
from our 
side often provoked emotional reaction from our people and made the problem even more complicated". 
For the contents of the whole speech, see Chiang, P. K., "The Impact of 
U. S. Trade Law on Government 
Policy Making in the Republic of China, " 11 Mich. J. Int'l L., pp. 279-287 (1990). 
6 
Siew, Vincent C., "A New Era for US-ROC Trade and Economic Ties, " Industry of Free China, 
Vo1. LXXi, No. 6, p. 3 (1988). 
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So, officially, it was friendship and Taiwan's huge trade surplus that prompted 
Taiwan to help the United States in resolving its trade deficits and declining 
competitiveness. Using friendship in terms of bilateral economic relations, 
however, was merely a face-saving gesture, for Taiwan simply did not have the 
capacity and strength to resist United States pressures. As for the second 
reason, it is only half correct. Indeed, as a nation that has a strict foreign 
exchange control system, tremendous accumulation of foreign exchange would 
mean that the Central Bank must issue the equivalent sum of NT dollar and inject 
the money to society should the foreign exchange owners (Taiwanese 
businessmen) needed them domestically. 
7 This, in turn, was likely to cause 
internal inflation. But it was wrong to say this internal problem could be solved 
by eliminating trade surplus with the United States. The problem actually was 
a matter of macroeconomics, not bilateral trade. In addition, as a mercantilist 
state, accumulation of foreign exchange has to be a central objective, and can 
never be given up. Thus, one has to conclude that Siew actually did not mean 
what he said. Whether Siew's speech was in accordance with any economic logic 
was not important, the message was clear enough: Taiwan would do something to 
"remedy" the situation. Accordingly, United States-Taiwan bilateral trade has 
been adjusted so as to achieve the biggest extent of eliminating trade imbalances 
and to resolve trade pressures. In the late 1980s, focus was turned to the issue 
of intellectual property protection (IPR) for it was alleged that counterfeiting and 
piracy in Taiwan had caused even greater losses to American business than 
traditional trade barriers. 
1 
For further discussion of Taiwan's foreign exchange control system, see Chapter 5B, -). 
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On the, other hand, some important facts should not be neglected. The 
1980s may be regarded as one of the most successful decades of Taiwan's 
economic development. The success also gave confidence to the ruling party and 
the state bureaucracy that their highly interventionist or corporatist trade 
policies were the key to such achievements. Therefore, it was unrealistic that 
the government (party-state) would abandon its policies or practices solely under 
the pressure of the United States, though, in order to resolve American 
pressures, a certain degree of "compromise" was deemed necessary. As a matter 
of fact, if one is to understand the evolution of Taiwan's trade and economic 
policies, it is important to bear in mind that it has never been the intention of 
the state to withdraw from the market, nor is it ready to give up its state-led 
policy. This insight is shared by some prominent scholars such as Robert Wade. 
8 
Indeed, if one agrees with Gordon White's theory of "developmental state" which 
suggested that the pervasive involvement of state in the industrial and economic 
development was characterised by reasonably efficient administrative 
institutions, 9 there was no point in Taiwan surrendering its political control 
network. On the contrary, one may even argue that, on many occasions, the 
state, in order to maintain its high rate of economic growth, has sought every 
opportunity to expand its influence in economic activities. 
8 
Robert Wade is perhaps one of the few Western scholars who has conducted in-depth study of 
Taiwan's economic developments. His opinion is quite anti-neoclassical 
because he argues that 
Taiwan's openness and outward orientation trade and industrial policies 
have not been based on free 
trade. Government intervention is based on the considerations of promoting certain sectors, raising 
government revenue, strengthening interstate alliance, and serving certain 
diplomatic objectives. 
See Robert Wade, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN 
INDUSTRIALISATION pp. 113-158 (1990). 
9 
Gordon White, "The Developmental State, " reprinted in Yash Ghai, Robin Luckham & Francis 
Snyder (ed. ), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW: A THIRD WORLD READER p. 435 
(1987). 
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As such, United States economic pressures and the traditional political 
control over the economy have made Taiwan's trade and economic policies very 
complicated in the sense that it is quite difficult to reason out a coherent theory 
behind all its actions. 
This chapter is an attempt to outline those trade and economic policies of 
Taiwan made between 1981-1993 in responding to the United States pressures. 
It should be noted that during this period the general issues of Taiwan's trade 
policy are too great to permit thorough and systematic analysis. Because of this 
limitation, selections based on the writer's own judgments about what is relevant 
and what is important are unavoidable. Therefore, this chapter does not give a 
full picture of Taiwan's trade policies. Emphasis is placed on how Taiwan sought 
to accommodate the American demands through the making of its trade policies. 
The writer argues that in order to strike a balance between American 
protectionist trade pressures which persistently demand "free trade" or "fair 
trade", and the maintenance of its traditional corporatist control over the 
economy, the power of the party-state, by dint of its delicate manipulation of 
various trade and economic policies, is slowly increasing its powers. Collateral 
to this expansion of state power is the "bilateralisation" of its liberalisation 
policy and relevant laws. The trend is evident in the recently promulgated 
Foreign Trade Law of 1993. On the whole, a general observation is that the 
foreign trade policies of Taiwan still maintain a high degree of "managed" nature 
as the state is inclined to adhere to the corporatist way of ruling; while on the 
other hand, it maybe said that the United States, at least indirectly, endorses it. 
I, -) 
B. THE "LIBERALISATION" PROGRAMME, THE "TRADE ACTION PLAN" AND THE 
ACCOMMODATIVE POLICY 
As foreign trade has been regarded as a tool to pursue diplomatic 
objectives, and that the maintenance of good relations with the United States has 
always been Taiwan's diplomatic priority, granting special favours to American 
businessmen is thus justified on political grounds. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that, in the early years, Taiwan chose to purchase from those 
American states where the senators were pro-Taiwan or which had sister-city or 
sister-state ties with Taiwan. 
10 In concrete cases, for instance, import license 
for beef was granted subject to certain fat and hormone contents so that only 
United States beef could pass; while on many occasions, no reason, not even a 
technical one, was provided for such discriminatory treatments. This was, in 
fact, the general picture of the United States - Taiwan trade pattern up to the 
early 1980s. 
Then, as Taiwan was under increasing pressures from the United States to 
open more of its domestic markets and to take more American products, Taiwan, 
for the first time, considered the option of liberalising its markets. This could 
not be achieved without the making of a large scale liberalisation and 
internationalisation programme. So, in the 1983 Economic Reforms Committee -- 
an ad hoc organ composed of selected government ministers, big entrepreneurs, 
academics, and lawyers (a typical corporatist combination)-- consensus was 
formed that if Taiwan was to further develop its economy, liberalisation of 
10 
Wade, supra note 8, p. 134. 
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industrial, financial and public sectors must be carried out. 
" This was indeed 
the first time that the idea of economic liberalisation was officially brought to the 
government. In 1986, a new economic programme based on the principles of 
"Liberalisation, Internationalisation and Institutionalisation" was enacted. 
12 This 
programme was a grand policy of opening Taiwan's market to the world. To use 
the words of one of the original planners, 
"Liberalisation allows the economy to be increasingly 
regulated by the free market. Thus, administrative 
intervention in private economic activities is being 
reduced in order to create an equitable and competitive 
environment for the efficient allocation and utilisation of 
resources. Internationalisation expands economic 
activities by opening up home markets and allowing 
foreign competition with a view towards encouraging 
economic, technological, and cultural exchange with 
foreign countries. Institutionalisation streamlines and 
systematizes economic activities by means of legislation 
and regulation and is a prerequisitl to successful 
liberalisation and Internationalisation. " 
Therefore, according to this programme, Taiwan was, presumably, to march 
toward a free-market economy where supply and demand would be the principal 
driving forces of the market. Law, on the other hand, served only as a 
framework to cope with "market imperfection" and to ensure competition, economic 
growth and justice. 
1 1 
See "Taiwan: is the Miracle Faltering, " 15 Asian Finance, No. 6, pp. 56-58 (15 June, 1989). 
12 
See CEPD, Executive Yuan, PERSPECTIVE OF THE TAIWAN ECONOMY UP TO THE YEAR 2000 (1986). 
13 
Chien, Frederick F., "Liberalisation, Internationalisation and Institutionalisation, " 
3 
J. Chinese L. p. 187 (1989). Frederick F. Chien was a cabinet minister of 
Taiwan, and held the 
position of the Chairman of the Council 
for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), the Executive 
Yuan in the late 1980s. 
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To substantiate the programme of "Liberalisation, Internationalisation and 
Institutionalisation", important targets were listed. They included reducing trade 
surplus, privatising state-run enterprises, increasing public expenditure, 
upgrading the cultural environment, improving welfare system, and amending laws 
etc. 
14 While the plan was still waiting to be implemented, the emergence of 
American bilateral trade pressures changed the whole picture. 
In order to ease the trade tensions with the United States, Taiwan was 
forced to steer this grand programme by making some special policies and 
practises. Of particular importance was the "Trade Action Plan" which intended 
to reduce trade surplus with the United States and the "Accommodative Policy" - 
-a direction to Taiwan's law reform in IPR areas. For the next several years, 
these two policies essentially became the highest guidelines of Taiwan to respond 
to America's trade pressures. And precisely because of these two pro-American 
policies, the ambitious programme of "Liberalisation, Internationalisation and 
Institutionalisation" had to be substantially narrowed down to the target of trade 
surplus reduction. 
15 1 call this a "bilateralisation" of the original policy in the 
sense that the objectives of the liberalisation policy have undergone a qualitative 
change. The main feature of these two policies was that they were initiated 
largely at the request or under the pressures of the United States, and their 
ultimate purpose was to provide economic gains for the United States, thus 
14 
Id., pp. 188-192. 
15 
Though it may be argued that time and effort are required to accomplish all the targets 
set forth in the "Liberalisation, Internationalisation and 
Institutionalisation" programme, the truth 
is that, apart from the efforts of reducing trade surplus with the 
United States, other targets have 
been substantially delayed. See supra note 
11. 
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remedying the "trade imbalances" between the two countries. This, of course, 
does not fit exactly into the original idea of liberalisation or internationalisation. 
As these two policies are so important in their functions, they deserve detailed 
discussion. 
The "Trade Action Plan" 
In early 1989, in order to enhance trade and economic relations with the 
United States and to "cope with" the "Liberalisation, Internationalisation and 
Institutionalisation" programme, the Executive Yuan of Taiwan produced a four- 
year "Plan for Enhancing Trade and Economic Relations with the United States" 
(the "Trade Action Plan"). After consulting with the United States, 
16 the Council 
of Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) of Taiwan announced the details 
for implementing the "Trade Action Plan" in March 1989.17 Some of the most 
important items of the Plan included: 
(1) increase American imports by means of tariff reduction in industrial and 
agricultural products; pro-American procurement missions (at least 3 to 4 times 
a year); simplification of importation procedures etc.; 
(2) further relaxation of restrictions on foreign banks, insurance and securities 
companies; 
(3) encourage American investments in Taiwan; encourage Taiwanese investments 
in Mexico and Canada so as to exploit the North American free trade area; 
(4) diversification of the market, so that by the year 1992 imports from and 
exports to the United States could be reduced to less than one-third of Taiwan's 
total annual trade volume; 
(5) improvements in IPR legislations and enforcements. 
ý$ 
16 
In March 1989, Mr. Vincent Siew, the then Vice-Commissioner of the Council of Economic 
Planning and Development flew to the United States to consult with the United States government about 
the details of the "Trade Action Plan". He returned to Taiwan on 21 March with a package of the 
plan. See Liberty Times (Tzu-yao jih pao), p. 3 (22 March, 1989). 
17 
Id. 
18 
id. 
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The above items were considered important because they were what the 
United States was particularly concerned with. Other items, such as establishing 
an United States-Taiwan Free Trade Area, establishing a trade dispute settlement 
institution, and relaxation of American export controls etc. received only little 
attention as they did not have immediate effects on the reduction of America's 
trade deficits. 19 As a matter of fact, the USTR has officially characterised the 
"Trade Action Plan" as a programme intended only to reduce Taiwan's trade 
surplus with the United States. 
20 As a result, it was a sheer departure from 
the "Liberalisation, Internationalisation and Institutionalisation" programme, for 
a grand liberalisation programme could not possibly be bilateral in nature. 
Instead, it had become an independent plan of its own, served to grant United 
States more trade privileges and to avoid American retaliatory actions. According 
to this policy, various legal measures were adopted in favour of the United 
States. This will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. 
The "Accommodative Policy"21 
The "Accommodative Policy" was employed to resolve America's demands on 
IPR improvements. The issue of IPR protection has become particularly critical 
19 
Obviously inspired by the idea of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 
government of Taiwan had been keen on persuading American policy-makers and influencing American 
public opinion on the establishment of an United States-Taiwan Free Trade Area. The 
issue of United 
States-Taiwan Free Trade Area will be further discussed in Chapter 8B. 
20 
According to an official report of the United States, "(i)n early 1989 Taiwan implemented 
a "Trade Action Plan", in effect through the end of 1992, that 
is intended to reduce its trade 
surplus with the United States". See USTR, 1993 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT 
ON FOREIGN TRADE 
BARRIERS, p. 247. (Hereinafter NTE Report) 
21 
"Accommodative Policy" is not an official term, nor is it my invention. But it is employed 
by an economic bureaucrat of Taiwan when discussing Taiwan's 
intellectual property rights protection. 
Li, Chih-Cheng, THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AS A STRATEGIC COMPONENT OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC POLICY(Ph. D. thesis, Kansas University, Sept., 1991) Dr. Li worked 
for 
the Central Trust of China (Taiwan), a component of the Ministry of Finance. 
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since the late 1980s following the passage of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act. 
From the start, the government of Taiwan was not left with much choice 
to face American pressures. The situation was clear since the beginning of the 
1980s: an accommodative IPR policy had to be formed, or the booming United 
States-Taiwan trade would be hampered. In its essence, the so-called 
accommodative policy means a one hundred percent cooperation with the United 
States to curb the IPR problems. The consensus was first formed in a cabinet- 
level meeting held on 7 September 1982, which announced many measures to 
combat IPR infringements. 
22 They included the ban on export of counterfeit 
goods, revision of the Trademark Law and the Patent Law and the strengthening 
of judicial actions etc. 
23 Then in 1984, the late President Chiang Ching-kuo 
instructed the government, 
"Counterfeiting is a serious problem which affects not 
only our national reputation but the future of our 
foreign trade. Uprooting this problem is an important 
task for the Ministry of Economic Affairs and requires 
the combined efforts of the entire government, 
particularly those of the judicial and security branches. 
Total eliminating of counterfeiting is a maýgr 
responsibility in our present economic- development. "`ý 
It should be noted that the IPR policy was made during the martial law 
era, thus it is not surprising that "security branches" (i. e. police and 
22 
Lin, Ruey-long, "Protection of Intellectual Property in the Republic of China, " 6 Chinese 
Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., p. 123 (1986-1987). 
23 
id. 
24 
Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan, Chi-Shih-Ssu Nien-Tu 
Yu 
Yuan Lieh-Quan 'Fang-Chih Fang-Nau Shang-Pin' Shih-Ti Cha-Cheng Pao-Kao (FACT FINDING 
REPORT ON ANTI- 
COUNTERFEITING PROGRAMME UNDER THE EXECUTIVE YUAN IN 1985) (March, 1985) cited 
by Lin, Id. 
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intelligence units) were included in President Chiang's mobilisation order. This, 
nonetheless, reflected the degree of urgency of the matter. President Chiang's 
statement marked the beginning of a systematic and total mobilisation of the 
government to fight commercial counterfeiting based on United States claims. 
Since then, the issue of IPR protection has become a priority of the national goal 
even after the lifting of martial law. Though no mention of American pressures 
could be found in the government's IPR policy statements, it had always been 
America's intention to have the highest authority of Taiwan announce his 
determination to protect IPR. For instance, in the 1989 IPR consultation, the 
United States demanded the announcement of a "White Paper" statement by 
President Lee, Teng-hui, emphasizing his commitment to protect IPR and to 
enforce IPR laws vigorously. 
25 The accommodative policy can best be understood 
by quoting an academic work of a Taiwanese bureaucrat, 
"(t)o round out Taiwan's IPR reform, it should not only 
continue to accommodate United States IPR initiatives, 
but most importantly, live up to its commitments 
engaged with the United States... to solve all these 
(IPR) problems simultaneously, the ROC's26 three 
government branches need to work in tandem. " 
For these reasons, "modernising" Taiwan's IPR laws in accordance with the 
American standards became a priority. According to this policy various IPR 
measures, including the establishment of special organs, new custom system, and 
special enforcement actions, were taken. All these will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6. 
25 
BOFT, Wuo-Kuo 78 Nien Tuei-Wai Mao-Yi Tsu-Shang Tan-Pan Chi-Yiao (A SUMMARY OF ROC'S 
EXTERNAL TRADE CONSULTATION IN 1989) Title 1 (9), p. 8 (June, 1990) . [Hereinafter 
the 1989 Consultation Report] The proposal was politely rejected as the government of Taiwan claimed 
that President Lee had already made a similar statement in the 2nd Plenary Session of the 
KMT Central 
Standing Committee held earlier that year. 
26 
Li, supra note 21, pp. 107-108. 
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It should be borne in mind that legally all these policies were implemented 
through the exercise of the so-called administrative powers. The statutory basis 
of this administrative discretion was, however, highly questionable. For over two 
decades, all trade regulatory powers were made according to the Organic Statute 
of the Board of Foreign Trade (BOFT), the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOFA). " 
Article 2 of the Statute authorised the BOFT to regulate imports and exports, and 
accordingly, the Screening Criteria for Export Application and the Screening 
Criteria for Import Application were promulgated. 
28 These two administrative 
orders have also become the bases of over thirty "third-generation" regulations. 
It was these administrative orders that constituted the backbone of Taiwan's 
trade regime. Needless to say, this Executive-created trade regime significantly 
violated the Constitution which stated that the power to decide matters involving 
foreign trade and economics rested in the hands of the Legislative branch; 
As such, it became a living embarrassment of the government which had 
repeatedly claimed that it was transforming to constitutional democracy. 
Eventually, the Taiwan government decided to follow the United States by 
creating a trade law. 
27 
The Organic Statute of the Board of Foreign Trade was promulgated on 24 December, 1970. 
The text of the Statute can be found in CCLRRC, Hsin-cheng 10-01-028, pp. 
{1292-5}-{1292-7}. 
28 
These two administrative orders are collected in CCLRC, Ching 100-2, pp. 1793-1794. 
29 
Article 107 of the Constitution states, " (i)n the following matters, the Central 
Government shall have the power of legislation and administration: 
11. Foreign trade policies; 12. 
Financial and economic matters affecting foreigners or 
foreign countries.... " 
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C. THE "MANAGERIAL" POLICY --- THE FOREIGN TRADE LAW OF 1993 
1. Legislative Intentions 
On 5 February, 1993, the government of Taiwan promulgated the Foreign 
Trade Law. The Law represented an effort to put Taiwan's trade affairs under 
proper statutory basis in the democratic era. As usual, the Law adopted many of 
the principles and rules in the GATT and the United States Trade Acts. 
30 Thus, 
in some way, the Foreign Trade Law is a vital development in Taiwan's trading 
history. Not only is it the first comprehensive piece of legislation on foreign 
trade, but it also injects needed legitimacy into existing regulatory machinery. J" 
Two additional reasons explain why Taiwan would promulgate such a law. 
First, bilateral negotiations with the United States have created tensions between 
the Executive and the Legislative branches. On many occasions, especially in the 
democratisation era since 1987, the newly elected legislators have accused the 
Executive branch of acting ultra vires, or usurping the Legislative power. 
Clearly, a law demarcating the two powers on the question of foreign trade 
affairs was necessary. 
Second, though the Law was initiated by the Executive Yuan in the early 
1980s, it was not until the 1990s that Taiwan decided to join the GATT and had 
30 
For instance, Article 18 of the Law states, when a rapid or sudden increase in the amount 
of importation has caused or is like to cause material 
damages to domestic industry which produces 
identical or directly competitive products, the 
industry may apply for investigation and import 
relief from the competent authority. This article 
is a copy of Article 19 of the GATT and Section 
202 of the United States Trade Act. 
31 
Yen, Ching-Chang & Wu, Sui-Yu, "International Trade and Custom Duty, " in Mitchell A. Silk, 
TAIWAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW p. 80 (1994). 
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received positive response from the United States32 that the making of the Law 
became a serious matter. For a law which establishes a trade regime based on 
the rule of law is certainly a prerequisite to GATT application. Unfortunately, 
as will be seen, this law could not escape being "bilateralised" because of the 
special trade relationships between the United States and Taiwan, and Taiwan's 
reluctance to give up its traditional corporatist and interventionist way of ruling. 
2. Policies Behind the Law -- Accommodating the "International" Needs and the 
Extension of Corporatist Control Over the Economy 
Although it is not the appropriate place to discuss in detail the contents 
of the Law, understanding the policy behind the Law through some of the 
significant provisions is deemed necessary. 
As soon as the Foreign Trade Law was promulgated, commentators had 
noticed that it was just another attempt of the Taiwan government to compromise 
its newly proclaimed "free trade" policy with its traditional protectionist and 
interventionist policy. 
33 This is not surprising considering that Article X45, 
section 3 of the Constitution states that, "foreign trade shall receive 
encouragement, guidance and protection from the States. " No doubt, this article 
provides a strong legal basis for government intervention. Thus, on the one 
hand, one sees some "free trade" Articles in the Law, for instance, Article 11 
states "(a)11 goods shall be permitted to import or export freely.... ". On the 
32 
On 19 July, 1991, United States President George Bush declared that he would fully support 
the application of Taiwan to join the GATT. See Chapter 
8C, n. 13 for detail. 
33 
, Taiwan's First Comprehensive Foreign Trade Legislation, " East Asian Executive Report, 
Issue: 15, p. 9 (Apr., 1993). 
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other hand, exceptions to this free trade principle, which aim at "guiding" and 
"protecting" foreign trade can be found almost everywhere in the Law, to the 
extent that it might be more appropriate to say that the Law is a legitimation of 
the interventionist and corporatist practices of the old trade regime. The 
"managerial" nature of the Law was so obvious that a legislator even suggested 
that the Law be called Management Regulation Regarding Imports and Exports'". 
Nonetheless, throughout the whole legislative process, no legislator challenged the 
rationale that foreign trade affairs should be properly managed by the state. 
This, nonetheless, reflects the survival of the interventionist and corporatist 
mentality of the government, both in the Legislative as well as in the Executive 
branches. 
Categorically, the Law provides several means of controlling or managing 
foreign trade. First, it contains several exceptional rules. Article 11 states that 
restrictions may be imposed due to national defence, social security, culture 
hygiene and sanitation, environment and ecology and policy needs. Though any 
ban or restriction as such is subject to the approval of the Legislative Yuan in 
order to prevent "democratic deficit", interpretation of these terms falls within 
the administrative discretion of the "competent authority" which is, as expected, 
the BOFT. 
While the above exceptions maybe be applied universally to all countries' 
imports or exports, there are some provisions which are specifically designed for 
34 
The opinion of legislator Chen, Shui-bian. Economic, Judicial Committee, Legislative 
Yuan, 
LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE, No. 161, p. 62 (1993). (Hereinafter LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE) 
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the United States. Article 6(4) states that the competent authority is authorised 
to ban temporarily import or export or take other necessary measures when there 
exists a chronic and huge trade imbalances between Taiwan and its trading 
counterparts. A main feature of this provision is that the so-called "chronic and 
huge trade imbalances" cannot possibly be decided by the competent authority, 
but has to be a result of bilateral negotiations with the trading counterpart in 
question. Thus, naturally, the bigger or stronger the trading counterpart (that 
is, the United States), the more likely it is that the term "chronic and huge 
trade imbalances" will be loosely interpreted. Indeed, this Article is the best 
reflection of Taiwan's political economy under the pressures of the American 
hegemony. It is thus not an exaggeration to say that it is a "safeguard clause" 
made for future bilateral arrangements with the United States. 
If Article 6 can be treated as a general exception to the law, then one 
might be interested to know whether there is any specific exception as well. The 
answer is positive. An Article 16 was made to allow the BOFT to impose 
quantitative restraints (quota), on either a gratuitous or a charged basis, on 
import or export for the sake of implementation of trade agreement or the needs 
of trade negotiation. This is an article that openly sanctions voluntary restraint 
arrangements (VRAs). Despite the fact that VRAs have been strongly criticised 
by legal scholars and economists, 
35 the Foreign Trade Law of Taiwan recognises 
its validity and necessity. Obviously, it was an attempt by the Taiwan 
government to legitimise the practice of voluntary restraint agreements between 
Taiwan and the United States, and pave the way for the future. 
For a discussion of voluntary restraint agreements, see 
Chapter 4E. 
54 
It maybe argued that all these exceptions are not in accordance with GATT 
rules, particularly Article XIX which is commonly known as the "escape clause". 
This argument is compelling, but dangerous. The reason for concern is simple. 
While adopting international rules seems to justify those articles, a far more 
important point is to see their operation in the context of national legal and 
political systems. In an authoritarian state, legal rules and exceptions do not 
mean so much as they do in Western democracies based on the rule of law, for 
the regime, without the need to look after the general public, can always 
manipulate the law and even the circumstances to which the rule or exception 
applies. 
36 In other words, by adopting an internationally sanctioned rule and 
exception, the regime is, ironically, provided with more room for manipulation. 
Especially in the case of Taiwan which is not even a member of GATT, the 
application of these exceptions is likely to be used as a means for bilateral trade 
arrangements which certainly is not the original intention of GATT. 
In addition, the Law also recognises the expansion of administrative 
discretion. As has been mentioned before, prior to the promulgation of the 
Foreign Trade Law, Taiwan's international trade regime was basically built on 
administrative orders which gave the competent authority wide regulatory 
discretionary powers. The situation has not improved much following the 
enactment of the Law. While in principle Article 7(3) states that bilateral or 
36 
It is in this sense that I think the West has a just cause in seeking and promoting 
democracy in developing countries. For only a democracy based on the rule of law can, through the 
operation of checks and balance, ensure that the making and application of 
laws are always subject 
to domestic legal control. Without such a system at the national level, the international legal 
system simply cannot function properly. But then the Western nations must rethink their own systems 
with regard to foreign trade and economic policies. 
As pointed out by Tumlir, they are not so 
democratic in this regard. See Chapter 7B, 3 for further discussion. 
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multilateral trade agreements should obtain approval from the Legislative Yuan, 
the exception is that those agreements which fall within the Executive discretion 
of the competent authority do not apply. This article was, in fact, based upon 
the United States practice of Presidential Executive Agreements according to 
which no participation of Congress is required. 37 Accordingly, it gives the 
Executive branch enormous power to dominate trade negotiations and results. 
Thus, during the course of legislative debate, opposition parties claimed that it 
was just another "game of words" played by the KMT to avoid legislative control 
of treaties. 
38 Their worry is sanctioned. While it maybe true that this American 
practice did not lead to Executive abuses in the United States, the fear is 
there. 39 When this system is transplanted to Taiwan -- a nation which still 
carries many authoritarian attributes, it, no doubt, sows the seeds of potential 
abuse by the Executive branch of Taiwan. This also implies that transplantation 
or imitation of foreign laws do not necessarily produce desirable results. 
One of the most severe criticisms of discretionary powers exercised by 
Western democratic nations is that they are always non-transparent in nature, 
37 
Executive agreement refers to those international agreements made by the President of the 
United States without the advice and consent of the Senate given by the two-third majority requisite 
for the conclusion of a treaty under the Constitution. The power of the President to make such 
agreements with and without the authorization or approval of Congress has been recognised 
by the 
Supreme Court. See Louis Henkin, Richard C. Pugh, Oscar Schachter & Hans Smit, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS pp. 214-219 (1987); Louis Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION pp. 173-176 
(1972). 
38 
Opinion of legislator Chen, Ding-nan. LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE, supra note 33, pp. 
160-161, 
177-180,188-194,199-204,211-216,. 
39 
Id., p. 216. See also Louis Henkin, "Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, " 
10 Mich. 
J. Int'l L. pp. 406-429 (1989). Some conservative commentators, 
however, argue that this fear does not 
exist, for the concerns about the roles of the two 
branches are precisely part of the competition 
envisioned by the Constitution. The concerns are, therefore, not constitutional. 
Jacques J. Gorlin, 
"Foreign Trade and the Constitution, " in Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht 
(ed. ), FOREIGN POLICY 
AND THE CONSTITUTION p. 71 (1990). 
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thus abridging effectively domestic political discussion of the issue. To quote 
Jan Tumlir, "without transparency, it becomes impossible to monitor policy 
experiments, and the system breeds cynicism in those it favours as much as in 
those it discriminates against". 
4U Accordingly, it is likely that the bigger the 
discretionary powers, the more undemocratic a process of decision making it 
would be. Unfortunately, further evidence shows that the problem of non- 
transparency is not solved by the new Foreign Trade Law. Article 8 of the 
Foreign Trade Law states only that the Executive branch in charge of trade 
negotiation "may" open public hearings before signing any trade agreements, 
which in practice is likely to be ignored by the competent authority due to 
bureaucratic resistance of "disturbing noises". Though one may contend that 
this is not so important as the agreements must be submitted to the Legislative 
Yuan for approval after all. The problem is that past experience has shown that 
the time for the Legislative Yuan to exercise approval was too short as American 
trade pressures were too imminent to make discussion meaningful. But would the 
competent authority submit the agreements in question to the Legislative Yuan 
earlier so that the Legislative Yuan could have full discussion? The answer is 
no. In fact, late submission to the Legislative Yuan for approval proved to be 
a useful strategy of the Executive branch to secure the trade agreements in its 
entirety and to avoid humiliations by legislators of the opposition parties. In 
other words, one has reason to believe that the self-seeking Executive branch 
would take advantage of American trade pressures to avoid its being checked and 
40 
Jan Tumlir, "Economic Policy as a Constitutional Problem, " Fifteen Wincoct Memorial 
Lecture p. 17 (1984). 
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thus embarrassed by the Legislative branch. 41 
Furthermore, one sees the possible intrusion of private economic activities 
by the state. The new trade regime created by the 1993 Foreign Trade Latiiv 
establishes a "code of conduct" which may subject individual freedoms to the 
higher goals of "national interests" or "national image". Article 17 of the Law 
states that importers and exporters are not allowed to conduct the following: (1) 
infringement of ROC and foreign intellectual property rights; (2) mislabelling 
product origin; (3) performing private contracts in bad faith; (4) disrupting trade 
order by unjust means; and (5) damaging national image or creating trade 
barriers. While it remains ambiguous as to the meaning of terms such as "bad 
faith", "trading order", "national image", and "trade barriers", some of them are 
almost "mission impossible" and even uncomprehensible. For instance, as 
challenged by a legislator, how could the government know whether importers or 
exporters violate foreign intellectual property rights, considering that Taiwan has 
more than one hundred trading partners most of which do not have formal 
diplomatic relations? 
42 Moreover, how can individuals be so powerful to set up 
"trade barriers" to block foreign trade without the sanction of the government? 
41 
Note that this point necessarily rejects the Weberian notion of the public officials as 
being dedicated either to the government interest or to some concept of the public interest. As a 
matter of fact, I quite agree with the Virginia political economy programme which treats the 
Executive branch of the government and the bureaucrats as a special interest group which 
favours non- 
transparent policy initiatives, not only to conceal special interest allocations 
from electoral 
scrutiny, but also to maximise their own discretionary power. See Charles 
K. Rowley & Willem 
Thorbecke, "The Role of the Congress and the Executive in the U. S. Trade Policy Determination: A 
Public Choice Analysis, " in Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed. ), NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW pp. 353-354 (1993). 
42 
Opinion of legislator Wang, Ling-lin. LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE, supra note 34, p. 74. 
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Nonetheless, the making of such a provision has a deeper concern. It was 
made to serve the interests of American multinationals for they have various 
associations and organisations in Taiwan which perform the function of 
investigating domestic intellectual property violations and informing the competent 
authority of them. 43 The reasons why Taiwan should pay attention to those 
American multinationals are not merely that they are economically significant, but 
also that, as noted by Thomas Gold, "they [multinationals] have taken the place 
of embassy in defining Taiwan's existence". 
44 To show that the law means 
business, the administrative penalty for such behaviour is extremely severe. 
45 
This, nonetheless, further reflects the "punishment-centred" nature of the 
authoritarian corporatist law. 
Enshrined in this code of conduct is the idea of "administrative guidance" 
according to which private importers and exporters are inevitably subject to the 
"instruction" or "moral suasion" of the competent authority. Accordingly, the 
G3 Among them, the most notable are the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) 
which represents over 1500 computer companies; the Business Software Alliance (BSA), an association 
of American software companies; the International Anti-counterfeiting Coalition (IACC), a coalition 
of over 120 members which according to its own estimation, represents total sales of over US$ 500 
billion or approximately 10% of annual United States GNP; the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association (PMA), an entity that represents over 100 United States-based companies which research, 
develop and market a substantial portion of medicines throughout the world; and the United States 
Trademark Association (USTA), a United States-based association which also accepts memberships from 
other countries. A general feature of these associations is that they exert pressures on 
both the 
United States and Taiwan to pursue their goals of IPR protection. In the United States, they 
participate in the public hearings held by the Congress, prepare their own 
list of Special Section 
301 "Priority Countries" and make recommendations to the USTR. In Taiwan, they "co-ordinate" with 
the government in sweeping counterfeiting and piracy. Summarised 
from Liu, Paul C. B., Hu, Han-chuan, 
Sun., Andy Y., Cheng, Shan-li & Pang, Ya-liang, Mei-Kuo Chi-Yeah Tuei Chih-Huei-Tsai-Chan-Chuan 
Hsiang-Kuan Li-Fa Tan-Pan Tso-Lueh Chi Ying-Hsiang (UNITED STATES INDUSTRIES AND GOVERNMENT 
INTERACTION ON TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEGISLATION) pp. 247-320 (1993). 
GG 
Thomas Gold, "Dependent Development in Taiwan, " (Doctoral thesis, Harvard University) 
(1981), cited by Wade, supra note 8, p. 154. 
45 
According to Art. 28 of the Foreign Trade Law, violation of Article 17 may be 
fined not less 
than NT$ 30,000 (750 Sterling Pounds) but not more than NT$ 
300,000 (7,500 Sterling Pounds), and 
rescission of import or export licenses. 
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competent authority can always apply any one of the provisions to exclude 
private economic participants (the best of which is , of course, to invoke 
"performing contracts in bad faith" or "damaging national image"). 
This "code of conduct" no doubt gives the Executive branch additional 
powers to check private activities. Free flow of goods (Art. 11) becomes 
meaningless if private participants can be excluded by the state according to 
vague legal rules. 
To conclude, the Foreign Trade Law of 1993 represents the Taiwan 
government's effort to establish an international trade regime with a sound legal 
basis. Despite the fact that the Law was made in the proclaimed democratic era, 
it reflected the survival of many corporatist practices which put the state in a 
high and guiding status. The Legislative Yuan still delegated to the later 
substantial and broad powers to regulate foreign trade matters. Of particular 
importance is that, because of the highly manipulative potential and ambiguous 
language, one can hardly see a predictable, consistent and coherent trade policy. 
Tumlir has pointed out that if law is to be used as an instrument of policy, clear 
legal rules must be made, so that the average citizen can understand. 
46 His 
argument is that clear legal rules are the only means by which the average 
citizen can make any sense of the complex policy issues confronting him and form 
a view as to whether a policy is succeeding or failing. 
47 By the same token, 
46 
Tumlir, supra note 40, p. 14. 
47 
Id. 
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clear legal rules are also important for the courts, for without them one simply 
cannot expect that the courts can do a better job than the bureaucrats in 
interpreting the law. Here the Foreign Trade Law is such a living creature 
which the average citizen and the court might find difficult to understand. Yet, 
there is one thing for sure: that all is subject to the flexible modification and 
manipulation of the "competent authority". More to the point, the new trade 
regime is an extension of the old one. In fact, one is bound to conclude that 
this was precisely the intention of the government. By concentrating power in 
the hands of the "competent authority", the government of Taiwan hopes to 
increase its bargaining chips in negotiating with foreign nations, the United 
States in particular. Only through this can its mercantilism be maintained. 
Last but not least, the making of this Foreign Trade Law is not an 
innovation of Taiwan. Many of the principles, rules and exceptions were copied 
from various United States trade laws. Thus, if the United States trade laws 
represent laws of neo-protectionism, then the Foreign Trade Law of Taiwan is a 
restatement of them. It is pointed out that the characteristic features of neo- 
protectionism are the delegation to the President of broad discretionary authority 
to modify tariffs and other tariff barriers, to impose trade restrictions for 
security reasons, and to impose import restriction to protect domestic 
producers. 
48 Among them, the President's power to negotiate voluntary restraint 
arrangements (VRAs) is the most notable and dangerous instrument of trade 
48 
See for instance, Robert E. Hudec, "GATT Legal Status in U. S. Domestic Law, " in Mein Hilf, 
Francis G. Jacobs & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed. ) THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND GATT pp. 240-241 
(1986). 
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policy. 
49 Here, as has been discussed above, all these features can be found in 
the Foreign Trade Law of Taiwan. Indeed, so many exceptions to the principle 
of free flow of goods in the Foreign Trade Law signifies the protectionist and the 
state-led mentality of Taiwan. An interesting and intriguing point is that this 
neo-protectionism provides the Executive with enormous discretionary powers 
which coincide with, and thus extend the traditional mercantilistic corporatist 
nature of Taiwan. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann used to term the implementation of 
American foreign trade polices and laws as "a limited government with unlimited 
power", 
50 
and was thus a "Hobbesian state". 
S' The situation here is that this 
Hobbesian state seems to have been adopted comfortably by Taiwan through the 
promulgation of its Foreign Trade Law. 
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Several conclusions can be drawn with regard to the trade policies of 
Taiwan made in the shadow of United States pressures. 
First, the multilateral trade policy of Taiwan is bent to serve its trade 
relations with the United States. It is true that Taiwan has the determination 
to establish a rule-based trade regime so as to integrate into the world economy 
49 
Tumlir, supra note 1, pp. 39-43. 
50 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "Limited Government and Unlimited Trade Policy Powers: Why 
Effective Judicial Review and a Liberal Constitution Depend on Individual Rights, " in Hilf & 
Petersmann (ed. ), supra note 41, pp. 537-561 (1993). 
51 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "National Constitutions and International Economic Law, " Id., 
pp. 4-52. 
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and to resolve American pressures. The grand policy of "Liberalisation, 
Internationalisation and Institutionalisation" was such an effort. It shows that 
Taiwan was prepared to open its market on a non-discriminatory basis in the 
hope that it could join the GATT/WTO in the near future. As a matter of fact, 
joining the GATT/WTO has been considered the best way to resolve American 
C 
pressures. ) Nevertheless, before that wish come true, policies and laws in 
favour of the United States have to be made. The "Trade Action Plan" was the 
most notable one. The multilateral trade policy of Taiwan was thus "bilateralised" 
in the sense that special consideration was given to United States nationals 
through bilateral negotiation. As a result, bilateralism remains a significant part 
of Taiwan's trade regime, regardless of the fact that it violates the very basic 
principle of most-favoured-nation (MFN). 
53 
Second, one has reason to believe that the United States is at least 
implicitly supporting a strong interventionist and regulatory state in Taiwan. As 
the United States has adopted a "result-oriented" approach in its bilateral trade 
talks, "measurable progress" on the part of its counterparts is considered a 
condition to avoid trade retaliations by the United States. Yet, as bilateral trade 
negotiations are conducted on a government-to-government basis, the government 
must be relied upon to achieve the so-called measurable progress. When a 
government is under external pressures to implement laws or to carry out strong 
enforcement actions to achieve certain objectives, the results have always been 
52 
This point will be further elaborated in Chapter 8. 
53 
Michael C. Aho, "More Bilateral Trade Agreements Would be a Blunder: What the New 
President Should Do? " 22 Cornell Int'l L. J., pp. 25-38 (1989). 
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that the government becomes more intrusive not only in economic activities, but 
also in other areas. In other words, for the sake of its own interests, the 
United States will not object to the Taiwan government's intervention in the 
economy in the name of "maintaining good relationships with the United States", 
"avoiding trade retaliation", or "national image". This further encourages Taiwan 
to maintain control over the economy and society. 
Third, the adoption of United States trade laws and principles in the 
Foreign Trade Law sustains Taiwan's corporatist control of the economy. The 
Foreign Trade Law is a combination of the old state-led policy and many American 
trade laws and principles. It openly discards liberal ideas by providing a 
corporatist mechanism for the "competent authority" to regulate the economy, and 
consolidates the various protectionist measures. Surely, though, one can still 
claim that Taiwan now has a trade law, and so, at least, the rules of the game 
are there. But the problem is that the trade law is largely a legal 
transplantation based on the condition that the state must remain dominant in the 
economy. As such, one finds not the idea of free trade, but a new breed of neo- 
protectionism. 
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CHAPTER 4. MAJOR LEGAL ISSUES AND IMPACTS REGARDING COMMODITY TRADE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 3, we discussed the various policies which Taiwan has 
implemented in respect to American trade pressures. It is argued that two main 
forces decide the trend of Taiwan's trade policy. On the one hand, American 
trade pressures have led to a market opening process, which ostensibly demand 
Taiwan's economy to be liberalised from state control. On the other hand, 
corporatist control by the regime remains, indicating that the state was reluctant 
to loosen its grip over the economy. Accordingly, the policy of liberalisation. and 
internationalisation in the 1980s and the Foreign Trade Law of the 1990s have 
been highly "bilateralised" and the corporatist style of ruling continues. In 
addition, a strong argument is also made by claiming that efforts to accommodate 
American demands have, in fact, further strengthened the power of state in the 
sense that the Executive's "discretionary" powers are largely strengthened. 
This chapter deals in detail with how Taiwan has handled United States 
pressures and demands. Some of the important trade issues which have occurred 
in the past decade are selected for discussion and analysis. The purpose is to 
provide a clear picture of United States-Taiwan trade relations through the 
discussion of concrete cases. These cases and issues are important not only 
because they involve legislative changes, which certainly are the concerns of 
lawyers, but also because they reflect significantly how Taiwan resolved American 
pressures in an authoritarian corporatist way. Important cases are discussed in 
ýq 
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every selected issue and independent evaluation is made thereafter. This chapter 
shows that unequal negotiating power between the two states has resulted in 
unequal trade agreements. It also shows how, to avoid American pressures, laws 
are constantly disregarded. This, nonetheless, favours the continuation of 
authoritarian corporatism. In addition, it is argued that the United States relied 
very much on the mobilisation of state power on the part of Taiwan to meet its 
needs. Note also that most of these "liberalisation efforts" were conducted either 
shortly before or after the lifting of martial law. The practices of the Taiwan 
government, however, were highly questionable in terms of the democratic 
principles of participation and openness. Yet, the outcome is evident: a series 
of mistaken policies caused by irresponsible bureaucratic improvisation, which 
eventually led to public resentment. 
B. TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
1. The World Food Surplus in the 1980s 
One of the main international trade issues throughout the 1980s and the 
early 1990s was perhaps the liberalisation of agricultural trade. Not only 
industrialised nations, that is, the United States, EC (now European Union; EU) 
and Japan quarrelled among themselves about farm subsidies, developing 
countries were also suffering from tremendous pressures from the United States 
to open their domestic markets. 
ýw 
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The reasons why the United States has been keen to liberalise world farm 
food products could not simply be explained in terms of the demand for "fair 
trade" or eliminating trade deficits. As noted by economists, a main factor was 
due to a shift in the trend of the world food markets. That is, industrial market 
economies had switched from being net importers to massive net exporters of food 
since the early 1980s, while the opposite happened for developing countries. 
However, this food surplus in the developed countries did not meet the market 
demands. Because of the emergence of Third World debt crisis, many debt-ridden 
developing countries were forced to slow down their import demand. 2 In Asian 
countries, notably Japan and the NICs, though without debt burden, farm policies 
changed to subsidising their farmers as food import dependence increased. 3 As 
a result, the 1980s witnessed a "crisis in world agriculture" characterised by 
plummeting agricultural prices, widespread economic stress in farming, and 
protectionism. 114 Domestically, this generated a fiscal burden of farm subsidies 
in the United States. 5 As such, they strained the fiscal capacity of the United 
Kym Anderson & Rodney Tyres, GLOBAL EFFECTS OF LIBERALISING TRADE IN FARM PRODUCTS pp. 1-2 
(1991). 
2 Id., pp. 4-5. 
3 
Id. p. 87. The reason Asian countries protected their farmers was the desire to maintain a 
certain degree of self-sufficiency. Fluctuation in size of the global harvest or political events 
may prevent a nation relying on foreign supplies from obtaining "the food it needs, when it needs 
it". For problems concerning world farm trade, see also Jon G. Filipek, "Agricultural in a World 
of Comparative Advantage: the Prospects for Farm Trade Liberalisation in the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiation, " 30 Harv. Intl L. J., pp. 123-170 (Wint. 1989). 
4 
William M. Miner & Dale E. Hathaway, "World Agriculture in Crisis: Reforming Government 
Policies, " in William M. Miner & Dale E. Hathaway (ed. ), WORLD AGRICULTURAL TRADE: BUILDING A 
CONSENSUS pp. 37-43 (1988); Grace Skogstad, "Agricultural Trade and the International Political 
Economy, " in Richard Stubbs & Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (ed. ), POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING 
GLOBAL ORDER, pp. 249-250 (1994). 
5 
According to a United States official statement, US$ 25 billion were spent directly to 
support farmers in 1987; another US$ 6 billion were transferred to farmers through programmes which 
maintain consumer prices for dairy and sugar-containing products well above world market 
levels. 
"Statement of the United States Delegation Presenting a Proposal 
for Negotiation on Agriculture, " 
collected in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf (ed. ), THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE 
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States attempting to reduce persistent budget deficit-6 
Haunted by all these international as well as domestic problems, the United 
States sought to "liberalise" the world agricultural markets. The inclusion of 
agricultural trade issues in the multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices 
of the GATT was part of the effort.? In addition, bilateral negotiations were also 
conducted in the same period by the United States and its trading counterparts. 
Needless to say, Taiwan was one of the main targets. 
2. Trade Talks and Turmoil 
Taiwan's agricultural policy has been driven by an intense desire to 
achieve self-sufficiency-8 Accordingly, various programmes, such as government 
rice purchase policy (to control the price of rice), price support system (paying 
cash to farmers producing dryland crops) have been carried out to ensure the 
NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS p. 266 (1991). 
b 
"Reforming World Agricultural Trade: A Policy Statement by Twenty-nine Professionals from 
Seventeen Countries, " in Miner & Hathaway, supra note 4, p. 6. 
7 
According to USTR Clayton Yeutter, United States proposal on agriculture in the Uruguay 
Round was to call for a freer and open trading environment in agriculture by the year 2,000. It 
planned to eliminate all trade barriers and trade distorting incentives while providing a safety net 
for farm incomes. Clayton Yeutter, "U. S. Negotiating Proposal on Agriculture in the Uruguay, " in 
Petersmann & Hilf, supra note 5, p. 265. 
8 
The reason, according to an official of Taiwan, is that "agriculture is a different kind 
of industry. We have to have some kind of security in our food production. " Cited by "Taipei Under 
United States Pressures to Open Local Markets: Friction on the Farm, " Far Eastern Economic Review 
p. 73 (17 Aug., 1989). For a discussion of Taiwan's agricultural policy, see Wang, Y. T., 
"Agricultural Development in the Republic of China on Taiwan, INDUSTRY OF FREE CHINA, Vol. LXIX, No. 2, 
pp. 7-11 (1988); Lo, Minh-Chi & Hwang, Tsorng-Chyi, "Agricultural Trade Policy in Taiwan, " INDUSTRY 
OF FREE CHINA, Vol. LXXX, No. 5, pp. 37-53 (1993); and Ronald D. Knutson & Lee, Yuan-ho, "Adjustment 
of Food and Agricultural Policy After the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement: Implications 
for Taiwan and 
the United States, " INDUSTRY OF FREE CHINA, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, pp. 77-86 (1994). 
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security of food supplies and farmers' income. These systems were in many 
ways similar to the United States policies. 
10 Yet, on the whole, it is said that 
Taiwan's agricultural policy is still less protective than the United States-" 
United States - Taiwan trade talks concerning agricultural products 
included mainly the following products: vegetables (maize, mushrooms), fruits 
(apples, orange juice, raisins, peaches), grains (rice), and meats (beef, chicken, 
turkey). 12 The central concern of bilateral talks was about tariff reductions and 
the removal of nontariff barriers on the part of Taiwan. However, this was not 
always the case. In trade talks concerning rice, the purpose was mainly to 
protect American exports to developing countries. Also, with regard to 
negotiations of turkey imports to Taiwan, it was more a game of power politics 
than a matter of comparative advantage or free trade. These two cases, 
therefore, deserve more attention in the understanding of the nature of American 
trade pressures. 
(1). The Rice Agreement 
As rice is one of Taiwan's main agricultural products, it is not surprising 
that, inspired by the practices of many Western countries, rice production is 
heavily subsided and strict import restrictions on rice are imposed. As a result, 
Taiwan, like the United States, has had an over-production of rice since the 
9 
Knutson & Lee, Id., pp. 79-83. 
1D 
Id., p. 78. 
11 Id., p. 83. 
12 
See Appendix II. 
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1980s. 13 Naturally, Taiwan began to seek opportunities to export its surplus rice 
to other countries. This led to a conflict of interests with the United States. 
In 1984, the United States Rice Millers' Association filed a complaint alleging 
subsidized rice export from Taiwan. After a brief consultation between the two 
countries, Taiwan and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the AIT and the CCNAA Concerning Exports of Rice from Taiwan on 1 
March 1984.14 Under the Memorandum of Understanding, which was to last for 
five years, Taiwan agreed to export its rice only to countries with less than US$ 
795 per capita income, and that the total amount of export should not exceed 1.37 
million metric tonnes. 15 One may call this a special kind of voluntary restraint 
arrangement (VRA) in the sense that restraints were not directed against 
contracting counterpart, but to a group of other countries. This means that 
potential markets for Taiwan's rice were limited to some underdeveloped or 
developing countries in the Third World. In reality, this meant that the 
opportunity to export Taiwan's rice was virtually nil because countries with a per 
capita income of US$ 795 seldom had the economic capability to buy rice from 
Taiwan. Apart from that, Taiwan was not to compete with the United States in 
other areas of the world. The most astonishing thing in the memorandum was 
that Taiwan also agreed to adhere to the "Buy American" policy, including the 
purchase of United States grains. 
16 
13 
Knutson & Lee, supra note 8, p. 81. 
14 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the AIT and the CCNAA Concerning Exports of Rice from 
Taiwan, 1 March 1984,4 CHINESE Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., pp. 334-340 (1984). 
15 
Id., p. 335. 
16 
Id., p. 340. 
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After one year, as Taiwan's domestic rice consumption continued to 
decrease which led to a sharp drop in the market price, Taiwan sought to re- 
negotiate the rice agreement with the United States, hoping that the United 
States could allow a certain degree of "flexibility" in the interpretation of the 
agreement regarding the areas for export. The United States rejected the 
suggestion by simply claiming that there was no need to re-negotiate the 
agreement. 
17 
It is obvious that the rice agreement violated the spirit of free trade 
where buyers are free to choose sellers. It was, in fact, an arrangement of 
trade distortions. However, because of suffering from a trade deficit with 
Taiwan, it seems that the United States was justified in making such an 
arrangement for the benefits of its farmers but at the expense of Taiwan's right 
to trade. Also it seems that because it enjoyed a trade surplus, Taiwan should 
restrain itself from competing in the world agricultural markets. Nothing is more 
ridiculous than citing this as an effort towards liberalisation. 
More dramatically, the rice agreement has caused chained internal problems 
for Taiwan. Having realised that it was impossible to gain any room for rice 
export, the government of Taiwan planned the following: (1) a Six Year Paddy 
Diversion Programme -- that is, to divert the use of riceland from the production 
of rice to alternative crops; (2) to promote rice consumption by encouraging the 
production of rice processing products (e. g. rice-made biscuits) and limiting the 
11 
Yen, Ching-Chang, Chung-Mei Ching-Mao Tan-Pan Yiu-Kuan Fa-Lu Wen-Ti Chih Yien-Chiu (A STUDY 
OF THE LEGAL ISSUES REGARDING US-TAIWAN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS) p. 530 (1988). 
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import of wheat; and (3) to blend rice with other coarse grains to feed animals 
and livestock. 18 None of them was economically efficient and desirable. To 
achieve (1), the government had to increase tax on agricultural products, 
otherwise it simply would not have enough money to carry out the policy. The 
implementation of (2) led to a sharp rise in wheat price, benefiting only those 
wheat import-quota holders. (3) only created severe price fluctuation in the 
animal feeds market. Besides, the meat of those animals fed with rice tasted 
different, and was therefore unwelcome in the market. 19 
The whole story therefore reflects a chained distortion of Taiwan's farm 
policy and market. In order to honour the rice agreement, Taiwan's internal rice 
surplus problem had resulted in the diversion programme, and this in turn gave 
rise to distortions in the production and prices of other commodities. One 
commodity problem led to another. If American farmers benefited from the rice 
agreement, it was certainly due to these re-distributive arrangements between 
the two countries. 
(2). The Turkey War 
If the issue of the rice agreement represented an unequal "treaty" for 
Taiwan, the case of allowing the import of American turkey meat would mean 
sheer coercion. Since the mid 1980s, the United States has been keen to 
18 
Economic Daily News (Ching-chi jih pao), p. 3 (24 Sept., 1986). 
19 
id. 
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penetrate Taiwan's meat market. 
into political unrest on Taiwan. 
The 1988 "turkey meat" case later developed 
Apart from the main purpose of reducing its trade deficits with Taiwan, two 
additional reasons explained why the United States had chosen "turkey parts" 
as the subject matter for trade negotiation. First, there had been a significant 
increase in applications for licences to import turkey parts 
20 by Taiwanese 
importers since the end of 1987.21 As a result, the market price for domestic 
chickens fell drastically. In order to safeguard chicken farmers, the Taiwan 
government ordered that all applications for the import of turkey must acquire 
approval from the Council of Agriculture from 23 January 1988.22 The United 
States regarded this as the establishment of a nontariff barrier, thus violating 
the United States-Taiwan Trade Agreement of 1978. Second, there has been a 
sharp increase in turkey slaughter in the United States since the mid 1980s; 
while exports of whole turkeys and turkey parts have suffered a significant drop 
in sales in some countries, notably Egypt (-75%) and Japan (-35%). 
23 
20 
It should be noted that Taiwanese consumers generally prefer turkey parts (wings and 
drumsticks) to whole turkey. 
21 
Turkey meat belonged to the category of import control according to Taiwan's import 
regulation. This means that importers must apply to the government for permission (license) to 
import. 
22 
BOFT, Wuo-Kuo 78 Nien Tuei-Wai Mao-Yi Tsu-Shang Tan-Pan Chi-Yiao (A SUMMARY OF ROC'S 
EXTERNAL TRADE CONSULTATION IN 1989) Title 1 (1), p. 1 (1990) . [Hereinafter 1989 
Consultation Report] 
23 
1988 CRB COMMODITY YEARBOOK p. 276. 
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Under pressure from the United States, Taiwan reluctantly agreed to lift 
24 the restrictions. This decision created political turmoil. On 20 May 1988, a 
demonstration by thousands of chicken farmers in Taipei erupted into the most 
violent incident since the riots in 1947 when the KMT government recovered the 
island. 25 Just eight months after the lifting of martial law, the event posed a 
serious challenge to the democratic government. 26 To remedy the situation, the 
government immediately announced that it would not "betray" the farmers; while 
on the other hand, it tried to seek a compromise with the United States by 
allowing a greater import quota for American turkey parts. However, in August 
the United States sent its ultimatum: lift the restriction completely or face 
retaliation. 
27 On 1 December 1988, as an expedient measure, the government 
issued a permit license allowing an emergency import of 290 metric tons of turkey 
:, hoping that this would ease its trade tensions with the United States. 
Taiwan's efforts proved futile. The toughness of the United States was 
underestimated and the threat of trade retaliation still imminent. Eventually, in 
the 1989 trade negotiation, Taiwan agreed to allow imports of turkey parts 
without any quantitative limitation starting from 1 September 1990; before that 
date import licenses for turkey parts in the amount of 950 metric tons would be 
24 
"Taipei Under US Pressure to Open Local Markets: Friction on Farm, " Far Eastern Economic 
Review, p. 73 (17 Aug., 1989). 
25 
Thomas R. Howell, Alan Wm. Wolff, Brent L. Bartlett & R. Michael Gadbaw (ed. ), CONFLICT 
AMONG NATIONS: TRADE POLICIES IN THE 1990s p. 320 (1992)(hereinafter Howell & Wolff); the event is 
also treated as part of Taiwan's constitutional history in Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz 
(ed. ), CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD binder XIX pp. xxv-xxvi (1994). 
26 
There was a rumour that some KMT hardliner suggested re-imposing martial law to restore 
law and order, but President Lee rejected such a proposal. 
27 
K. T. Hsueh, "A Review of ROC-US Economic and Trade Relations Since 1955, " 4 American 
Monthly Journal, Issue 6, p. 69. 
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issued. 28 Because of this agreement, it was estimated that the livelihood of up 
to 200,000 farmers was affected. 29 
3. Evaluation 
Trade talks concerning agricultural products violated almost every principle 
the United States has sought to accomplish in its grand plan of liberalisation. 
First, the negotiations were based on power, not on law or even basic principles 
of free trade. This has rendered the United States official statement for world 
agricultural liberalisation that "developing countries, in particular, will have an 
opportunity to compete in a free market, to earn through trade, the exchange 
needed to finance development, including their own agricultural production" 
unreliable. 
30 Second, concessions on the part of Taiwan were made according 
to self-created executive discretion either without the knowledge of the public 
or against public opinion. The Executive branch of Taiwan, therefore, became a 
tool of United States policy insofar as it implemented and, thus legitimised, 
United States pressure in the domestic legal order. Consequently, this has 
further expanded the power of the Executive in the economy. 
In addition, the rice agreement and the opening of agricultural markets for 
American products have led to the establishment of economically inefficient 
28 
Article 2 of the AGREED MINUTES. The text is collected in 1989 Consultation Report, supra 
note 22, Title 1, pp. 17-18. 
29 
Id., p. 2. 
30 
"Statement of the United States Delegation Presenting a Proposal for Negotiation on 
Agriculture, " in supra note 5, p. 266. 
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structural adjustments on the part of Taiwan. The government of Taiwan was not 
only blamed for its "soft" attitudes towards the United States, but also its 
massive policy failure. One may thus argue that through these coercive 
arrangements, the United States is exporting its domestic problems to Taiwan. 
Moreover, it should be noted that all the trade agreements and subsequent 
arrangements were conducted in such an authoritarian way that public concern 
was deliberately put aside. In a democracy, the "altruistic" rice agreement and 
the "self-sacrifice" turkey agreements could never have been concluded, at least 
not without a proper planning in advance or a proportional consideration from 
the counterpart. True, the government did try to compensate the farmers by 
introducing news schemes, but that too was carried out brutally and proved to 
be unworkable. Yet, the omnipotence of the state meant that the government was 
not to be accused of any wrong doing. This reflects the other side of the 
"state-led" developmental state, that is, whether right or wrong, the government 
stays in power as it is. In an era when everyone (including the government) 
was talking about democratisation, the government was practising exactly the 
opposite, without even the slightest fear of losing power. 
C. BEER, WINE AND TOBACCO 
One of the most painful experiences of United States-Taiwan trade is 
perhaps the controversy over the importation of American beer, wine and tobacco 
happened between October 1985 and December 1986, precisely the period during 
which Taiwan was preparing to lift its martial law and marched for democracy. 
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Here, trade retaliation according to section 301 of the United States Trade Act 
was almost invoked for the purpose of opening Taiwan's wine and cigarette 
markets which were worth around US$ 1 billion per year. In order to resolve 
the pressures, the government of Taiwan had to take a series of measures in line 
with the United States, thus, again, fully exposed its vulnerability to the 
economic hegemony. The United States' demands were straight-forward at the 
beginning -- Taiwan must open its markets for American beer, wine and tobacco. 
However, subsequent bilateral negotiation proved that the issue was wider in its 
scope and more sophisticated in its context. In brief, it became an issue of how 
to preserve the monopoly status of the Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Bureau 
(TTWMB) of the Provincial Government of Taiwan in order to maintain its revenue 
which constituted some 10% of Taiwan's annual budget, 
31 
and to maintain the 
competitiveness of American wine and cigarettes in Taiwanese markets. The 
result was considered satisfactory in the eyes of the USTR in that United States 
cigarettes sales have increased rapidly since 1986, and that overall sales of 
products (tobacco, alcoholic and wine products) "have increased since it (the 
agreement) took effect. ' 
32 To understand the whole story and its implications, 
one needs to start from the legal and the institutional framework governing the 
sale of tobacco and wine in Taiwan. 
31 
The annual revenue of the TTWMB was around NT$ 40 billion (1 
billion Sterling Pounds; in 
1989. It was the source for the salaries of the army, public officials, and teaching staffs and 
employees of public schools. See 1989 Consultation Report, supra note 
22, Title II (1), p. 7. 
32 
1989 NTE Report, p. 168. 
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1. State Monopoly of Tobacco and Wine --- A Colonial Heritage 
One of the remaining systems that the government of Taiwan inherited from 
Japan during its occupation of Taiwan is the state-controlled manufacture, 
distribution and sale of wine and tobacco. To legalise the monopoly status of the 
state, a Temporary Regulation Governing Tobacco and Wine Within the Province 
of Taiwan was promulgated on 7 July, 1953. Though "temporary" in nature, the 
Law is still effective to date. According to the Law, the TTWMB is empowered to 
procure tobacco leaves, scrutinize the manufacturing of wine, distribute the 
products, and appoint retail sellers[Art. 6,17,28,19]. For over thirty years, the 
monopoly system has served three important functions: (1) as a main financial 
source for the Taiwan Provincial Government; (2) securing, in part, the income 
of the tobacco, grape and rice farmers by procuring their harvests; (3) 
regulating the market through price policy and limited advertisements to ensure 
that the market would not expand to a degree detrimental to health. 
33 Thus, it 
can be said that in comparison with other state monopolies, the existence of the 
TTWMB has some rather positive purposes. 
On the other hand, foreign wine and cigarettes were subjected to extremely 
high tariffs and control by the TTWMB. In fact, before 1986, domestic consumers 
could only buy foreign wine and tobacco in the branch offices of the TTWMB. 
33 
People's Daily News (Ming-chung jih pao), p. 2 (17 Aug., 1986). 
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This encouraged the emergence of a black market, though according to the Law 
severe criminal and administrative penalties might be imposed. '' 
2. The Battle and Issues 
The United States expressed its interests in opening Taiwan's cigarette and 
wine markets in 1985. After a brief negotiation, following the practices of Japan 
and South Korea, Taiwan denied the demand. In less than two months, the 
Reagan administration threatened to initiate a section 301 investigation of 
Taiwan's possible unfair distribution and sale of tobacco and wine. This 
surprised Taiwan for it took more than seven years for the United States to 
reach a wine and tobacco agreement with Japan. 
35 In other words, Taiwan did 
not expect that United States would react in such an efficient and dramatic 
manner. 
36 This caused internal panics in the cabinet of Taiwan. In October 
1985, the Vice-minister of the MOEA flew to the United States and signed a brief 
agreement with the United States committing Taiwan to the opening of wine and 
cigarette markets for American companies. The only condition was that the status 
of the TTWMB remained unchanged, though Taiwan agreed in principle that 
34 
According to Art. 36 of the Law, the maximum criminal penalty for illegal manufacture of 
cigarettes and wine is an imprisonment of not more than three years. In addition, for illegal sale 
of cigarettes and wine, an administrative fine of three times the values of the genuine products may 
be imposed. 
35 
National Evening News (Ming-tsu wen pao), p. 2 (9 Dec., 1986). 
36 
An interview with Mr. Kao, Y. C. and Mr. Lu, Y. L. suggests that there is one reason 
explaining the quick and relentless response of the United States -- the 
lousy performance of 
Taiwan's negotiating team. True, mastery of English was a problem, 
but the most fatal reason had 
to be the lack of co-ordination among different "competent authorities", namely, MOEA, 
MOF, and 
TTWMB. 
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"importation of American products should be depended on market demands". ' 
So, the section 301 investigation was dropped, at least temporarily. 
Negotiations for the detailed implementation of this agreement started in 
1986. The negotiations were centered mainly on two issues: (1) calculation of 
monopoly tax; and (2) limitation of advertising. Other issues such as importation 
procedures, labelling and packaging, and warehousing were all technical and 
relatively unimportant matters which could be solved easily if the two foremost 
issues reached agreement. Nonetheless, the negotiations still proved to be a 
nightmare to the Taiwanese negotiating team. 
With regard to the first issue, as the United States realised the structural 
functions of the TTWMB in Taiwan's agricultural sector, it agreed that the TTWMB 
had a right to charge a monopoly tax on American imports. A 185% of monopoly 
tax on the product was thus accepted by the United States. Compared with 
Japan's monopoly tax of 200% and South Korea's 190%, Taiwan's demand was 
lenient. 38 But then the issue was on what basis it should be calculated. Taiwan 
insisted that calculation be based on C. I. F. (cost, insurance and freight) times 
185%, otherwise the Provincial Government would suffer from financial problems. 
On the other hand, the American side, based on competitiveness consideration, 
argued that it should be based on F. O. B. (free on board) times 185%. 
39 
37 
United Daily News (Lien-ho pao), p. 2 (1 Nov., 1986). 
38 
Economic Daily News (Ching-chi jih pao), p. 2 (29 Aug., 1986). 
39 
People's Daily News (Ming-chung jih pao), p. 3 (24 Aug., 1986). 
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Obviously, according to the former, the sum reached would be higher than the 
latter. This issue was of particular significance with regard to cigarettes which 
were sold in small pack form. 4U In real terms, a pack of American cigarette 
would be charged NT$ 32 (80 Pence) of monopoly tax according to the former's 
calculation, or NT$ 20 (50 Pence) according to the latter's formula. ýl The United 
States claimed that the C. I. F. formula would damage the competitiveness of 
American products in Taiwan, and therefore rejected the proposal. Later, Taiwan 
agreed to lower the monopoly tax to NT$ 25 (62 Pence) per pack. But the United 
States still refused to accept, and claimed that NT$ 20 of monopoly tax per pack 
was the bottom line. So, neither side could agree on this practical but technical 
matter. 
As to the second issue, Taiwan insisted that no advertisement would be 
allowed on TV, radio or in newspapers because cigarettes, in particular, are 
hazardous to health. However, agents of American companies were allowed to do 
some promotional activities and limited advertisements in their branches. 
42 The 
United States rejected this proposal and argued that: (1) as there was no law 
governing the advertising of cigarettes and wine, advertisements should be 
allowed without being subject to any limitation; and (2) limitations on 
advertisements would put some not-so-well-known American cigarettes (such as 
PARAMOUNT, WEST, ASTOR, and KING GEORGE) in a very disadvantageous position 
40 
As to beer and wine, the dispute was minor probably because the beer and wine products of 
TTWMB and that of the United States multinationals' belonged to 
different price range and were for 
different classes of people. As such, they would not compete with each other 
for consumers. 
41 
Shin Sheng Daily News (Shin-sheng jih pao), p. 2 (27 Aug., 1986). 
42 
People's Daily News (Ming-chung jih pao), p. 3 (24 August, 1986). 
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in competing with TTWMB's products and even with well-known American 
cigarettes (MARLBORO, KENT, MORE, 555 etc. ). Therefore, as a matter of fairness 
in market competition, advertisements of whatever kind should be permitted so 
that consumers could make their right choice. 
43 
These two arguments, though not convincing, were difficult for Taiwan to 
rebut. First, as a state-monopoly, and an authoritarian corporatist state, 
regulating the TTWMB's advertising activities according to law was superfluous. 
Law, in the eyes of the authoritarian regime, was used to govern people, not to 
regulate the government itself. As far as the government was concerned, the 
TTWMB was empowered to decide the kind of advertising it deemed fit, and that 
was more than adequate. Yet, this explained only the nature and practice of the 
Taiwan government. As a nation committed to democracy and the rule of law, this 
rather exposed the legal weakness of Taiwan's democratic transition. 
Unfortunately, this legal weakness was immediately taken advantage of by the 
United States. Turning to the second point, if, for the sake of argument, its 
basic rationale is correct, then the best way to ensure the competitiveness of 
small firms is perhaps to grant advertising subsidies to the sellers of those not 
so well known cigarette brands, because the big firms are always capable of 
spending big money for big advertisements. But, of course, Taiwan was not in 
a position to make such an argument unless it wished for pointing fingers. In 
fact, the only argument Taiwan made was that even the United States government 
forbade cigarette commercials on TV. However, the United States claimed that its 
43 
id. 
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situation was different because there were laws regulating such activities 
whereas in Taiwan there were none. 
Therefore, the negotiation broke down completely. At this juncture, the 
government of Taiwan made a serious misjudgment and miscalculation on the 
determination of the United States. As the United States had never invoked 
section 301 on any country regarding the opening of their wine and cigarette 
markets, the "High Level Party-government" of Taiwan thus believed that it was 
not likely to be applied to Taiwan, considering also that Taiwan's wine and 
cigarettes markets were not big enough. Its judgment was wrong. On 27 
October, 1986, the United States Trade Ambassador Clayton Yeutter announced 
that it would seek trade retaliation according to section 301 of the Trade Act of 
1974,44 but he refused to give a retaliation list or to tell the size of retaliation. 
Suddenly, Taiwan realised that the United States was serious about the whole 
matter and trade retaliation of an unknown amount was indeed imminent. Facing 
such pressure, secret negotiations were immediately conducted in the United 
States. Knowing that Taiwan wished to seek a resolution, the United States 
increased its demands --- monopoly tax for cigarettes should be lower than NT$ 
20 (50 Pence) per pack. On 12 December 1986, an agreement was finally 
reached. 
45 According to the agreement, Taiwan promised that, inter alia, the 
monopoly tax for each pack of American cigarettes would be NT$ 16.6 (41 Pence), 
44 
51 Federal Register 39,639 (1986); Economic Daily News (Ching-chi jih pao), p. 2 (5 
December, 1986). 
45 
Agreement Between the AIT and the CCNAA Concerning Beer, Wine and Cigarettes, 12 December, 
1986. Text published in 6 CHINESE Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., pp. 440-445 (1987). 
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and that American wine and cigarettes could be advertised in magazines, with the 
former advertised additionally in newspapers. 46 Soon, American wine, beer, and 
cigarettes entered the Taiwanese market. 
47 It was estimated that Taiwan's 
tobacco and grape farmers, particularly the latter, would suffer big losses due 
to the TTWMB's reduction in its procurement of their products. As grape trees 
belonged to long-term plantation, it was impossible to replace them for other 
crops. 
48 As noted by a Taiwanese newspaper reporter, this agreement reminded 
people of the Opium War between China and the United Kingdom in the 19th 
century. 
49 
3. Evaluation 
The issue of the importation of American cigarettes and wine reveals 
several crucial points. First, the disagreement over the calculation of monopoly 
tax shows that the United States does not hesitate to use its section 301 weapon 
even on minor technical issues. Second, the negotiation fully reflects the fact 
that the United States government was working for the economic benefits of its 
own tobacco companies and was deliberately ignoring its own anti-smoking 
46 
Liberty Daily News (Tzu-yao jih pao), p. 2 (10 Dec., 1986). 
47 
"Moving into Taiwan's Open Wine, Beer, Cigarette Market, " East Asian Executive Report, p. 7 
(15 May, 1987). 
48 
Id. 
49 
Economic Daily News (Ching-chi jih pao), p. 2, (9 December, 1986). 
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policy. 
50 In fact, one may suspect that this case was a way to compensate 
American tobacco companies' loss in the domestic market by opening overseas 
markets for them. 51 In other words, this is a remarkable example of double- 
standard. Third, it shows that section 301 is a flexible policy instrument. 
Against strong countries, such as Japan, it is flexible. But when it was used in 
countries like Taiwan, it became an economic atomic bomb, ready to be triggered 
at any time. Fourth, this "blunt-instrument" approach of the United States has 
become exemplary model for other countries. Following the signing of the United 
States-Taiwan agreement, the EC demanded the same treatment from Taiwan for 
its wine and tobacco products, otherwise it would consider curtailing Taiwan's 
quotas for textile exports to the EC. 
52 This is indeed ironic because the EC has 
traditionally maintained that America's unilateralism disrupts world trade. 
53 But 
it seems that when immediate economic interests are at hand, the EC does not 
50 
In January 1987, an official document of the United States stated that, "(s)moking presents 
the largest single source of health risk in America. The fatality risk of smoking is more than 26 
times greater than that of work... Life insurance companies usually charge higher premiums reflecting 
their greater immortality... The issue of smoking goes beyond matters of personal choice; secondary 
smoke affects others... 42 state and D. C. restrict smoking in public places, including government 
workplace. New rules for Federal employer were also made. " See PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC REPORT, pp. 185- 
186 (Jan., 1987). 
51 
This is evidenced by the strong support of some United States Senators from states with 
major tobacco-growing interests. For instance, in 1992 when Taiwan planned to impose restrictions 
on cigarette marketing in legislation, Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Mitch McConnell of 
Kentucky wrote letters to the Taiwan government protesting the proposed bill. They even threatened 
that Taiwan's application to enter the GATT could be impeded. See "U. S. Cigarette Firms are Battling 
Taiwan, " Wall St. J., p. 13D (4 May, 1992). 
52 
Liu, Lawrence S., "Legal and Policy Perspectives on United States Trade Initiatives and 
Economic Liberalisation in the ROC, " 11 Mich. J. Int'l L., p. 341 (1990). 
53 
For instance, Corrado Pirzio-Biroli, the deputy head of the EC delegation in Washington 
D. C., when commenting on America's section 301 of the Trade Act, says, "(w)orld trade problems cannot 
be solved through forced settlements based on a unilateral determination of unfairness, unilateral 
time tables, and the threat of unilateral trade action if no agreement is reached. In particular, 
this cannot be done with respect to countries that possess substantial retaliatory power. Were the 
rest of the world to respond with their own 301s, GATT would seriously face collapse.... " See 
Corrado Pirzio-Biroli, "A European View of the 1988 U. S. Trade Act and Section 301, " in Jadgish 
Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick (ed. ), AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD 
TRADING SYSTEM p. 261 (1990). 
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hesitate to play the same trick. Power politics remains an essential ingredient 
in international trade. 54 Unwilling to sustain another stroke, on 1 January, 1987, 
Taiwan opened its wine and tobacco markets to other non-American companies. ýJ 
D. PRO-AMERICAN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT ARRANGEMENTS 
In order to reduce effectively Taiwan's huge trade surplus with the United 
States, and as part of the "Trade Action Plan", the government of Taiwan had, 
through various means, instructed and encouraged its public and private sectors 
to buy American products. One effective directive was to grant preference to 
American firms in Taiwan's public-procurement projects -- that is, the purchase 
of goods and services by public authorities, agencies and enterprises for 
governmental purposes. This, needless to say, was great news to the United 
States, as the Taiwan government was well-known for its heavy involvement in 
the country's economic activities. The Ten Constructions in the 1970s, and the 
recent Six-Year Plan all indicate that the government is the biggest "consumer" 
on the island. 
Here, two questions arise. First, how could this kind of policy which is 
so discriminatory in nature escape the laws of Taiwan? Or, to approach it from 
another angle, how are the laws governing public procurement interpreted to 
meet the policy of the government? Second, what is the attitude of the United 
States with regard to the Taiwan government's legal or illegal arrangements? 
In order to answer these two questions, one must first try to understand the 
labyrinth of Taiwan's public procurement laws. 
54 
1 owe this point to my supervisor Professor Julio Faundez. 
55 
Liu, supra note 52. 
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1. The Legal Labyrinth 
Apart from the unregulated "Buy Domestic" policy which requires that all 
public enterprises and administrative agencies should procure locally if the goods 
and services can be manufactured in Taiwan or if acceptable substitutes are 
available locally, few people, even the responsible bureaucrats, know exactly the 
number of laws, regulations and administrative orders governing public 
procurement, let alone which should be applied in a specific case-56 According 
to a recent government publication made for the preparation of Taiwan's joining 
the GATT, 57 there are forty two laws, regulations and administrative orders 
concerning public procurement of goods and services, and the number is 
increasing. More recently, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) has issued another 
order instructing that construction contracts for the Six-Year Plan may be 
awarded to the "most reasonable" bidder, instead of the one who offers the 
lowest price-58 Therefore, it is quite impossible, and indeed unnecessary, to 
discuss all these laws and orders in detail. It will be sufficient to analyze their 
general traits and government practices with regard to international bidding. 
56 
This writer has an experience of facing these intriguing administrative orders and 
practices. In the spring of 1990, I was employed by the Institute for Information Industry (III) to 
join a special project of designing a computerisation programme for the Judicial Yuan. As the 
project involved the procurement of computer hardware as well as software, an open procedure was 
decided. But then, I found that what really governed the whole process was not the Regulation 
Concerning the Auditing and Monitoring of Project Construction, Repair, Purchase, Ordering and 
Selling of Property by Governmental Organs (see below), as it should be, but some special orders 
which could only be found in the files of the project manager. And the project manager always 
complained that the orders were deficient because they were made by bureaucrats who knew little about 
computers. As a matter of fact, during the six-month period, IBM and McDonald Douglas, the two most 
ambitious potential bidders, had been trying to persuade the III and the competent authority that 
the procurement rules be changed in their favour. 
51 
BOFT, Ministry of Economic Affairs, GATT cheng-fu kuai-yuai Lieu-wen chi wo-kuo cheng-fu 
tsai-ko shiang-kuan fa-kuai hui-pien (A COMPILATION OF GATT PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS 
AND ROC 
GOVERNMENT'S LAWS RELATING TO PROCUREMENT) (December, 1992). [Hereinafter Procurement Regulations] 
58 
"Creating the Legal Environment for Taiwan's Six-Year Plan, " 13 East Asian Executive 
Report, pp. 8,15-18 (15 Dec., 1991). 
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Scholars and commentators might be interested to know that there is a 
proper legal source for these procurement orders. The basic law governing 
public procurement is the Regulation Concerning the Auditing and Monitoring of 
Project Construction, Repair, Purchase, Ordering and Selling of Property by 
Governmental Organs promulgated on 31 October, 1950. According to this law, 
public contracts may be awarded by open, compared or negotiated procedures 
[Art. 6 & 7], roughly similar to the tendering procedures regulated by the GATT 
Procurement Code of 1979.59 Open procedure means that the public contract is 
open for bidding and will be awarded to the bidder who offers the lowest price. 
This rule is indeed the general principle of procurement, and is in accordance 
with the GATT rules. 
60 The aim of open procedure is to invite the greatest 
number of bidders so that vivid competition can be achieved. However, one rule 
not necessarily approved by GATT is that if the competent authority consider 
that the price is "obviously unreasonable", which might lead to inferior quality, 
then it is possible that the bidder who offers the second lowest price may be 
awarded the contract, or a new bidding procedure maybe re-opened[Art. 15]. 
59 
The GATT Procurement Code was negotiated during the Tokyo Round and concluded 
for the 
purpose of opening to foreign trade the previously restricted market of government 
procurement. Each 
party that adopts the Agreement is required to 
follow the rules of non-discrimination, and 
transparency for the benefit of foreign suppliers of other Signatories countries. 
According Article 
V of the Code, there are three tendering procedures, namely, the open, 
the selective and the single. 
Open procedures are those under which all interested suppliers may submit 
a tender. Selective 
procedures allow entities to invite limited qualified suppliers 
for the bids. Single procedures mean 
suppliers contact suppliers individually. Selective and 
Single procedures are treated as exceptions. 
For full discussion of the GATT Procurement Code, see Morton Pomeranz, 
"Toward a New International 
Order in Government Procurement, " 11 Law & Poly Int'l Bus., pp. 1263-1300 
(1979); David V. Anthony 
& Carol K. Hagerty, Cautious Optimism as a Guide to Foreign Government 
Procurement, " 11 Law & Poly 
Intl Bus., pp. 1301-1358 (1979); Joanne Fiaschetti, 
"Technical Analysis of the Government Procurement 
Agreement, " 11 Law & Poly Int'l Bus., pp. 1345-1358 (1979). 
60 
Article V, para. 14(f) of the GATT Procurement Code. 
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Under certain conditions, the competent authority may choose the compared 
procedure -- that is, the invitation of limited qualified firms and compared the 
prices they offer. One of the conditions is "upon the prior designation by the 
Executive Yuan of specific procurement area"[Art. 7(5)]. In other words, the 
Executive Yuan has the power to decide (limit) which country's firms are allowed 
to participate in the compared procedure. Negotiated procedure normally happens 
when there is only one qualified bidder who is willing to take the public contract 
[Art. 11]. 
Accordingly, it is clear that the Executive branch, through the 
interpretation of the law, could easily disregard the open procedures. In 
addition, Article 35 further provides that in case of a natural calamity, or 
significant economic crisis, then upon the approval of the Executive Yuan, 
regulations concerning open, compared and negotiated procedures can be ignored. 
This is also recognised by the GATT Procurement Code[Art. VIII]. Here, it should 
be noted that the practical problem of Taiwan with regard to procurement is not 
that discriminatory procedures are commonplace -- arguably, even industrialised 
countries are keen on discriminatory practices, 
61 but that the procedures lack 
transparency and judicial remedies. With regard to the former, the crux of the 
problem is that it has been the practice of the bureaucrats to make ad hoc 
orders to solve specific procurement cases. To date, procurement concerning 
manufactured goods, natural resources, computer hardware and software, medical 
bl 
EC, for instance, has a discriminatory policy in favoured of "national champions". Even 
the United States has the "Buy American Act"; 47 Stat. 1520 (1933), 41 U. S. C. 10a. For discussion 
of EC procurement laws, see Friedl Weiss, "Public Procurement Law in the EC Internal Market 1992: 
the Second Coming of the European Champion, " The Antitrust Bulletin, pp. 307-335 (Summer 1992); for 
the "Buy American Act", Pomeranz, supra note 59, pp. 1264-1270. 
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apparatus, telecommunication equipment, public construction and services 
contracts etc. all have special rules to follow. With regard to public enterprises 
the administrative order Measures for Application of Importation of Goods by 
Public Enterprises, 62 which allows that, due to trade policy, the BOFT may 
designate procurement areas[Art. 6(1)], achieves the same objectives of qualifying 
the number and nationalities of the suppliers. In sum, principles and rules 
regarding special procurement projects are subject to modifications of the 
competent authority at any time and for any reason. Under this kind of system, 
foreign suppliers could never obtain full knowledge of the procurement 
information. Precisely because of this enormous power, the government is able 
to direct its organs to buy American goods and services. 
For a full understanding of the problem of judicial remedy, one needs to 
know more about the existence of a special Constitutional organ -- the Control 
Yuan. Article 90 of the ROC Constitution states, "The Control Yuan shall be the 
highest control organ of the State and shall exercise the power of consent, 
impeachment, censure, and auditing. " Accordingly, a Ministry of Audit under the 
Control Yuan was established to take charge of all matters relating to auditing, 
including the review of procurement projects. The complexity here is that the 
Control Yuan is traditionally regarded as a quasi-judicial organ, and this makes 
the overturning of its decisions by the court impossible. As a matter of fact, 
when faced with those incoherent administrative orders, one cannot expect that 
62 
The text of the Measures is collected in CCLRRC, Hsing-Cheng 10-11-08; reproduced in 
Procurement Regulations, supra note 57, pp. 93-95. 
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the court can do a better job than the Ministry of Auditing. 63 In brief, judicial 
remedies for unfair or illegal bidding, though legally possible, are, in fact, 
meaningless. 
In reality, the operation of the system of public procurement has 
culminated in the following results: bad quality, high costs, and delayed bidding 
procedures. 
64 
In the case of Taiwan joining the bidding procedure in the United States, 
the pro-American procurement policy can be implemented without difficulty. A 
special administrative order Measures Regrading Procurement of Property in 
Foreign Countries65 states that the competent authority MOEA may designate 
procurement area[Art. 6]. As such, all Taiwan has to do is offer an unreasonably 
high price to obtain the contract. 
2. The "Achievements" 
The pro-American procurement policy has been carried out to its fullest 
extent since the mid-1980s, even without pressures from the United States. The 
reason for such a seemingly "voluntary" action on the part of Taiwan is the hope 
63 
The most unfortunate thing is that the Control Yuan, before the 1990s, was regarded as one 
of the dirtiest government organs. The problem was a structural one, for most of the members of the 
Control Yuan, who were supposed to hold their post through elections, were those old unelected 
persons loyal to the KMT party. As such, the Control Yuan became a place for clientilism. 
64 
"Pro-American Procurement Policy: Hot Potato? Panacea? " Economic Daily News, p. 2 (3 
December, 1988). 
65 
The text of the Measures is reproduced in Procurement Regulations, supra note 58, pp. 82-83. 
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that the United States would be lenient to other sectors of trade. The facts 
speak for themselves. In 1988, for instance, among the 130 procurement cases 
opened for international bidding by the Taiwan government, 90 of them went to 
the United States companies-66 As to the state-run public enterprises, out of 
a total of 67 procurement made by the Tai Power (Electricity) Company in the 
same year, United States companies were awarded 54.67 
In the international market where the bidding procedure is governed by 
foreign law, pro-American procurement policy is often carried out at the expense 
of economic efficiency. The procurement of Alaska crude oil provides the best 
example. In 1986, Taiwan participated in the international bidding for Alaskan 
crude oil. Before announcing the result, the United States had anticipated that 
Japan would offer the highest price and be awarded the contract. The reason 
was that as the United States had expressed its intention of reducing its huge 
trade deficits, of which Japan was the biggest "sinner", it was the United States' 
understanding that Japan would do something to remedy it. The result was 
astonishing. Taiwa n's China Oil -- -a state-owned corporation - -- got the 
contract. By offering a price of 15% more than the international oil market price, 
even Japan could not compete with Taiwan. In real terms, it meant Taiwan would 
have to pay an extra US$ 1.83 per barrel (in 1986, the oil price in the Asian 
market was around US$ 13 per barrel). 
68 It certainly seemed a noteworthy 
66 
1989 Consultation Report, supra note 22, Title 1 (4), pp. 25-26. 
67 
Id. 
68 
Economic Daily News (Ching-chi jih pao), p. 2 (9 Dec., 1986). 
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performance to the United States and even to the world. In effect, however, it 
meant nothing more than dumping cash on the richest country in the world. 
Similar cost-inefficient contracts can also be found in the purchase of American 
grains and other agricultural products. 
69 
3. The Attitudes of the United States 
Supporters of the United States Trade Act, particularly section 301, claim 
that the legal rationale for imposing trade pressures and threats on the part of 
the United States is its commitment to a more liberal, open and rule-based 
market . 
70 If this is the case, then it is logical for the United States to 
encourage the Taiwan government to adhere to the GATT principles, and even to 
abandon the pro-American policy. 
Quite the contrary happened, the United States had been keen to make use 
of Taiwan's authority and existing laws to gain more business opportunities. 
Thus, instead of challenging the legality of those procurement laws, the United 
States cared more about what kind of preferences American firms could enjoy in 
the actual bidding process (for instance, under what circumstances would 
European and Japanese firms be excluded), and whether pro-American 
69 
id. 
10 
For instance, Warren Maruyama, an officer of the White House, says, "(d)espite any 
appearance of unilateralism, the United States has sought to use section 301 
in a constructive way, 
with the aim of strengthening the GATT and multilateral 
dispute settlement mechanism over the long- 
term. " Warren Maruyama, "Section 301 and the Appearance of Unilateralism, " 11 Mich. J. Znt'Z L., 
p. 395 (Winter 1990). 
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procurement policy would still be upheld in the future. 71 Only when American 
firms became the disappointed bidders would the legal deficiencies of non- 
transparency or discriminatory treatment be brought to the negotiating table. 
Moreover, on several occasions, the United States even spoke on behalf of some 
of its industries of not being able to be awarded the contracts. For instance, 
in 1991, the United States protested against Taiwan's "discriminatory" 
procurement policy which foreclosed the highly competitive United States soda 
ash industry from selling to the TTWMB. 72 In 1994, based on the so-called 
"United States sources", the United States government claimed that American 
firms "might be able to sell up to US$ 100 million more per year to the 
Directorate General for Telecommunication if the "Buy Taiwan" policy were 
eliminated. "73 All these indicate that the United States seemed to have adopted 
a different negotiating strategy and standard with regard to the issue of public 
procurement. Practical self-interests override the commitment to the rule-based 
GATT; while the basic notion of free trade (and even fair trade) is in the process 
of being forgotten. 
It was only until 1994 that the United States required Taiwan to adhere to 
the Government Procurement Code as re-negotiated during the Uruguay Round. 
74 
This change of attitude is certainly positive, yet it remains to be seen how the 
United States would react if the government of Taiwan, by complying with the 
11 
1989 Consultation Report, supra note 22, Title 1(4), pp. 24-27. 
12 
1991 NTE Report, p. 208. 
13 
1994 NTE Report, p. 256. 
74 
Id., p. 257. 
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GATT rule of non-discrimination, openly abolish its pro-American public 
procurement policy. 
4. Evaluation 
Taiwan's regulations governing public procurement constitute the darkest 
area of law and legality. Not only do they bear the characteristics of non- 
transparency, discrimination and lack of predictability, very often they are 
subject to a high degree of manipulation by the government. Under these 
circumstances, all kinds of policies could be easily implemented without even 
amending a single law or explaining to the public. Nevertheless, these old 
practices survive and have successfully passed down to the democratic era, 
partly because the Executive branch need them to carry out the " Buy American 
Policy" 
It remains to be seen how Taiwan would react to the American's latest 
demand of adhering to the GATT Government Procurement Code. Maybe all laws 
governing public procurement will need to be overhauled, and new non- 
discriminatory, transparent practices will be established. However, it is likely 
that as long as the United States does not object to Taiwan's "Buy American 
Policy", which surely will be strongly against its own interests, all possible legal 
changes would occur only on paper. On Taiwan's side, by seeing trade and 
economic policies as an extension of foreign policy, there is no reason to give up 
the present policy. In sum, this means that the government procurement 
practices, in spite of their deficiencies, are not likely to change because of this 
external factor. As to the legal deficiencies, it is better not to mention it. 
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E. VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT ARRANGEMENTS (VRAs) ON MACHINE TOOLS, 
TEXTILES AND OTHERS 
1. A Brief Overview of the Development of VRAs 
One of the most intriguing facts in international economics is perhaps the 
existence of hundreds of VRAs since World War II -- an era signifying the 
prevalence of global free trade. It is intriguing in the sense that VRAs' precise 
function is to destroy the idea of free trade by creating bilateral, secretive and 
non-transparent trade arrangements. Commentators and scholars, from economic 
and legal aspects have, since the 1970s, criticised the VRAs. They attacked VRAs 
as unwise trade policy, 
75 
a symbol of "neo-protectionism", 76 a new "non-tariff 
barrier" designed to placate domestic special interests groups, 
77 illegitimate 
devices in stark violation of domestic laws, 
78 
and more seriously, the rule-based 
multilateral trade order created by GATT. 79 Nevertheless, it seems that VRAs are 
still the policy instruments favoured by the United States. 
75 
Michael William Lochmann, "The Japanese VER on Automobile exports: an Abandonment of the 
Free Trade Principles of the GATT and the Free Market Principles of the U. S. Antitrust Law, " 27 Harv. 
Intl L. J., pp. 149-153 (Wint. l986); Eric C. Emerson, "Voluntary Restraint Agreements & Democratic 
Decision-making, " 31 Virg. J. Intl L., p. 282 (Wint. 1991). 
76 
Jan Tumlir, PROTECTIONISM, TRADE POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES pp. 38-43 (1985). 
77 
Malcolm D. H. Smith, "Voluntary Export Quotas and U. S. Trade Policy -- A New Non-Tariff 
Barrier, " 5 Law & Poly Inc 11 Bus., p. 10 (1973). 
18 
VRAs violate U. S. domestic law as they largely bypass the import relief process (section 
201) of the Trade Act. Section 201 requires a formal injury determination by the International Trade 
Commission before any import relief could be imposed. However, the United States administration, 
at this juncture, would negotiate with the exporting countries, and "persuade" them that the Congress 
might pass a bill mandating an import quota. But by voluntarily limiting the exports, the bill could 
be blocked in the committee. See Tumlir, supra note 76, pp. 39-40; Emerson, supra note 75, p. 289. 
79 
To sum up the analysis of those international academics, a VRA has the potential to violate 
three separate GATT articles: (1) Article XIX which requires that any import relief measures be 
imposed pursuant to a finding of injury; (2) Article I which mandates equal treatment for any 
signatory's trading partners; (3) Article XI which limits the use of quantitative restrictions on 
trade. See Brian Hindley, "VER and the GATT's Main Escape Clause, " 3 World Economy, pp. 313-341 
(1980); John Jackson, "The GATT Consistency of ERAS, " 11 World Economy, pp. 485-500 (1988); Michel 
Koestecki, "ERA and Trade Liberalisation, " 10 World Economy, pp. 425-454 (1987); Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, "Grey Area Trade Policy and the Rule of Law, " 22 J. of World Trade, issue 2, pp. 23-44 
(1988). 
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No doubt, the various VRAs have practical reasons for their existence. 
From the viewpoint of the exporting countries, as analyzed in Professor John 
Jackson's earlier book, VRAs are actions taken deliberately by exporting countries 
because of their concern that unilateral quotas would otherwise be imposed by 
the importing countries, and once uniliteral quotas are imposed, they bear within 
themselves the seeds of their own continuity. 
80 This argument does not, 
however, sound very convincing as VRAs, once established, also become difficult 
to terminate. The experience of VRAs on textiles is strong evidence of this. In 
the case of Taiwan, VRA on textile products can be dated back as early as 1978. 
It was then renewed, modified, and extended in 1980,1982,1986,1990, and 
1992.81 Today, it is still one of the main jobs of the Textile Federation -- a 
permanent quasi-governmental organisation of Taiwan -- to administer the 
country's system of textile export quotas. To use Lochmann's words, VRA is like 
Pandora's Box, once the lid is opened, it becomes increasingly difficult to close. ` 
It is also argued that by agreeing to voluntary restraints, exporting 
countries maintain relatively more control over "voluntary" restraints. 
83 This 
$D 
John Jackson, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
TEXT p. 668 (1977). 
81 
Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool, and Man-Made Fibre Textiles and Textile 
Products, 1978; Implementing Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool, and Man-Made Fibre Textiles 
and Textile Products, 1980,1 Chinese Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., p. 226 (1981); Agreement Relating to Trade 
in Cotton, Wool, and Man-Made Fibre Textiles and Textile Products, 1982,3 Chinese Yb. int'1 L. & 
Aff. , P. 295 (1983) ; Exchange of Letters 
Between the AIT and the CCNAA Concerning the Amendments and 
Changes of an Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool, Man-Made Fibre, Silk Blend and Other 
Vegetable Fibre Textile and Textile Products, 1986,6 Chinese Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., p. 415 (1986-87); 
Agreement Between the AIT and the CCNAA Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool, Man-Made Fibre, Silk Blend 
and Other Non-Cotton Vegetable Fibre Textile Products, 1990,10 Chinese Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., (1989- 
90) ; and Textile Agreement Between the AIT and the CCNAA, 1992,11 Chinese Yb. Int 'IL. & Aff. , p. 571 
(1991-92). The 1992 Agreement will expire on 31 December, 1995. 
82 
Lochmann, supra note 75, p. 152. 
83 
According to Kostecki, the restriction is voluntary in the sense (i) that the exporting 
country formally has a right to eliminate or to modify it unilaterally and (ii) that 
it is 
essentially monitored and enforced at the exporting countries. Koestecki, supra note 74, pp. 425-426. 
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point is also weak because one can hardly imagine that the exporting countries 
(normally developing countries) would dare terminate unilaterally the VRAs with 
the United States. Such an action might invite even grater hostility. 
A more convincing argument is provided by Jan Tumlir who suggests that 
America's negotiation of VRAs with exporting countries (particularly Asian 
countries) relies largely on coercion, bringing non-trade considerations and 
i 
conditions into the negotiation. 
4 More often than not, they involve the use of 
threat and bribes, thus bringing certain undeniable elements of voluntariness in 
the resulting arrangement. 
85 Tumlir's argument is also supported by another 
free-trade advocate, Professor Robert McGee, who based on natural rights theory, 
claims that the United States is keen to use threats and intimidation to get 
foreign governments to agree to "voluntary" restrictions. 
86 Accordingly, it is 
unethical since the United States government functions to protect the special 
interests of minority groups at the expense of majority consumers. 
87 
Under these circumstances, it is often the consideration of exporting 
countries that through VRAs, they can at least preserve a portion of their 
exports to the importing countries. 
88 This could be the only reason why the 
agreements contain a certain degree of voluntariness. 
84 
Tumlir, supra note 76, p. 41. 
85 
Id., p. 39. 
86 
Robert W. McGee, "Trade Policy of a Free Society, " 19 Capital U. L. Rev., p. 322 (Spr. 1990). 
87 
Id., pp. 338-339. 
88 
Jackson, supra note 80, p. 670. 
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The case is perhaps most obvious in the VRAs between the United States 
and Taiwan. Since the 1970s, Taiwan has concluded several VRAs (and the similar 
orderly market arrangements; OMAs89) with the United States concerning textiles, 
machine tools, and colour television sets, 
90 
whereby Taiwan agrees to limit 
quantitatively its exports of these products to the United States. The reason for 
making such a self-restraint commitment is clear: Taiwan would face the threat 
of more restrictive measures by the United States if it refused to do so (such 
as the withdrawal of GSP). In addition, in the interests of maintaining political 
and economic harmony with the hegemony, it was simply not appropriate to 
challenge the United States initiatives. One might as well call Taiwan's 
acceptance of VRAs another kind of accommodative policy. 
2. The Legal Complexities 
(1). Legal Bases of VRAs 
If one is to find a legal basis for the Taiwan government to conclude VRAs, 
then, reluctantly, the National Mobilisation Law -- which granted the government 
almost unlimited discretionary powers to regulate the economy during wartime, 
89 
An OMA has similar effects as a VRA. The difference is that OMA 
is not made on a 
government-to-government basis, but between industries. 
90 
Arrangement Between the CCNAA and the AIT Concerning Trade in Certain Machine 
Tools, 1986, 
6 CHINESE Yb. Int'1 L. & Aff., p. 445 (1987); Understanding Between the CCNAA and the 
AZT Concerning 
Trade in Certain Machine Tools, 1992,11 CHINESE Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., p. 529 
(1991-92); Memorandum 
Concerning Extension of Self-restraint Measures for Exporting Colour Television to the 
United States 
of 1980,1 CHINESE Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., p. 
240 (1981). For VRAs on textile products, see supra note 
81, and accompanying text. 
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serves this purpose. 91 Article 19 expressly states that the government, if 
necessary, may encourage, limit or restrict the importation or exportation of 
certain goods, and increase or decrease import or export taxes. It should be 
noted that the law was made in 1942 against the background of Sino-Japanese 
war. But it remained effective after the war as the KMT government needed it 
to "suppress" the "communist rebellion". The Constitution, which was made in 
1947, had to be put aside. 
Nevertheless, the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the ending of "the 
Duration to Suppress the Rebellion" in 1991 meant the demise of the National 
Mobilisation Law. This immediately gave rise to the problem of future VRAs. 
Wittily, the Foreign Trade Law of 1993 solved this problem. Article 7(111) states 
that apart from those belonging to the executive discretion, all agreements 
concluded after external trade negotiations must be referred by the Executive 
Yuan to the Legislative Yuan for approval. While this Article says nothing of 
whether VRAs belong to the area of executive discretion or agreements subject 
to legislative approval, Article 16 further provides that the competent authority, 
BOFT, could impose quotas on export goods as "a matter of necessity for trade 
negotiations or implementing trade agreements or accords". As the implementation 
of VRAs necessarily involves the setting up of quotas, these two Articles combine 
to give the Executive discretionary powers over the making of VRAs. 
41 
The National Mobilisation Law was made by the National Assembly on 29 March 1942 and 
promulgated on 5 May 1942. The legislative purpose of this 
law was to utilise effectively national 
resources to fight against the Japanese. The Law, 
however, remained effective after the war. 
100 
The result of this broad delegation of powers to the BOFT means that the 
Legislative and the Judicial branches are barred from questioning the illegality 
of the Executive's decisions concerning at least at the implementation stage. 
(2). The Issue of Cartel-like Arrangements 
A very sensitive issue surrounding the VRAs is their legality under the 
anti-trust law. In the United States, it is argued that VRAs usually involve 
naked restraint of trade, such as restriction on output and division of markets 
among producers which are considered per se illegal under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. 92 However, the current American practice is that if United States 
government is involved in the making of VRAs, anti-trust charges would be 
exempted. 
93 Even if a party brings a suit against a VRA, an anti-trust suit 
against foreign exporter would still be blocked if the defendants assert the 
affirmative defense of foreign sovereign compulsion. 
94 
The problem of cartel-like arrangements is less complex in Taiwan. First 
of all, it is doubtful whether there exists any incentive to bring such an anti- 
trust claim by Taiwanese exporters. More often than not, Taiwanese 
manufacturers or exporters (particularly those bigger ones) in the industries 
involved were not against the export quota system arising from such VRAs. 
92 
Emersion, supra note 75, p. 306. 
93 
Id. , p. 307. 
94 
Lochmann, supra note 75, pp. 141-145; Id., pp. 309-310. 
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Since quota was so "precious" due to its scarcity, very often the quota system 
allowed quota-holders to sit back and reap a premium for their quota without 
manufacturing anything. 95 The case is most obvious in Taiwanese textile quotas 
to the United States. 96 In other words, it is hard to tell if quota-holders 
earned less due to the VRAs. 
Second, it is true that the Fair Trade Law of 199247 expressly prohibits 
enterprises in competition with each other from engaging in concerted actions to 
restrict prices, quantities, customers, territories, or otherwise restrict each 
other's commercial activities [Article 14]. Also, enterprises are prohibited from 
engaging in horizontal price-fixing, horizontal territorial allocation and output 
restrictions [Article 7]. Enterprises engaged in such cartels may be subject to 
a maximum three-year imprisonment and/or fines up to NT$ 1 million (approx. 
25,000 Sterling Pounds) [Article 35]. By looking at these regulations, one would 
not have the slightest doubt that VRAs are prohibited. However, the Fair Trade 
Law, in consideration of the various VRAs still in force, establishes an exception 
that such cartel like arrangements will be approved by the Fair Trade Commission 
95 
Hindley, supra note 79, at 318. 
96 
For instance, as early as the 1970s, VRAs on textiles have caused problems. In 1977, quota 
on category 221 (sweaters and cardigans, knit) from Taiwan was quoted at US$ 11.3 a dozen. A local 
manufacture with an order from New York, but without a quota, would pay the US$ 11.3, and add it on 
to his price. So would the New York importer-wholesaler and the retail outlet. At 10,000 dozen, 
that is US$ 113,000 into some Taiwanese textile manufacturer's pocket -- "and he has not even raised 
a finger". See N. Y. J. Com., p. 7 (21 Nov., 1977). 
91 
The Fair Trade Law was promulgated on 4 February 1991 and came into force one year after 
promulgation. Generally speaking, the Law is an omnibus legislation which encompasses both the 
antitrust rules and the unfair competition law. For a critic of the Law, see Liu, Lawrence S., "In 
the Name of Fair Trade: A Commentary on the New Competition Law and Policy of Taiwan, the Republic 
of China, " 27 Intl Lawyer, No. 1, pp. 145-167 (Spr. 1993); Liao, I. N., "Review and Discussion Regarding 
the Necessity of the Enactment of the Fair Trade Law, and Suggestion for Amending the Draft of the 
Fair Trade Law, " a paper presented at the Symposium organised by the Chinese Human Rights Society 
(Dec., 1985); Neil L. Meyers, "The Republic of China's Fair Trade Law: A Brief Review of the Earliest 
Cases, " 11 Chinese Yb. Int'l L., pp. 201-217 (1991-1992). 
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if they are found to secure or promote exports in overseas markets [Article 
14(4)]. In other words, when cartel arrangements are organised by inter- 
governmental efforts, they will be shielded from prosecution. This further 
implies that the Executive branch of the government is able to conduct (managed) 
trade policies outside the framework of domestic law. Its corrosive effects on the 
national law is obvious. 
3. The Case of Machine Tool as Paradigm 
The conclusion of a VRA on machine tools between Taiwan and the United 
States on 15 December, 1986 offers a typical example of how "Accommodative 
Policy" works to cover up American protectionism without making a slight protest 
to its unsound rationale. In the mid-1980s, the collapse of a United States 
machine tool producer Houdaille shocked the machine tool industry, not only 
because it signified the decline of the industry, but also thousands of jobs were 
lost-98 Ultimately, a case was brought under section 232 of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962, which permitted the imposition of import restrictions to protect 
industries deemed essential to the nation's security. 
99 The United States 
President then initiated bilateral negotiations with Japan, Germany, Switzerland 
and Taiwan on the possibility of concluding VRAs on machine tools. 
98 
For more discussion of the decline of the United States machine tool industry, see David 
B. Yoffie & Benjamin Gomes-Casseres, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION: CASES AND NOTES IN STRATEGY 
AND MANAGEMENT pp. 425-432 (1994). 
99 19 U. S. C. 1962. 
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The United States President's action was based on the finding of the 
Commerce Department which stated, 
"(t)he actions were undertaken to facilitate the 
revitalisation of the United States machine tool industry, 
which (Commerce), in consultation with the United States 
Department of Defense, identified as a vital component 
of the United States defense base. Restraints on exports 
of machine tools were designed to limit the high levels 
of imports to allow the United States machine tool 
manufacturers to re-emerge as a 1Dreliable source of critical machine tool product lines. " 
To put it simply, the rationale was based on the protection of "national 
defense": that the United States had to be "war ready" in terms of the capability 
to produce enough craftsmen. This "national defense argument" is, in fact, not 
strange to economists. Adam Smith used to say that defense was more important 
than opulence. 
' 1 Naturally, this has become the highest guideline for the 
United States to conduct bilateral negotiations with its trading partners. 
United States - Taiwan bilateral negotiations were soon held to discuss the 
issue. From the very first meeting, the USTR handed Taiwan a draft of the 
arrangement which required Taiwan to roll back its exports of six kinds of 
machine tools to the 1985 market share, and threatened that unilateral quotas 
would be imposed if Taiwan did not agree to the arrangement. 
102 Under this 
pressure, Taiwan had no choice but to agree to a five-year VRA with the United 
100 
GATT, TRADE POLICY REVIEW: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA p. 96 (1989). 
101 
Adam Smith, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS Vol . 1, pp. 
4 64 - 
465 (1976). 
102 
Chuang, M. H. King, Lin, K. Casey, W. S. & Tong, Alvin H., "Panel Discussion: 
The Impact 
of United States Trade Law Actions on Business Decisions 
in Taiwan, " reprinted in 11 Mich. J. Int'1 
L., P. 294 (1990). 
104 
States. 1C3 The arrangement was further renewed in 1992 based on the same 
rationale of revitalizing United States machine tool industry. 104 
While this is not the place to challenge the concept and scope of the so- 
called "national defense", 105 the argument looks extremely awkward when applied 
to Taiwan. First, the reasons seem to imply that had the United States allowed 
more imports of machine tools from Taiwan, its defense base would have collapsed. 
It is folly to say that those low-cost machine tools Taiwan produced had the 
technological capacity to corrupt American defense base. In no way could 
Taiwan's technology be compared with Japan, Germany, Switzerland or the United 
States. In fact, during the course of negotiation, Taiwan argued that it was 
actually supplementing, rather than competing against, United States 
manufacturers. In other words, it was benefiting rather than threatening United 
States national security. 
106 The United States rejected this point by replying, 
with even greater folly, that Taiwan, nonetheless, had the tremendous 
potential. 
107 
103 
Arrangement Between the CCNAA and AIT Concerning Trade in Certain Machine Tools, made 15 
December, 1986. Effective on 1 July 1987, the arrangement would last for five years. The text can 
be found in 6 CHINESE Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., pp. 445-460 (1987). 
104 In the 1992 agreement, the Preamble states, "(r)ecognizing the efforts of AIT to 
revitalize the machine tool industry in the territory represented by AIT... " For full text, see 11 
CHINESE Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., p. 529 (1991-92). 
105 According to Professor McGee, at one time in the United States history, it was claimed 
that national defense required that Congress place a high tariff on the importation of gloves. So 
much the more, section 104 of the 1952 Defense Production Act restricts peanut imports in the 
interests of national defense. These absurd examples, nonetheless, reflect the vague and potentially 
flexible concept of "national defense". Thus, once an exception is made for one industry, there is 
no logical stopping point. MeGee, supra note 86, p. 326. 
106 
Chuang, Lin & Tong, supra note 102, p. 294. 
107 
Id., p. 294. 
105 
Second, export of Taiwanese machine tools to the United States amounted 
to only around US$ 140 million per annum, which constituted a market share of 
only 1.2% in the United States- 108 In terms of bilateral trade, this is almost a 
negligible sum. Why then did the United States still want Taiwan to limit its 
exports voluntarily? This point was raised during the negotiation, and the 
answer given by the United States was astonishing. The United States claimed 
that if Taiwan was allowed to grow at its current pace, Taiwan would eventually 
replace Japan as the main supplier of imported machine tools to the United 
States. 109 Therefore, the United States insisted on targeting Taiwan for a VRA. 
There is, however, an additional reason explaining why Taiwan was targeted. As 
noted by the chairman of a Taiwanese machine tool company, Dr. Chuang, . K. C., 
it was due to the traditional hostility on the part of the United States Machine 
Tool Association towards some Taiwanese manufacturers. 
110 This also 
demonstrated the power and influence of American lobbying groups. 
Last, the conclusion of this agreement was made under clandestine 
circumstances and in a non-transparent manner. It seemed that this kind of 
trade arrangement was a top national secret and the public should be barred 
from obtaining any knowledge of it. It was not until the agreement was reached 
and a detailed implementation administrative order was printed in the CCLRRC 
that the public could know its details. 
108 Nationalist Evening News (Ming-tsu wen pao), p. 2 (10 Sept., 1986). 
109 Chuang, Lin & Tong, supra note 102, p. 294. 
110 
Id. p. 295. 
106 
4. Evaluation 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the story of VRAs. First, VRAs are 
typical "power-oriented" products based on unsound rationale. They are 
achieved through the use of threats and coercion by the United States. Second, 
the whole process allows American interest groups to play an important role in 
deciding which country should be targeted. Small nations like Taiwan are likely 
to suffer most from this kind of arrangement. Third, VRA negotiations are 
conducted secretly so that the public and even the legislative organ only knows 
their existence after the agreements are published. As such, they are 
undemocratic in nature. However, Taiwan continues this practice by granting it 
a legal basis in the recent Foreign Trade Law of 1993. According to this Law, 
the Executive branch is given discretionary powers to regulate matters 
concerning VRAs. This means that the government is still able to conduct secret 
VRAs with the United States through non-transparent procedures. The 
codification of VRA practices says one thing: that since VRA is a system initiated 
by the United States, the issue of openness in democratic decision-making does 
not, and should not exist. More to the point, it is justified because it is 
sanctioned by the United States. In other words, the grip of the state is still 
there, as in the old authoritarian days. Thus while externally, Taiwan is weak 
in matters of VRA; internally, through the enactment of law, the Taiwan 
government is becoming so strong that it allows no challenge to the legality of 
VRAs. 
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Last but not least, while it has become a trend for the United States to 
conclude VRAs with developing countries, an extension of this protectionist logic 
means that any effort to promote export volume is considered evil. Thus, the 
United States was aggravated when in 1986 Taiwan sought to improve its 
disappointing automobile industry III by entering into an agreement with TOYOTA. 
The reason was that the joint-venture agreement included an export performance 
requirement, which required that export of automobiles would increase from 12.5% 
at the beginning to 50% by 1992.112 This was considered a potential threat to 
the United States automobile industry. Accordingly, the Reagan administration 
announced that it would conduct an investigation of such an export performance 
requirement according to section 307 of its Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.113 
Facing such a pressure, Taiwan, as expected, immediately dropped the export 
III 
The government of Taiwan started to develop its automobile industry in 1967. In the 
following years, five automotive companies were allowed to set up. However, one of them failed to 
engage in production, and was thus dissolved. Two of them, with the help of two Japanese car 
companies, started to produce small vehicles in 1968. In 1972, FORD established a subsidiary in 
Taiwan and also started to produce small vehicles. In 1979, another domestic automotive company was 
given license to produce. Yet, all these were small scale companies in the sense that not much 
technology was obtained through the joint-venture agreements. By the beginning of the 1980s, the 
government announced "The Development Plan for the Promotion of Automotive Industry", intending to 
establish a large scale automotive company. Yet, Taiwan's automobile industry is still treated as 
small potatoes. Wade, for instance, discussed Taiwan's automobile industry only in bracket form, as 
a contrast to South Korea's success. In fact, it is not overstated that it constituted the biggest 
failure of Taiwan's state-led developmental policy. For a detailed discussion of Taiwan's automobile 
industry, see "Taiwan's Automotive Industry and Its Exports", in Chinese Economics Monthly No. 438, 
pp. 21-28 (Mar., 1987). Robert Wade, GOVERNING THE MARKET: THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST 
ASIAN INDUSTRIALISATION pp. 309-311 (1990). 
112 
China Times (Chung-kuo shih pao), p. 2 (6 April, 1986). 
113 
Initiation of Investigation under Section 307: Taiwan Export Performance Requirements in 
the Automobile Sector, 51 Federal Register 12,008 (1986). The 1984 trade act confers on the relevant 
authority in the United States the required legislative authority on the issue of foreign direct 
investment. Section 307 defines international trade so as to include both goods and services and 
foreign direct investments by United States persons, especially if such investment has implications 
for trade in goods and services. It further provides that if the USTR determines that action by the 
United States is appropriate to respond to any export performance requirements of any foreign country 
or instrumentality that adversely affect the economic interests of the United States, the USTR shall 
seek to obtain the reduction and elimination of such export performance requirements and may impose 
duties or other import restrictions on the products or services of such entities for such time as 
is determined appropriate, including the exclusion from entry into the United States of products 
subject to such requirements. See 19 U. S. C. A. 2114d. 
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performance requirements "in any future or pending investment applications". 11l 
However, the evil of export performance requirements was not, from the start, 
recognised by the GATT panel, 
115 
nor later, the Trade Related Investments 
Measures (TRIMs) of the Uruguay Round MTN. 116 So, by juxtaposing the 
practices of VRAs and the case of export performance requirements, we find an 
intriguing phenomenon: Taiwan is forced to engage in the widely condemned 
practice of VRAs, while it must restrain itself from doing something which is 
internationally permissible. 
F. ADJUSTMENT OF THE TARIFF SYSTEM AND RATES 
1. Taiwan's Tariff System 
Tariffs are, in principle, permitted under the GATT. 
117 The basic principle 
is that each member state must accord non-discriminatory, most-favoured-nation 
treatment to other members. Contracting parties are restrained in the use of 
114 
Exchange of Letters Between the CCNAA and AIT Concerning the Export Performance 
Requirement Affecting Investment in the Automotive Sector, Oct. 9,1986. Reprinted in 6 Chinese Yb. 
Int'l L. & Aff., pp. 415 (1986-1987). 
115 
In the 1982 United States-Canada FIRA case, a dispute was brought by the United States 
against Canada on FIRA (Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act) to the GATT panel. The 
United States argued that the requirements imposed on the foreign investors by FIRA to purchase goods 
of Canadian origin in preference to imported goods, to manufacture goods in Canada which would 
otherwise have to be imported, and to export specific quantities of production were inconsistent with 
Articles 111: 4,111: 5, XI,, and XVI: l(c). After resolving the issue of whether it was a subject 
covered by GATT, the Council nonetheless allowed the panel to proceed. However, the result turned 
out to be in favour of Canada. Except the first requirement, all the claims were dismissed by the 
GATT panel as not in violation of the GATT. For a discussion of the FIRA case, see The United Nations 
on Trade and Investment, THE OUTCOME OF THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT-- SUPPORTING PAPERS 
TO THE TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1994, pp. 137-138 (1994). 
116 The Uruguay Round of MTN on TRIMS reached the final agreement that export performance 
requirements remained permissible under the World Trade Organisation agreement. Id., p. 143. 
117 
Article II, III, XI: 1, XVI of the GATT. 
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that instrument only if they have bound the tariff for a particular product, 
usually as a result of multilateral negotiations in the GATT. 118 Taiwan was not 
a member of GATT, so in principle it had no obligation to follow the principles 
lied down by it. However, this was not totally correct. In 1978 and 1979, Taiwan 
promised the United States that it would adhere "substantially" to certain 
customs rules made by the Tokyo Round MTN. 119 Apart from that, Taiwan was 
free to create a tariff system of its own. As a matter of fact, tariff was used 
lQU as the principal instrument of early import-substitution policy. ý This 
explained why tariff rates were so high at Taiwan's early developmental stage. 
Generally speaking, the Customs Law is based on the principle of 
reciprocity, according to which a "double duty rate" system is created --- i. e. 
a general duty rate applies to goods imported from countries and areas; and a 
reciprocal duty rate applies to goods imported form countries and areas that 
have reciprocal treatment with Taiwan. 
121 The purpose of designing such a 
system was twofold: to promote trade, and to bargain for reciprocal treatment 
with trade partners. For a nation which has no link to GATT, this design 
certainly is acceptable. 
118 
Frieder Roessler, "The Constitutional Function of the Multilateral Trade Order, " in 
Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed. ), NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
p. 57 (1993). 
119 
The Republic of China committed to "observe substantially the same as those applicable 
to developing countries set forth in the non-tariff agreements concluded in the Tokyo Round, 
including agreements on subsidies and countervailing duties, customs valuation, licensing, government 
procurement, commercial counterfeiting, and technical barriers to trade". See Exchange of letters 
between Ambassador Robert S. Strauss, United States Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 
and Political Vice Minister Wong, Yi-ting of the ROC's Ministry of Economic Affairs (29 Dec., 1978), 
reprinted in 30 U. S. T. 6440, T. I. A. S. No. 9561. 
120 
Chen, Tain-jy & Hou, Chi-ming, "The Political Economy of Tariff Policy in the ROC on 
Taiwan, " Industry of Free China, Vol. LXXVI, No. 5, p. 43 (1991). 
121 
Yen, Ching-chang & Wu, Sui-yu, "International Trade and Custom Duty, " in Mitchell A. Silk 
(ed. ), TAIWAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW p. 73 (1994). 
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As a matter of internal finance, tariff revenues constitute a very important 
source of the government's finance. According to the official figure, tariff 
revenues amounted to more than 3% of the GNP from the 22 year 1985 to 1990.1 ` 
Obviously, without this sum of money, the Taiwan government would have sunk 
into deep budget deficits, which was highly undesirable as a developing country. 
For this reason, it is always easier to talk about free trade in terms of 
elimination of tariffs than to actually convince developing countries to cut their 
tariffs by telling them tariffs are impediments to the growth of world trade, not 
to mention that the tariffs system is an important instrument for protecting a 
developing country's infant industry. The reality is this: when tariffs become an 
important component of national finance through decades of practice, as in the 
case of Taiwan, it is impossible to lower the tariff rates in a dramatic way. 
Otherwise, the government would have no choice but to increase tax or to shrink 
its size to accommodate its financial situation. 
123 Neither of which is acceptable 
to the public at large. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find that the tariff 
rates in Taiwan before the 1980s were extremely high. 
2. Main Issues 
High tariff rates, however, were regarded as a major impediment to 
American exports to Taiwan. As such, they have accounted for the overwhelming 
122 
The amount of import duties in NT$ million, and as percentage of GNP from the year 1985 
to 1990 are 81,783 (3.31%), 92,387 (3.24%), 105,115 (3.26%), 117,238 (3.35%), 129,234 (3.33%), and 
121,995 (2.89%) respectively. Industry of Free China, Vol. LXXXI, No. 3 (1994). In terms of Sterling 
Pounds, the figures are approximately 1.6 billion, 1.9 billion, 2.3 billion, 2.7 billion, 3.2 
billion, and 3.0 billion respectively. 
123 
Chen & Hou, supra note 120. 
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proportion of United States firms' market access complaints. Almost every year, 
the USTR would make some negative comments on Taiwan's tariff rates. 
In the 1980s, there were two tariff issues which infuriated the United 
States. They were, namely, Taiwan's shift to the customs valuation system, and 
its high tariff rates. In the former, the United States threatened to invoke 
section 301 of its Trade Act to punish Taiwan. The results of these two cases, 
particularly the former, represent just another "face-losing" compromise and 
naked violation of law on the part of Taiwan. 
(1). The Case of Customs Valuation 
It is perhaps necessary to outline the customs valuation systems of Taiwan 
and some of the background that led to the controversy. Generally speaking, 
Taiwan has a unique customs valuation system. Before 1974, Taiwan adopted the 
true C. I. F. value and wholesale price of the primary market at the imported port 
as the bases for customs valuation. In 1974 the Customs Law was amended to 
191 
change its customs valuation method to reflect the true C. I. F. value. `4 Here, 
it must be clarified that Taiwan's customs valuation system should not be 
regarded as odd, because national customs valuation systems, even those based 
on a common approach like the Brussels Definition of Value, varied 
considerably. 
125 It was precisely these national variations that led to the 
formation of GATT Customs Valuation Code in the Tokyo Round MTN. 
124 
Id., p. 71. 
125 
Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand, 1 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW p. 193 
(1990) 
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The Customs Valuation Code sets down rules by which Contracting Parties 
are to value imported merchandise for the purpose of levying ad valorem 
duties. 126 The primary principle is that the valuation of imported goods should 
reflect "actual value", not the value of local goods or any fictitious value[GATT, 
Article VII, para. 2(a)]. According to Article 1 of the Code of Customs Valuation 
(Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT), the customs value of 
imported goods shall be the transaction value, that is the price actually paid or 
payable for the goods when sold for export to the country of importation. The 
United States government's eagerness to implement this Code led to the 1979 
bilateral trade agreement according to which Taiwan promised to adopt the GATT 
Customs Valuation Code based on "transaction values". 
Several months after the signing of the 1979 trade agreement between 
Taiwan and the United States, the Reagan administration demanded Taiwan to 
overhaul its tariffs system by adherence to the GATT Customs Valuation Code. 
Taiwan responded by claiming that, according to GATT, developing countries 
enjoyed a five-year transitional period, and, as a developing country, Taiwan was 
entitled to putt it aside until 1984. President Reagan, a long-term friend of 
Taiwan, accepted Taiwan's explanation. 
Five years later, in the summer of 1984, the issue of the customs valuation 
was brought to the negotiation table again. This time, the United States 
threatened to cancel Taiwan's GSP if it still refused to adopt the new system. 
126 
For text of the GATT Customs Valuation Code, see Id., pp. 193-232. 
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The United States thought that the use of such a threat was legitimate because 
GATT's five-year transitional period had already lapsed. Facing such a pressure, 
Taiwan promised that GATT's customs valuation code would be enforced not later 
than 1985. But until October 1985, Taiwan was not prepared to honour its 
promise. This time the explanation was that Taiwan needed more time to amend 
its laws, train its personnel, and establish a data base. 127 Already annoyed by 
Taiwan's delay, the United States demanded that the system be implemented on 
1 January 1986.128 
After a secret negotiation, the United States agreed that Taiwan might 
postpone the implementation of the new customs valuation code but not later than 
1 July 1986. An underlying reason for the United States government's "leniency" 
was that Taiwan promised that its customs authority would disregard the existing 
Customs Law, and apply the "transaction values" as the basis of customs 
valuation to all American imported goods from 15 January 1986. 
129 This certainly 
was a dirty deal because it meant that the Executive branch and the United 
States had collaborated to bury the law. 
This move of Taiwan demonstrated that it had no intention of adopting the 
Customs Valuation Code based on "transaction values", at least before the end of 
1980s. The reason, as mentioned above, was that the MOF did not wish to lose 
121 
United Daily News (Lien-ho pao), p. 2 (3 August, 1986). 
128 
Id. 
129 Id., p. 3 (6 August, 1986). 
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a possibly substantial amount of tariff revenue. More important, the cabinet was 
already entangled by the issues of political liberalisation and lifting of martial 
law during that period. Any material change in the economic system was 
regarded as highly inappropriate. So, at this stage, the tactic was to provide 
the United States with enhanced privileged custom treatment on the one hand, 
and to maintain the old system on the other. The cabinet of Taiwan routinely 
believed that the United States would accept such an arrangement. 
Unfortunately, the old trick did not work this time. 
On 1 July, 1986, Taiwan promulgated its new Customs Law. According to 
the new law, customs valuation for American imported goods would be based on 
"transaction values" as stated in the GATT Customs Valuation Code; whereas for 
imported goods of other countries, a "duty paying list" was announced according 
to which 186 items of imported goods would be subject to a pre-determined tariff 
rates. The "duty paying list" would appear in the form of an administrative 
order. The MOF also stated that the "duty paying list" would last 
for five years 
because GATT allowed a five-year transitional period for developing countries. 
130 
In addition, the Finance Ministry explained that the making of the 
"duty paying 
list" was to prevent deliberate under-estimation of some 
foreign imported goods 
by importers for the purpose of evading tariffs. Therefore, it was a fair system 
to protect the welfare of the state. 
131 
130 
Economic Daily News (Ching-chi 
jih pao), p. 2 (3 August, 1986). 
131 Id. p. 2 (7 August, 1986). 
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Even now, it is still quite hard to understand why the MOF would make 
such an unwise explanation by re-applying GATT's five-year transitional period. 
Nonetheless, it is not difficult to imagine the reaction of the United States which 
strongly criticised the "duty paying list" as "artificial"132 and soon instituted 
a section 301 action against Taiwan in August, 1986.133 The United States 
reaction was understandable, because the new dual-system would still include 
those goods manufactured by non-American companies invested by American 
multinationals in the "duty paying list", thereby eliminating their competitiveness 
in the Taiwanese market. 
Facing such pressure, on 8 August, 1986, the Vice-Minister of Finance 
announced that the "duty paying list" would be abolished on 1 October, 1986, and 
that there would be no discrimination regarding the implementation of customs 
valuation based on "transaction valuations". 
134 Accordingly, the section 301 
investigation was terminated. Once again, the creditability and accountability of 
the Taiwan government was seriously damaged. 
(2). Tariff Reductions 
When the ratio of external trade to GNP (trade ratio) of a country is large, 
and when trade is concentrated in a limited number of trading partners, tariff 
132 
1986 NTE Report, p. 245. 
133 Taiwan Customs Valuation Unfair Practice, 51 Federal Register 37,528 (1986). 
134 
United Daily News (Lien-ho pao), p. 2 (9 August, 1986); see also David Simon, "Legal 
Development in United States-Republic of China Trade From July 1,1988 Through December 31,1990, " 
9 Chinese Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., p. 159 (1989-1990). 
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policy is likely to become a central item in bilateral negotiation. 135 The case of 
Taiwan is a typical example. First of all, Taiwan is probably one of the few 
countries that has an extremely high degree of reliance on external trade. 
According to an analysis made by two Taiwanese economists, by 1970, the trade 
ratio in 1970 was 53%. In 1980, it jumped to 96%, and fell to 78.8% in 1989.136 
On the other hand, Taiwan's external trade has been concentrated in two 
countries, namely the United States (export) and Japan (import). In terms of 
exports, the share of the United States in Taiwan's total exports was 48% in 1986. 
This culminated in a huge trade surplus with the United States. As such, it is 
not surprising that the United States began to exert significant pressure on 
Taiwan to lower its tariffs. 
Nonetheless, compared with the issue of customs valuation, tariffs reduction 
was an easier case for both the United States and the Taiwan governments, for 
the "liberalisation" was conducted, as noted by Howell and Glenn, in piecemeal 
form instead of as a wholesale programme. 
137 Naturally, the items on which 
such tariffs were to be reduced were often dictated by the United States. 
138 
One might be able to describe this as an effort to remove "trade barriers" and 
thus to achieve "free trade" or "fair trade". As a result, it has almost become 
routine work for Taiwan to reduce its tariffs to meet the needs of the United 
States. Up until 1991, after various negotiations, Taiwan had lowered its average 
135 
Chen & Hou, supra note 120, p. 45, 
136 
Id., p. 43. 
137 
Howell & Wolff, supra note 25, p. 321. 
138 Chen & Hou, supra note 120, pp. 65-66. 
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nominal and effective tariff rates to 8.89% and 4.97% respectively. lj9 When 
compared with the average nominal tariff rate of 35.96% and effective tariff rate 
of 9% in 1980, it certainly was a significant concession. 140 
Here, a certain degree of legal manipulation was involved. As a matter of 
law, any reduction of tariffs requires the consent and resolution of the 
Legislative Yuan, because it would affect the welfare of the people. Yet, 
submission of piecemeal tariff concession on only few commodity items each time 
to the Legislative Yuan for approval was certainly too trivial. Accordingly, the 
Executive branch had to rely on an Article 47-1 of the Customs Law made in 
1971, which allowed the competent authority, MOF, to implement tariff cuts of up 
to 50% by means of administrative discretion. 141 Obviously, this article was an 
imitation of the United States Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which delegated 
certain powers to the President to negotiate with foreign countries. But the 
problem here is that its application was more a passive response than a positive 
outcome of trade negotiation based upon reciprocity. As such, it became an 
expedient and convenient means to suit those piecemeal concessions. The fact 
that the aggregation of all these small concessions could amount to a huge 
difference in the long-term was neglected. Yet, the USTR liked it. 142 
139 
1993 NTE Report, p. 247. 
140 
Tsai, Chi-yuan, "The Causes of Taiwan's Current Account Surplus in the 1980s, " INDUSTRY 
OF FREE CHINA, Vol. LXXX, No. 3, p. 52 (Sept., 1993). 
141 
Article 47-1, Section 1 states, "In order to tackle special domestic and international 
economic situation, to adjust commodity supply, and to maintain reasonable industrial management, 
customs for import goods as stated in the Customs Import Regulation may be adjusted within a range 
of 50% .... 11 
142 
For instance, when discussing Taiwan's import policy, the USTR emphases, "(t) Executive 
Yuan will implement these tariff cuts by means of the discretionary modification authority in 
Art. 47-1 of the Customs Law or exert its best efforts to secure enactment of these tariff reductions 
by the Legislative Yuan.... " 1994 NTE Report, p. 253. 
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3. Evaluation 
Statist scholars are keen to emphasis the "strength" of state, specifically 
its ability to provide stable and dynamic leadership for development. They claim 
that the so-called "developmental states" (Taiwan is, notably, one of them) contain 
a reasonably efficient administrative institutions responsive to political cues and 
the technical capacity to analyze problems, formulate feasible solutions and 
implement them in technically competent ways. 143 In concrete cases, however, 
this generalisation sounds too good to be true. The case of Taiwan's adjusting 
its tariffs system reflects quite another story. In a certain sense, it is not 
incorrect to say that Taiwan was quite effective in responding to the United 
States pressures. But this by no means implies that the solutions were 
necessarily wise and sensible. Now it is almost certain that the insistence on the 
old custom valuation system and the invention of the "duty paying list" were 
more than unwise. Decisions were made under very closed conditions in 
disregard of both the United States threats and societal needs in general. They 
reflect evidently the authoritarian mentality that the government could do or say 
whatever it wanted, because whatever the government did was in the national 
interest -- a notion which had never been democratically defined. But when the 
decisions proved to be unworkable, there was no such thing as political 
responsibility because it was the United States that pushed too far. In the end, 
rather than blaming itself, the government blamed the United States. In fact, it 
was only through creating this kind of self-comforting mentality that the self- 
induced humiliation could be justified. Nor was the adjustment of the tariff rates 
143 Gordon White, "The Developmental State, " reprinted in Yash Ghai, Robin Luckham & Francis 
Snyder (ed. ), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW: A THIRD WORLD READER p. 435 (1987). 
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according to the delegated legislation of the Customs Law a proper one, bearing 
in mind that the Law was made in the authoritarian era by the purely 
rubberstamping Legislative Yuan. If the KMT government was serious about 
constitutional democracy, then it could have claimed that it needed to review the 
law before agreeing to any tariff reductions. Surely, though, the outcome would 
not have been different as American pressures had proved to be too immense and 
imminent, but at least this would have received warm support from the public, 
and avoided non-sensible tactics invented by the bureaucrats. The entire story 
of adjusting the tariff system thus reveals one simple truth: that developmental 
states are not always competent enough and they do make serious mistakes. Yet, 
because of the lack of democratic control, policy failure and legal manipulation 
are forgotten (and thus forgiven) with the passage of time. 
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Chapter 5 MAJOR LEGAL ISSUES AND IMPACTS WITH REGARD TO TRADE IN SERVICES -- ACCESS TO BANKING AND INSURANCE MARKETS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
According to the official definition of the United States, "international 
trade" includes trade in goods and services. ' The service sector is a 
heterogenous group of activities which include such industries as banking, 
insurance, transportation, communication, tourism, construction and engineering, 
retail trade, franchising, advertising, and professional services. 2 As service 
trade has become the most dynamic segment of America in recent years, 
3 
bringing the issue of liberalisation of trade in services into bilateral as well as 
multilateral negotiations is therefore considered an important objective by the 
United States. It is said that the United States advocacy of liberalisation of 
service trade appears to have been the result of three factors: (1) response to 
pressures from multinational corporations; (2) its desire to strengthen the "free 
trade lobby" to offset the growing political power of protectionist interests; and 
(3) the recognition that services were of growing importance in the United States 
exports. 
4 The standard argument for opening service markets is based on 
Ricardo's well-known theory of comparative advantage where the growth of trade 
I 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1974, section 102(g). 
2 
OECD, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES: INSURANCE, p. 7 (1983). [Hereinafter 1983 OECD] 
3 
International trade in services grew at an annual rate of 19% between 1970 and 1980. Growth 
continued through the 1980s. By 1988, United States companies alone had estimated foreign market 
sales of US$ 150-200 billion. Terrence P. Steward, 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 
(1986-1992) pp. 2342-2343 (1993). 
4 
The United Nations on Trade and Investment, THE OUTCOME OF THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN INITIAL 
ASSESSMENT-- SUPPORTING PAPERS TO THE TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1994, p. 145 (1994). (Hereinafter 
UN Assessment Papers) 
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leads to the kind of international specialisation in which each agent performs the 
tasks at which he is most effective. 5 Accordingly, the Trade and Tariff Act of 
1984 provided the mandate for the United States administration to negotiate on 
trade in services. 
The significance of the 1984 Trade Act is that it introduced the concept of 
reciprocity, that of the "achievement of commercial opportunities in foreign 
markets substantially equivalent to those accorded by the United States", 
commonly known as "equal competitive opportunity". In the international forum, 
a specific and initial objective is the demand for national treatment on the part 
of the negotiating counterparts. 6 Conceptually, the national treatment 
requirement is thus closely linked to market access.? This objective was later 
reconfirmed in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. 
The issue of trade in services was first brought to the multilateral forum 
in September 1986 as part of the MTN of Uruguay Round-8 As expected, it 
generated much interest and dissent as the United States contended that the 
benefits of services trade liberalisation would enhance development and economic 
5 
Mario A. Kakabadse, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES: PROSPECTS FOR LIBERALISATION IN THE 
1990s p. 54 (1987). 
6 
Wedige von Dewitz, "Services and the Uruguay Round: Issues Raised in Connection with 
Multilateral Action on Services: A Comment, " in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf (ed. ), THE 
NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS p. 491 (1991). Note 
the application of the concept of national treatment in transnational business activities, however, 
was based on the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises of 1976. 
See OECD, DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES AND DECISIONS OF THE MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES, NATIONAL TREATMENT, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES, CONSULTATION 
PROCEDURES (1979). 
7 
UN Assessment Papers, supra note 4, p. 167. 
8 
Id., p. 146. 
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growth for both developed and developing countries. 9 A Group of Negotiations 
on Services (GNS) was thus formed to address the relevant issues. On 15 
December 1993, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was finally 
reached. 
10 The GATS is said to have taken into consideration the demands of 
developing countries by incorporating the principle of "progressive liberalisation" 
which provides that the process of liberalisation will take place with due respect 
for national policy objectives and the level of development of individual parties, 
both overall and in individual sectors [Art. XIX: 2], 11 
However, it would be erroneous to conclude that the GATS is the first 
attempt of the United States and other industrialised countries to penetrate 
developing or other non-Western countries' service markets. In fact, more than 
a decade ago, the United States held negotiations regarding service trade with 
Taiwan and South Korea on a bilateral basis. In 1978, the United States first 
expressed its willingness to gain access to Taiwan's insurance market. 
12 In the 
following years, it also sought the possibility of penetrating the banking, 
shipping, telecommunication, film, and professional business sectors. Also 
different from the GATT forum, the negotiation objective is clear and straight- 
forward: to reduce or eliminate all barriers which deny United States 
corporations' establishment and operation in such markets to achieve liberalisation 
in the American sense. 
9 
Kakabadse, supra note 5, p. 53. 
10 
UN Assessment Report, supra note 4, p. 146. 
11 
UNCTAD, TRADE IN SERVICES: SECTORAL ISSUES P-155 (1989). (Hereinafter UNCTAD Project) 
12 
Yen, Ching-chang, Chung-Me! Ching-Mao Tan-Pan Yiu-Kuan Fa-Lu Wen-Ti Chih Yien-Chiu (A STUDY 
OF THE LEGAL ISSUES REGARDING US-TAIWAN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS p. 451 (1988). 
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In reality, the task of achieving this objective through bilateral negotiation 
proves to be complex and difficult. First, there is always the fear that granting 
foreign market access to service sectors would dismantle or weaken the 
prudential regulations aiming at ensuring the integrity and stability of service 
sectors as well as effective supervision. As such, the economic well-being of the 
nation can be at stake. This argument is so strong that even industrialised 
nations (including the United States) have various kinds of limitations to block 
foreign entry-13 Indeed, the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI) in 1991 and the Barings Bank in early 1995 has also revealed 
significant impacts on smaller financial markets. 14 Second, financial services 
have traditionally been considered domestic matters owing to their pervasive 
relations with financing, payments, and economic activity. 
15 For example, as 
pointed out by Krommenacker, 
16 the regulation of banking and insurance 
services constitutes an instrument for implementing monetary or economic- 
development policies through the mobilisation of private savings. A de-regulation 
of national banking and insurance regulations would thus mean a loss of this 
policy instrument. It is, therefore, an extremely sensitive issue for bilateral 
13 
For instance, in order to prevent openness, in 1980 the United States imposed a temporary 
moratorium on all foreign takeovers of American banks. Also, in several states, there are 
residential or citizenship requirements, limitations in acquiring shares, and minimum assets 
requirement. In insurance, deposit requirement, and demonstrated experience requirement are 
commonplace. In France, insurance cannot be imported, while in Belgium only non-marine business with 
a premium of less than US$ 1.5 million can be placed abroad. See Kakabadse, supra note 5, pp. 63-64; 
OECD, NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN-CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES, pp. 175-185 (1993). 
14 
It is estimated that the Barings has a total investment of around US$ 600 million in 
Taiwan's stock market. Because of the "rogue dealer" scandal, the weighted price index of Taiwan's 
stock exchange dropped 3.07% on 26 February 1995. Japan and Singapore suffered similar situations. 
See Central Daily News (Chung-yang jih pao), p. 1 (27 Feb., 1995). 
15 
UN Assessment Papers, supra note 4, p. 179. 
lb 
Raymond J. Krommenacker, "Multilateral Services Negotiations: From Interest-Lateralism to 
Reasoned Multilateralism in the Context of the Servicization of the Economy, " in Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann & Hilf, supra note 6, p. 491. 
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negotiation since it touches the very sovereign integrity and independence of the 
state. Moreover, these sectors often involve strategic considerations, as in the 
case of shipping in Taiwan, 17 and thus further complicate the issue. 
As mentioned above, the United States and Taiwan have engaged in 
bilateral talks concerning service trade since the late 1970s. Throughout the 
1980s, as Taiwan's trade surplus with the United States continued to expand 
rapidly, pressures from the latter to open Taiwan's service markets became 
imminent. Different from the situations in the merchandise trade, American 
pressures did not arouse public discontent. The reason was due to the 
compatibility of American demands with the domestic demands of Taiwan for a 
more competitive service industry and of gaining greater access to overseas 
financial services. In fact, it is true to say that the pressures from inside and 
outside Taiwan culminated in the significant relaxation of regulations governing 
service industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
1ß On the other hand, the 
threat of trade retaliation was still regarded as extremely offensive, while the 
efforts forcing Taiwan to appreciate its currency for up to 50%, thus causing 
painful re-adjustment in the manufacturing sector, were unforgettable. 
This chapter is an attempt to discuss United States efforts in opening 
Taiwan's banking and insurance markets. Although it is true that service trade 
17 
The United States was once interested in gaining access to Taiwan's inland shipping 
transportation service, but soon dropped the idea because Taiwan warned that all vessels sailing 
between the inland ports were subject to expropriation should a war break out with Communist China. 
18 
Jane Kaufman Winn, "Banking and Finance in Taiwan: The Prospects for internationalization 
in the 1990s, " 25 Int'l Lawyer, no. 4, pp. 907-952 (1991); "Taiwan Faces Up to Maturity -- Trade Forced 
to Quieten Down a Bit, " Financial Times, p. 5 (12 July, 1989). 
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includes more than these two sectors, it is these two sectors which have aroused 
serious controversies and significant legal interest. 19 To ensure a fuller 
understanding of the issues, a brief description of Taiwan's banking and 
insurance industries is provided. There follows the responses and changes on 
the part of Taiwan to United States pressures. 
In the course of the analysis, two significant inter-related arguments are 
made. First, United States legal demands for national treatment and 
liberalisation, in the context of bilateral negotiations, served mainly to benefit 
American multinationals. This is evidenced by the selective, piecemeal, and 
expedient administrative measures taken by Taiwan to grant American firms 
special privileges in such markets. These measures, whether made for prudential 
or liberalisation purposes, were not only highly discriminatory in nature, but also 
arbitrarily made. This observation leads us to the second argument. It is 
conceptually misleading to say that the United States has played a constructive 
role in Taiwan's recent financial liberalisation. As far as the regulations 
governing foreign financial institutions are concerned, relaxation of limitations on 
establishment and operation requirements were carried out under the old 
corporatist framework, which meant the whole process was dominated by 
administrative discretion unchecked by the legislative and the judicial branches. 
19 
Other issues such telecommunication, American films quota, and professional services still 
remain unsolved. As a matter of fact, viewed from the recent NTE Reports, the issue of 
telecommunication is likely to become the centre of future negotiations. See 1991 and 1992 NTE 
Report, pp. 238,255-256 respectively. With regard to United States films, Taiwan found no difficulty 
of lifting the limitations. For instance, before 1990 Taiwan limited to eight the number of prints 
which could be imported of each film title. In June 1990 Taiwan increased this limit to twelve. See 
1991 NTE Report, p. 197. As to professional services, focus was mainly on the profession of public 
accountants and attorneys. The issue was cooled down largely because Taiwan insisted that foreign 
professionals should have a basic understanding of the Chinese language. This requirement is 
reasonable but difficult for United States CPAs and attorneys. It is not the purpose of this thesis 
to predict future development, the discussion of these issues at this moment is thus premature. 
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Thus, it might be more appropriate to suggest that the development is a flexible 
adjustment of administrative measures, but not liberalisation. As a matter of law, 
liberalisation necessarily involves the adherence to clear rules (transparency) and 
predictability of law based on coherent policy and legal principles. And only 
through this can the legal system be integrated into the financial fabric. Here, 
however, one finds bureaucratic measures taken in response to United States 
pressures. To summarise, the granting of more economic rights to foreign 
nationals does not necessarily constitute economic liberalisation. What is more 
important is the often neglected issue of whether the state still maintains a high 
degree of freedom for discretionary management -- an issue of significant 
democratic concern. 
B. ACCESS TO THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
1. The "Pawn Shop" Style Banking System and the Financial 
Liberalisation on Taiwan 
Largely due to historical lessons, 20 the banking industry of Taiwan has 
traditionally been under strict control. As noted by a commentator, the policy 
of Taiwan has been for the government to dominate the banking system, and for 
the banking system to dominate the financial system. 
21 Before 1990, not only 
29 
One of the reasons that the KMT government lost its fights against the Communists was the 
uncontrollable hyper-inflation which occurred between 1948 and 1949 in the mainland. An important 
reason accounted for this phenomenon was due to the over-issuance of currency. Therefore, taking this 
event as a lesson, the first thing to do as soon as the KMT moved to Taiwan was to strictly regulate 
banking and financial activities. For a history of the financial collapse of China, see Witold 
Rodzinski, 2A HISTORY OF CHINA pp. 256-257 (1983). 
21 
Winn, supra note 18, p. 908. 
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were all domestic banks owned by the government, 22 their activities were strictly 
limited. Government ownership facilitated government control, and the smaller the 
number of banks, the easier the control. Government control appeared not only 
by means of strict legal limitations in the establishment and scope of business, 
but was also virtually under the direct management of the Central Bank. For 
instance, all banks had to report all their transactions to the Central bank 
weekly; foreign exchange transactions had to be reported daily. In fact, even 
today, the Central Bank only allows selected banks to carry out foreign exchange 
transactions. These privileged banks were called "Foreign Exchange Appointed 
Banks". 23 Moreover, the banks' senior staff were appointed by the government. 
Chairmen were mostly ex-Ministers or Central Bank officials, while shareholders 
included government officials. Under this structure, banks' independent legal 
status24 was only nominal. This reflected the nature of a corporatist state -- 
active control of civil entities to achieve the collective ends of maintaining 
economic and financial stability. 
Accordingly, a narrow concept of banking prevailed. Banks operated like 
pawn shops, the main concern of which was to protect the security of their 
lending, let alone diversification and expansion of their activities. Thus, in spite 
of their lack of professional banking knowledge, they made huge profits which 
22 
According to the ROC Constitution, the government is divided into three levels, namely, 
the Central, the Provincial, and the Hsien [Art. 112,121]. 
23 
The statutory basis for such an appointment is Article 5(2) of the Statute for the 
Administration of Foreign Exchange. 
24 
According to Article 52 of the Banking Law, a bank is a legal person registered in the form 
of a company limited by shares -- i. e. a company organised by seven or more shareholders; the total 
capital stock of the company is divided into shares and each shareholder is liable to the company 
for his subscribed shares. 
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were a result of the banking cartel managed by the Central Bank. 2S The 
significance of foreign banks was marginal, not only in terms of their numbers, 
but also their limited scope of business. Before 1980, there were only seven 
foreign banks permitted -- one office each. Regulation of these foreign banks 
was thus relatively easy. To ensure the controlling role of domestic banks, 
foreign banks' establishment, location, scope of activities, and operating assets 
etc. were all subject to the review of the competent authorities, namely, the MOF 
and the Central Bank. 26 This was done through an administrative order 
Guidelines for Screening and Approval of Establishment of Branches and 
Representative Offices by Foreign Banks (Foreign Banks Regulations) promulgated 
on 23 August 1983. The Foreign Bank Regulations is typically delegated 
legislation made according to the Banking Law. 27 As it was made in the 
authoritarian era, not much attention was paid to its appropriateness, particularly 
the enormous management discretion of the competent authorities. 
In the eyes of liberal economists, the banking and financial system of 
Taiwan is rigid, protectionist and unresponsive to market forces, and is therefore 
disproportionate with its economic development. 
28 Yet, this is not totally right 
25 
Robert Wade, GOVERNING THE MARKET: THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN 
INDUSTRIALISATION p. 164 (1990). 
26 
Art. 216-124 of the Banking Law. 
27 
Article 121 of the Banking Law states that the scope of foreign banks' business shall be 
decided by the central competent authority in the form of (administrative) order, after consultation 
with the Central Bank, and within the purview of Article 71,78, and 101(1). With regard to foreign 
exchange business, approval must be obtained from the Central Bank. 
28 
Academic writings criticising Taiwan's banking system and demanding liberalisation or de- 
regulation is not lacking. See, for instance, Liang Kuo-Shu, "Financial Reform, Trade and Foreign- 
Exchange Liberalisation in the ROC, " Industry of Free China, Vol. LXVIII, No. 6, pp. 7-21 (1987); Liang 
Kuo-shi, "The Taiwan Economy and Financial Markets, " Industry of Free China, Vol. LXXI, No. 4, pp. 1-9 
(1989); Yu, Tzong-shian, "Prospects for Taiwan's Economic Development, " Industry of Free China, 
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in the sense that they seem to imply that this pawn shop banking system has 
few links with Taiwan's economic development. Wade challenges this point and 
develops an interesting argument: that somehow these qualities of Taiwan's 
financial system had helped the government to develop its industrial policies, and 
thus, from a larger spectrum, economic development. 29 Nevertheless, this 
argument is only partly true, for the anachronistic banking system did fail to 
cope with the fast growing economy. The reason is that because of the rapid 
accumulation of trade surplus in the 1980s, there was a large increase in money 
supply. 
30 This sudden increase of money together with surprisingly stable 
prices meant a significant lowering of interest rates by the banks. As the 
financial market failed to meet the needs of society, the trend encouraged people 
with "entrepreneur spirit" to seek investment or play risky monetary games un- 
regulated by law. This led to some financial disasters which almost destabilised 
the entire financial system. 
ll Clearly, the government had to do something to 
Vol. LXXI, No. 5, pp. 9-17 (1989); Shieh, Samuel C, "Financial Liberalisation and Internationalisation 
in the ROC -- Current Status and Future Policy Direction, " Industry of Free China, Vol. LXXII, No. 6, 
pp. 9-17 (1989); Hsu, Paul S. P., "Jurisprudence in Taiwan, " 11 Mich. J. Intl L., p. 387 (1990); Liang 
Kuo-shu, "The Banking System and Financial Reform in Taiwan, " Industry of Free China, Vol. LXXVIII, 
No. 3, pp. 25-46 (1992). 
29 
Wade argues strongly that the illiberal nature of the financial system has helped create 
the "curb" market. The curb market is an unregulated, semi-legal credit market in which loan 
suppliers and demanders can transact freely at uncontrolled interest rates. It facilitates small 
business not only because it provides financial flexibility, but also by supplying information. See 
Wade, supra note 25, pp. 159-161. 
30 
For instance, from the year 1985 to 1990, the supply of MI as a percentage change from the 
previous year are +12%, +51.4%, +37.8%, +24.4%, +6.0%, and -6.6% respectively. For M2, the figures 
are +23.4%, +25.3%, +26.6%, +17.9%, +15.3%, and +9.9% respectively. See Industry of Free China, 
Vol. LXXXI, No. 3 (1994). For analysis of Taiwan's then financial situation, see The Economist 
(London), pp. 19-22 (28 March-2 April 1987). 
31 
Three major financial crises happened in the 1980s which led not only to financial 
instability, but also a cabinet re-shuffle. (1) The Tenth Credit Cooperative Corporation scandal: 
In February 1985, a mega-scandal erupted when the Cathay Plastics Co. and the Tenth Credit 
Cooperative Corp. both collapsed after receiving huge sums of money from investors. Cathay Plastics 
Co. absorbed an equivalent of US$ 120 million from the public, while improperly borrowing an 
equivalent of US$ 190 million from the Tenth Credit Cooperative Corp. The President of the Cathay 
Plastics Co., Mr. Tsai, Chan-chou, also a KMT-supported legislator, was then convicted of bouncing 
5,565 checks for the equivalent of US$ 47 million. The case ended when the government took over the 
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alleviate the situation. Financial "liberalisation" seemed to be a good idea. 
Accordingly, in 1989, the Banking Law was amended which, for the first time, 
allowed privately held banks to set up. 
32 Various other measures such as 
deregulation of interest rates and relaxation of the business scope of banks were 
also taken to facilitate financial activities. 33 During this period of policy shift, 
the United States came into the picture, not only to demand financial 
liberalisation, but also in the hope that this would alleviate bilateral trade. 
2. United States Policies and Efforts 
It is said that the United States played the role of a catalyst in Taiwan's 
financial "liberalisation". 34 When making this important comment, however, one 
must be sure about the basic standing of the United States with regard to 
Tenth Credit Corp., followed by the death of Mr. Tsai due to liver disease. See "Discredited 
Policies, " Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 70, (11 April, 1985); "The Never-Ending Story, " Far E. 
Econ. Rev., p. 94 (12 Sept., 1985); "Taiwan Notes, " Asian Wall St. J., p. 1 (3 Feb., 1986). 
(2) Underground Investment Companies Crisis: The underground investment companies rose to prominence 
in 1986 and 1987. Within few years, more than 170 of them were established. As no law governed 
their activities -- offering sky high interests rates for depositors, they soon absorbed a large 
share of the hot money in the economy. The largest of them, Hung Yuan, was estimated to have taken 
the equivalent of US$ 8 billion in five years. By 1989, the government could no longer tolerate this 
situation. Following the amendment to Banking Law in 1989 which made these investment activities 
illegal, the government began the sweeping action. See "Fate of a Grey-Market Behemoth in Taiwan 
Could Cause Financial and Political Tremors, " Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, p. 1 (20 Nov., 1989). 
(3) The Rise and Fall of the Stock Market: From 1986-1990 the stock exchange market enjoyed 
unprecedented popularity as a large number of people such as housewives, taxi drivers, and even full 
time workers became speculators. illegal lending provided by brokers with access to "curb" market 
increased the volume of speculation. As such, the market hit an all-time high weighted index of 
12,495.37 on 10 Feb., 1990. Then it collapsed. In less than eight months time, it became 2,560.47 
on 1 Oct. 1990. Stein, "The Search for Ways to End Financial Anarchy, " Asian Finance., p. 29 (15 July, 
1990). 
32 
"Banking and Big Business, " Far Eastern Economic Review, pp. 36-37 (4 April, 1991). 
33 
New Amendment Liberalizes Taiwan's banking Sector, " East Asian Executive Reports, Vo1.11, 
Issue 8, pp. 16-17 (Aug., 1989). 
ý4 
Winn, supra note 18, p. 908. 
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Taiwan's banking system, and what actions it has taken. Here, two significant 
policies which became two different forces on the part of the United States can 
be distinguished. First is the demand for market access according to the 
principle of national treatment to Taiwan's banking industry. Next is the United 
States pressuring of Taiwan to appreciate its currency, the New Taiwan Dollar 
(NT$), by accusing it of manipulating the exchange rate to gain unfair competitive 
advantage in international trade. As will be seen, it is these two forces that 
contributed partly to the later financial "liberalisation" on Taiwan. 
(1) National Treatment and Market Access 
In 1978, the United States enacted the International Banking Act (IBA). 35 
According to this Act, the standard of national treatment was adopted, which 
required foreign countries to grant United States banking operations equality of 
competitive opportunity in similar circumstances. The national treatment approach 
was supported by most of the large United States banks. 
36 The concept of 
national treatment does not, however, include a threat of retaliation like the 
section 301 of the Trade Act. 
37 Instead, the IBA requires that the Secretary of 
the Treasury report periodically on the treatment of United States banks in 
foreign markets, and that the President or his designee conduct discussions with 
35 
12 U. S. C. 3102-3108 (1988). 
36 Paul M. Horvitz & R. Richardson Pettit, "Financial Service in the European Community and 
the Implications for the United States, in Claude E. Barfield & Mark Perlman (ed. ), INDUSTRY, 
SERVICE, AND AGRICULTURE: THE UNITED STATES FACES A UNITED EUROPE (U. S.: American Enterprise), p. 322 
(1992). 
37 Winn, supra note 18, p. 929. 
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the governments of countries that are major financial centres. Winn claims that 
this lack of coercion seems to place United States efforts to encourage Taiwan 
to open its domestic banking market on the level of moral suasion. 38 This 
observation obviously neglects the existence of a national treatment clause in The 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the Republic of China and 
the United States of America of 1948 (FCN Treaty). 39 In other words, it is not 
only a matter of moral suasion, but also the possibility of treaty violation should 
Taiwan refuse to take any positive actions. As a matter of fact, the demand for 
national treatment according to the FCN Treaty was precisely the United States 
basic standing in the bilateral negotiations since 1986. For instance, according 
to the complaint made by the USTR in 1986, "Taiwan does not provide national 
treatment for foreign banks. Local branches of United States banks must operate 
within a restricted scope of business that puts them at a serious disadvantage 
compared to their Taiwanese competitors. 1140 [Emphasis added] National 
treatment, together with the long term lobbying efforts of American banks in 
Taiwan41 have culminated in the promulgation and amendment of the Foreign 
Bank Regulations. 
38 
Id. 
39 
Article III (3) of the United States - ROC FCN Treaty states, "The High Contracting 
Parties, adhering generally to the principle of national treatment... agree that corporations and 
associations of either High Contracting Parties shall be permitted... to engage in and carry on 
commercial... financial activities.... " The text of the treaty can be found in State Dept., TREATIES 
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, Vol. 6, pp. 761-786 
(1971). 
40 
1986 NTE Report, p. 247. 
41 
Mitchell A. Silk, Liu, Lawrence S. & Lester Ross, "Banking: The Regulatory Aspect, " in 
Mitchell A. Silk (ed. ), TAIWAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW p. 372 (1994); and Liu, Lawrence S., 
"Financial Developments and Foreign Investment Strategies in Taiwan: A Legal and Policy Perspective, " 
25 Int'l Lawyer., p. 83 (1991). 
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Here, one significant point must be clarified. Though it is true that in 
most countries, national treatment represents a substantial liberalisation of the 
treatment of foreign banks, this was not the case in Taiwan. Instead, two 
seemingly contradictory developments can be found. First, even after the major 
amendment to the Banking Law and the Foreign Bank Regulations in 1989,42 
foreign banks are still subject to several limitations. Take the establishment 
requirements for example, apart from those prudential regulations which require 
onerous capitalization [Art. 3,4,5], some of the limitations still run counter to the 
national treatment principle. For instance, only three foreign banks are allowed 
to be established each year, and in principle only one branch office in each city 
[Art. 7,9]. Compared with domestic banks which have extensive networks of 
branches across the island, this certainly is not national treatment or equal 
competitive opportunity. With regard to the scope of business, foreign banks' New 
Taiwan Dollar (NT$) -denominated deposits may not exceed 15 times of the 
branches' registered operating capital in Taiwan [Art. 13]. More, as foreign banks 
are still not allowed to establish subsidiaries in Taiwan, American banks cannot 
take full advantage of engaging in securities transactions. 
43 Last, the competent 
authorities may tighten their activity if the conditions deem necessary [Art. 16]. 
Second, in certain areas, foreign banks receive better than national 
treatment. The most notable of which being that foreign banks are allowed to 
0 
42 
Some Taiwanese and American academics and commentators prefer to call this 1989 amendment 
as a major step in financial liberalization and adherence to national treatment. However, in their 
contributions, they also admit that "completely open market access for foreign banks to participate 
in Taiwan's financial market is not likely in the foreseeable future". See Silk, Liu & Ross, Id., 
p. 372. 
43 
1993 NTE Report, p. 253. 
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engage in foreign exchange transactions. In other words, they automatically 
become "Foreign Exchange Appointed Banks" [Art. 12(6)]. In addition, foreign 
banks enjoy the exclusive privilege of pre-sale foreign exchange export loans, 
and are also able to own financial leasing companies [Art. 12(16)]. As Taiwan 
admits, these arrangements have, in effect, resulted in "supra-national 
treatment". 44 
In sum, as a response to the American demand of national treatment in 
banking, Taiwan relaxed its Foreign Bank Regulations, but in a rather imbalanced 
way. Thus, it can hardly be said that the principle of national treatment is 
fulfilled. In fact, the results are also below and above national treatment. Of 
course, one may always argue that they were made for prudential or other good 
reasons, but this misses the point. What is to be questioned is that the outcome 
was a result of administrative manipulations made without public knowledge. In 
other words, there were no clear principles or rules governing this so-called 
foreign banking liberalisation. All decisions were made by the competent 
authority in the name of administrative discretion according to a very general 
delegated legislation of the Banking Law. Nonetheless, this non-transparency was 
sanctioned due to the still effective Standardization Law which offered almost no 
checks to administrative orders or discretion. 
45 It should be borne in mind 
that, according to a court precedent, the exercise of administrative discretion is 
44 
BOFT, Wo-kuo 78 nien dual-wei mau-i tsa-shang tan-pan chi-yau (A SUMMARY OF ROC'S EXTERNAL 
TRADE CONSULTATION IN 1989) Title 1(4), p. 31. (1990). [Hereinafter 1989 
Consultation Report] 
45 
See Chapter 7B, 3. 
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not subject to review of the court. 46 It follows that one cannot be sure it was 
a consistent effort of "liberalisation" because the competent authority was still 
given the management discretion to withdraw or tighten foreign banks' scope of 
business, be it due to prudential or other reasons, not to mention the 
appropriateness of the regulations. All these convey one important message: that 
the relaxation of banking regulations was conducted under the corporatist 
framework with a siege mentality, and the purpose was purely to make 
concessions with the United States. The legal system is thus still insulated from 
the financial sector. We shall further elaborate this point in the final evaluation 
of this chapter. 
(2) Exchange Rate Manipulation 
Another American effort that led Taiwan to relax its traditional control over 
the financial system was its persistent pressure to force Taiwan to appreciate the 
New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) between 1985 and 1988 -- precisely the period when 
Taiwan was suffering from an expansion of money supply in the domestic 
economy. The mixing of these two internal and external forces gradually left the 
government no choice but to overhaul its financial and banking policies. 
From a broader perspective, the demand for NT$ appreciation was an 
inevitable consequence of the Plaza Agreement and the Louvre Accord reached 
in the mid-1980s by the industrialised nations, which recognised that US$ was 
46 
See Chapter 7B, 4. 
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overvalued. 
47 The agreements endorsed the intervention of the central banks 
of the trading nations in foreign exchange markets, in order to achieve a so- 
called "managed float" system. The overvalued dollar also gave rise to a theory 
that America's trading partners might be manipulating the exchange rate so as 
to gain an unfair competitive advantage in international trade, which, in turn, 
was a cause of the nation's large trade deficits. This theory is substantiated in 
the Exchange Rate and International Economic Policy Coordination Act of 1988 
(Exchange Rate Act), which authorized the President to enter into negotiations 
with countries found to be manipulating their currency and having a significant 
trade surplus with the United States. 48 
Nevertheless, negotiations with Taiwan regarding the value of NT$ started 
before the enactment of the Exchange Rate Act. While it is true that the Central 
Bank of Taiwan did play a strong role in maintaining the stability of the 
exchange rate, 
49 it is still arguable whether it was manipulating it for the 
41 
In September 1985, the United States Treasury Secretary, and the finance ministers of 
Japan, West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom met at the Plaza hotel in New York to discuss 
the problem of US$. In the resulting Plaza Agreement, the ministers announced that the dollar was 
overvalued and that coordinated action was necessary to push down its value. However, no commitments 
were made to alter the macroeconomic policies. Then, in February 1987, a Louvre Accord was signed 
in Paris by these G-5 countries plus Canada. The central objective of the agreement was to stabilise 
the US$ value through equilibrating changes in macroeconomic policies and to prevent undue volatility 
in exchange rates through market intervention. Franklin R. Root, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENTS 
pp. 493-494 (1990). 
48 
Exchange Rate and International Economic Policy Coordination Act of 1988,22 U. S. C. 5301 
(1988). 
49 
To ensure the stabilisation of the NT$, it has been the practice of the Taiwan government 
to follow the Bretton Woods system by pegging NT$ to the US$ at a fixed rate. This, however, would 
require the intervention of the Central Bank of Taiwan in the foreign exchange market. The method 
of intervention was not complicated. By using the international reserves, the Central 
Bank sells 
US$ when NT$ is depreciating, and buys US$ when NT$ is appreciating. Legally speaking, such an 
intervention was not without any statutory basis. Article 2 of the Central Bank Law states that the 
objectives of the Central Bank are to promote monetary stability, promote a sound 
financial and 
banking system, and maintain internal and external stability 
in the value of the currency. In 
addition, Article 33 and Article 34 further empower the Central Bank to 
hold international reserves, 
and depending on the conditions of balance of payments, to adjust the 
demand and supply of foreign 
exchange, so as to maintain an ordered foreign exchange market. 
This broad delegation of power 
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purpose of trade. Regardless of this issue, however, in 1985 it seemed that 
consensus had been reached that NT$ should appreciate. From that time on, NT$ 
appreciated against the US$ at a rate of approximately NT$ 0.01 per day. Until 
1987, NT$ had appreciated for more than 40%. 50 Intriguingly, NT$ hardly moved 
against the US$ in 1988. This was due to the fact that Taiwan slashed its trade 
surplus with the United States by importing over one hundred tones of gold. 51 
However, as trade deficits remained large, the United States still claimed in an 
official report that Taiwan was seeking a competitive advantage for exports to the 
United States by keeping its currency at artificially low levels against the 
US$. 52 The United States thus demanded further liberalisation of foreign 
exchange market. As a result, Taiwan amended its Statute for the Administration 
of Foreign Exchange in 1989 to allow greater freedom for the banks to determine 
the exchange rate. 53 In 1990, the attitude of the United States seemed to have 
softened. The United States claimed that although no evidence existed of direct 
exchange rate manipulation, Taiwan's external surplus was so large that there was 
a need for further liberalisation of its exchange rate policies. 
54 
enables the Central Bank to do almost everything it can to cope with the State's economic situation. 
50 
"Candidates for the U. S. Blacklist -- the Little Dragon, " Financial Times, p. VI, (25 May, 
1989). 
51 Id. 
52 
Treasury Department, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND EXCHANGE RATE 
POLICY, pp. 16-17 (15 Oct., 1988). [Hereinafter Treasury Report] 
53 
These measures included: (1) permitting outward remittance of up to US$ 5 million a year; 
(2) inward remittance of up to US$ 2 million; (3) transactions above US$ 30,000 were to take place 
at a freely determined rate. 
54 
1990 Treasury Report, supra note 52, p. 19. 
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The artificial appreciation of NT$ deliberately manipulated by the Central 
Bank has had several significant effects. First, as 70% of Taiwan's foreign 
reserves were deposited in US$ in United States banks, it was estimated that by 
the beginning of 1989, the net exchange loss incurred as a result of NT$ 
appreciation had amounted to US$ 10 billion. 55 Second, a re-structuring of the 
manufacturing sector took place. Less competitive business had to either fold 
up or re-locate their manufacturing operations overseas. 56 On the other hand, 
while there is no clear evidence to show the existence of clear causal links, the 
mid-1980s was the period of mass counterfeiting and piracy of foreign goods on 
the island -- an easier way for businessmen to start a new venture. 
57 Third, 
large Taiwanese businesses were able to cancel off or delay the effects of. NT$ 
appreciation by resorting to US$ pre-export loans and sold forward dollars to 
hedge exchange-rate risks-58 The NT$ appreciation thus created an anti- 
competitive effect by squeezing out small and financially weak firms. Taiwan has, 
therefore, paid a great price to liberalise its exchange rate system under the 
pressure of the United States. 
55 
China Times (Taiwan), p. 6, (20 March, 1989). 
56 
Liu, Lawrence S., "Legal and Policy Perspectives on United States Trade Initiatives and 
Economic Liberalisation in the Republic of China, " 11 Mich. J. Int'l L., p. 342 (1990). 
57 
For discussion of intellectual property issues, see Chapter 6. 
58 
For instance, on 30 October 1987, the spot rate was US$ 1= NT$ 29.91, but exporters, 
having known that appreciation of NT$ was unavoidable, sold their US$ six months earlier at the 
forward rate of US$ 1= NT$ 32.31, thus gaining the difference of NT$ 2.4. As a result, the 
forward 
cover offered by the Central Bank and the authorised commercial banks provide a cushion to exporters 
and allow them considerable delay in facing up to the full impact of the rapid NT$ appreciation. 
See 
Liang, Kuo-shu & Liang Hou, Ching-ing, "ROC-US Trade Relations from a Financial Perspective, " 
Industry of Free China, Vol. LXIX, No. 4., pp. 7-8 (1988). Dr. Liang was the 
Governor of Taiwan's 
Central Bank. 
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While these are the unexpected effects of NT$ appreciation policy, the 
expected outcome -- to alleviate bilateral trade in favour of the United States -- 
did not happen. In fact, Taiwan's trade surplus with the United States remained 
large even after 1989. Ironically, an important reason for such a failure, as 
noted by the former Governor of the Central Bank of Taiwan, was the 
compensating effects of many VRAs between the two countries. 
59 According to 
Mr. Liang, Kuo-shu, 
"VRAs provide an assured sales outlet and enables exporters to 
capture rents arising from their ability to raise the export price by 
the difference between the international price and the higher 
domestic price in the importing country. At the microeconomic level, 
VRAs thus offer greater security to trade flows than would be 
obtainable under an unrestricted trade regime. " 
Liang's analysis clearly demonstrates how futile it is to try to solve the problem 
of trade deficit with a trading relation based on "managed trade" rather than 
free trade, and how dangerous it is to rely on a theory to carry out a policy 
without considering the effects of other policy tools. Tumlir heavily criticises 
the inefficiency of the United States government's redistributive economic policy. 
He argues that the resource costs (specialists' brainpower, lobbying costs, 
compliance by the private sectors etc. ) themselves were part of the reason. 
60 
The case of forcing Taiwan to appreciate NT$ provides a concrete example. 
59 
Id. 
60 
Jan Tumlir, "Economic Policy as a Constitutional Problem, " Fifteen Wincott Memorial Lecture 
p. 9 (1984). 
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C. ACCESS TO THE INSURANCE MARKET 
1. Overview of the Insurance Market on Taiwan 
The modern form of insurance appeared towards the end of the seventeenth 
century, but it was mainly during the last century that insurance became an 
institutionalized activity. 61 In the industrialised nations, the annual increase in 
premiums collected in the second half of the twentieth century is far greater 
than the increase in gross domestic product. 
62 The significance of insurance is 
recognised in the 1964 UNCTAD session which acknowledged that "a sound 
national insurance and reinsurance market is an essential characteristic of 
economic growth". 
63 This background explains why national insurance laws have 
been keen to limit the operation of foreign companies in a highly discriminatory 
manner. The United States, for instance, has a very complicated state system of 
insurance regulation, which operates substantially as a foreign entry barrier. 
64 
While it is not difficult to realise the economic significance of insurance, 
and thus to tighten control over foreign insurance companies through licensing 
and operational limitations, it is not easy for less developed countries to establish 
a sound insurance regulatory and supervision system. A famous Taiwan legal 
61 
UNCTAD Project, supra note 11, p. 158. 
62 
id. 
63 Id. p 159. 
64 
Robert L. Carter, "Insurance Trade Between the United States and the European Community, " 
in Barfield & Perlman (ed. ), supra note 36, p. 304. For a study of discriminatory treatment on 
foreign insurance companies in industrialised nations, see 1983 OECD, supra note 2, pp. 12-24. 
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expert, Mr. Hsu, Paul S. P., once said, "Taiwan did not have much of a service 
industry in the modern sense". 
65 His comment is absolutely correct in terms of 
Taiwan's insurance market. Before the 1980s, the market, both life and non-life 
insurances, were virtually dominated by a few domestic companies. 66 This 
cartel-like insurance market was caused by the protective measures of the 
government which had frozen the issuance of new licences since 1964. 
Accordingly, foreign insurance companies, which had once maintained offices 
before World War 11,67 had no access to Taiwan's insurance market after 1945. 
On the other hand, the regulation and supervision of insurance companies 
were extremely loose to the extent the quality of their service was far from 
satisfactory. 
68 To use a rather satirical term to describe, the -insurance 
industry was still a "30 year-old infant". 
69 
65 
Cited by "The Economic World of the 1990s and Taiwan's Place in It, " in Harvey J. Feldman 
(ed. ), CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE FUTURES OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA p. 112 (1991) Mr. Hsu is a law 
Professor of the National University as well as senior partner of Taiwan's largest law firm, Lee & 
Li Attorneys at Law. 
66 
By the end of the 1980s, the life insurance market was an oligopoly dominated by two 
firms, namely the Cathy Life and the Shin Kong Life. The two of which controlled almost 80% of the 
market. In non-life insurance, the first three big firm, to wit, Cathy, Mingtai, and Shing Kong 
enjoyed a market share of over 50%. Huang, C. Y., "Insurance Law in Taiwan, " in Silk, supra note 41, 
p. 409. 
67 
The first foreign insurance company to establish a representative office was the Liverpool 
Insurance Company of the United Kingdom in 1836. Then in 1895, following the cessation of Taiwan 
to Japan, Japanese insurance companies entered the Taiwanese market. During the peak years of 
colonial rule, there were in total 31 non-life and 34 life Japanese insurance companies in operation. 
The recovery of Taiwan by the KMT government in 1945 also ended the Japanese insurance business in 
Taiwan. The KMT government also assumed control of all the Japanese offices. Id. pp. 407-408. 
68 
The situation was worst in life insurance where insurance companies used to hire ignorant 
old people, housewives, and even prostitutes as their agents. Their responsibility was to persuade 
people to buy insurance. However, due to their lack of professional training, those insured were 
always ill-informed of the details of the contracts. This gave the insurance companies ample 
opportunities to rescind the contracts when the perils insured occurred. Insurance companies were 
keen to invoke Article 64 of the Insurance Law which required full disclosure from the insured. This 
phenomenon is heavily criticised by Shih, Vincent W., presently a Grand Justice of the Judicial Yuan. 
See Shih, Vincent W., Pao-Hsien fa kai-tun (AN INTRODUCTION TO INSURANCE LAW) (1993). 
69 
Cited by Winn, supra note 18, p. 914, n. 42. 
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The reason which accounted for the backwardness of Taiwan's insurance 
industry was not that Taiwan did not have an insurance law. As a matter of 
fact, the Republic of China has an Insurance Law promulgated as early as 1929, 
but that the law has never been whole-heartedly enforced. The underlying 
reasons for such non-enforcement are due to non-legal factors. First, traditional 
Chinese dislike the idea of planning for future misfortune because, as a matter 
of superstition, they believe life will get worse if you think something "bad". 
This made life insurance extremely difficult to develop. Second, the economy of 
Taiwan in the early years was still at its development stage, which meant the 
significance of non-life insurance amenable to commodity trade was marginal. 
Third, the economic bureaucrats lacked general knowledge about insurance. 70 
However, as Taiwan was transforming to a modern society accompanied by 
fast economic growth, the need for insurance, both life and non-life, became 
imminent. This is reflected by the fact that the number of people buying 
insurance increased rapidly since the mid-1980s. 
701 It follows that those old 
domestic insurance companies, which earned their fat profits through cartelization 
and inequitable contractual terms, could not meet the needs of society. All these 
10 
Here is an interesting story revealing the ignorance of Taiwan's government officials. 
Professor Shih, Vincent, an expert in insurance law, once met formally with the Minister of 
Transportation and Communication. During the meeting, Professor Shih handed a recent book of his 
concerning automobile insurance. Professor Shih wrote the book because he understood the terrible 
deficiency in Taiwan's third party car insurance system. The Minister reacted with surprise by 
saying, "oh, I do not know that there is so much about car insurance". That Minister is presently 
the Premier of the Executive Yuan. Professor Shih was elected as a Grand Justice in 1994. The story 
was told by Professor Shih during his lecture at the National Chengchi University in 1984. This 
writer was his student. 
1D~1 According to a recent official statistics, the insured persons as percentage of total 
population from 1986 to 1994 is 31.44,34.95,40.12,46.95,49.03,51.73,56.43,58.30, and 59.52 
respectively. See Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, MONTHLY 
STATISTICS OF THE ROC Vol. XXI, No., l, pp-20-21 (Jan., 1995). 
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point to the fact that when the United States expressed its demands that 
Taiwan's insurance market be opened, the society welcomed it with silence and 
expectation. Compared with the "Great Turkey War", 7 i1 this time the United 
States was on the side of the people of Taiwan. In addition, probably because 
of this "popular support", the pressures exerted on the Taiwan government were 
immense. The section 301 trade retaliation was almost invoked twice to force 
Taiwan to allow more American insurance companies to enter. 
2. Negotiations and Concessions 
The first United States - Taiwan negotiation that touched the issue of 
insurance was held in December 1978, just before the severance of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries. A Bilateral Trade Agreement Between the 
ROC and the United States was made on 29 December 1978.72 According to the 
measures regarding the concession of non-tariff barriers, Taiwan promised to 
allow American insurances companies, both life and non-life, to establish branch 
offices, without limitations on the number, to operate in Taiwan . 
73 
To substantiate the agreement, on 17 February 1981, the MOF promulgated 
an administrative order called the Guidelines for Reviewing United States 
Insurance Company Applications for Establishing a Branch in the ROC (Insurance 
71 
See Chapter 4B, 2. 
72 
Yen, supra note 12, p. 450. 
73 rd ý p. 451. 
144 
Guidelines). The statutory basis of this order is Article 137(5) of the Insurance 
Law which authorises the competent authority to regulate matters concerning 
foreign insurers. In other words, it is another broad delegated legislation. In 
the following years, this Insurance Guidelines have become the sole regulations 
governing the establishment and operation of American insurance companies. As 
this administrative order regulates only American insurance companies, it is thus 
discriminatory in nature. Third-country insurers (e. g. Japanese and European 
insurance companies) do not enjoy the same right of market entry as United 
States insurers. Some Western commentators thus found it objectionable. 74 
True, it can be argued that Taiwan is not a member of any international economic 
organisation, and therefore has no obligation to commit to the principle of most- 
favoured-nation principle. But this bilateral arrangement does reveal at least one 
thing: that granting licenses to American insurance companies is not based on 
Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage, but on special bilateral relations. The 
problem is that the United States, the world's free trade promoter, did not 
oppose such discriminatory Insurance Guidelines, but sought to play the game of 
market access under this administrative framework. 
Regardless of this special favour, American insurance companies are still 
subject to an array of establishment and operations requirements. The 1981 
Insurance Guidelines set out the following requirements for American firms who 
wished to establish branch offices in Taiwan: (1) the paid-in capital of the United 
States companies must be the equivalent of NT$ 100 million (approx. 2 million 
74 
Carter, supra note 64, p. 307. 
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Sterling Pounds) or more; (2) the United States companies must have engaged in 
(reinsurance) business with Taiwan's insurance firms for at least five years. In 
addition, the scope of activities was also limited. American insurance firms could 
only write policies covering United States citizens and risks located in Taiwan. 
Marine insurance and joint venture enterprises were excluded. Because of these 
limitations, only two American insurance firms established branch offices in 
Taiwan before 1985. $ Obviously, the establishment requirements are set for 
prudential reasons, in spite of the fact that they may be too strict. On the 
other hand, limitations on their scope of activities are purely protectionist. As 
this Insurance Guidelines was far away from the national treatment principle, the 
United States disapproved of it and thus sought to convince Taiwan to amend it. 
Bilateral negotiations, therefore, became a bargain of these limitations. 
In the 1986 trade negotiation, the United States first threatened Taiwan 
with the use of section 301 of its Trade Act if Taiwan refused to grant national 
treatment to United Stated firms. 76 The threat, however, disappeared when 
Taiwan promised to approve the application of an American firm CHUBB for the 
operation of non-life insurance before November 1986, and to allow two more life 
insurance firms to expand their scope of business, such as to cover cancer 
illness. 77 It thus appeared that the use of trade threats was but a strategy on 
the part of the United States to serve the interests of a few insurance firms who 
75 
The Insurance Company of North America (CIGNA group) and the American Insurance 
Underwriters (AIG group) both established their branch offices in Taiwan in 1982. 
76 
China Times (Chung-kuo shih pao), p. 2, (19 January, 1987). 
77 
Yen, supra note 12, pp. 573-574. 
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had their applications pending in the office of Taiwan's competent authority. In 
the same year, the Insurance Guidelines was also amended to allow American firms 
to issue policies to United States wholly-owned subsidiaries and to Sino-United 
States joint-venture companies. In addition, a quota was set regarding the 
opening of American insurance companies in Taiwan each year: to wit, at most two 
life and two non-life insurance companies. 
78 These opening measures immediately 
invited many American insurance firms. By the end of 1989, there were already 
12 American companies that had been given approval to do insurance business 
in Taiwan. 79 
The threat of section 301 trade sanction reappeared in the April 1990 trade 
talks as the United States once again demanded more national treatment and more 
quota for American firms. The demands were met, but still with some 
reservations. On 20 July, 1990, the Insurance Guidelines was amended again. 
The quota was changed to three life licences and three non-life licences, and 
with the allowance that utilised quota in one category could be allocated to 
applicants from the other category. 
8° Moreover, American firms were allowed to 
establish additional branches upon the fulfilment of certain conditions. 
The whole story of opening Taiwan's insurance market raises the doubt of 
whether it was the Insurance Guidelines that governed the establishment and 
78 
1989 Consultation Report, supra note 44, Title 1(4), p. 28. 
79 
Id. p. 25. 
80 
1991 NTE Report, p. 210. 
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operation of American insurers, or it was bilateral negotiations that governed the 
Insurance Guidelines. As a matter of law, a legislation or administrative order 
must have a firm and clear policy behind it so that the average citizen can follow 
it. 81 A good policy requires consideration of all internal and external conditions, 
and balancing of different interests. Thus, if it is a legislation, a democratic 
procedure which provides meaningful debate by the parliament is considered the 
best way. If it is in the form of an administrative order, then the requirement 
of transparency should be fulfilled. Only through these procedures can clear 
rules be made to implement a policy. Here, however, one notices that the 
Insurance Guidelines was modified according to United States pressures. As a 
matter of fact, it was precisely for the purpose of eliminating bilateral trade 
surplus with the United States that Taiwan agreed to increase the quota for the 
entrance of United States insurance companies. 
82 This, of course, was not the 
reason provided by the government of Taiwan. The trouble is that the 
government provided no reason at all, as if it was something that had nothing 
to do with the general public. Why is it that a year ago a quota of two American 
insurance companies was considered appropriate, and this year three is alright? 
Are there any quantifiable economic reasons behind such a change? On what 
rationale are American insurance firms allowed to keep flooding in while European 
insurers are denied the opportunity to enter? Does that imply all the American 
insurance companies are better than European? When a government is 
preoccupied by the "mission" of eliminating trade surplus, this kind of question, 
81 
Tumlir, supra note 60, p. 14. 
82 
This is the reason provided by Taiwan's negotiating team to the EC during the EC-Taiwan 
trade consultation held on 13 July 1989 in Bangkok, Thailand. See 1989 Consultation Report, supra 
note 44, Title 11 (1), p. 10. 
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which should have been taken seriously when the issue of liberalisation is 
concerned, simply means nothing. One therefore has reason to believe that the 
so-called liberalisation in the insurance sector actually means granting special 
favour to American companies. The United states, on the other hand, remained 
silent at this point, and kept on dealing with Taiwan in this way. The 
acquiescence of the United States thus, in effect, encouraged state-control and 
discriminatory treatment on the part of Taiwan. 
D. OVERALL EVALUATION 
It is generally recognised that the so-called national treatment is a long- 
term objective within the liberalisation process. 
83 In other words, no nation 
should expect that the application of national treatment would achieve market 
access once and for all. Concessions and compromises with the protective 
regulations of the host country are unavoidable. It is in this sense that the 
concept of national treatment can be associated smoothly with the so-called 
"progressive liberalisation" which gives due respect to national objectives and 
the level of development. When these concepts and principles are used in MTN 
such as GATT, member states, based on the principle of equality, are able to 
interpret the meaning of their obligations they have accepted, and can thus take 
into consideration all relevant factors and plan in advance their liberalisation 
policy. Through this, international obligation of national treatment becomes part 
of the national policy. And there is no fear that the MTN will serve to legitimise 
83 
UNCTAD Project, supra note 11, pp. 172-173; Krommenacker, supra note 16, p. 467. 
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the objectives of bilateral negotiation which is infamous for its power-oriented 
nature. National laws, regulations and administrative guidelines relating to the 
establishment and operation of foreign service companies can be made according 
to the established international rules. In addition, foreign companies are also 
assured the access to these laws and practices because of the adherence to the 
principle of transparency. 
In the context of bilateral negotiations, however, the application of the 
concept of national treatment loses its meaning completely, as does the principle 
of "progressive liberalisation". In its essence, as the above analysis has 
demonstrated, the meaning of national treatment in bilateral trade talks is boiled 
down to how many, which and why specific American banks or insurance 
companies should be granted permissions to establish and operate in Taiwan. The 
result of the negotiation directs the law. This makes the role of the United 
States government a de facto surrogate of the American multinationals. On the 
Taiwan side, as trade talks are held on regular basis, it becomes impossible to 
make sensible planning of liberalisation in advance. Instead, the so-called 
"liberalisation plan" is disintegrated into many small items to be used as 
bargaining chips with the United States. Worse, this largely increases the 
possibility of trade-off in exchange for United States mercy at other issues (e. g. 
intellectual property protection) in the course of negotiation. The so-called 
"progressive liberalisation" thus evaporates. 
When bilateral negotiations involve such complicated considerations, it is 
natural that the competent authority finds it difficult to explain to the general 
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public why certain legal arrangements are made afterwards. So the best thing 
is to remain silent, which means a "black-box" policy. Conveniently, the 
authoritarian corporatist machine provides such a path. Arrangements are 
deliberately made in the name of administrative orders because control of them 
is virtually non-existent under the present administrative law. 84 The result is 
that improvised administrative discretion decides American multinationals' access 
to Taiwan's market. The whole issue of liberalisation of service trade thus sinks 
to the hands of certain bureaucrats who receive high orders from the "High 
Level Party-government". When all these have become bureaucratic practices, the 
requirement of due process is forgotten. This, in turn, further strengthens the 
corporatist framework of the state. Power is still concentrated in the hands of 
the few who act in the name of "national interests". As a result, the legal 
system is insulated from the issues of service trade. Instead, what can be found 
is the proliferation of many ad hoc guidelines with no clear legal rules. 
Eventually, the so-called "liberalisation" of the service sector becomes 
incomprehensible to the average citizen; as such, they are in no position to pass 
judgment on whether the policy is succeeding or failing. Thus, Tumlir's 
nightmare of an undemocratic society does not apply only to America. 
85 
84 
See Chapter 7B for a detailed discussion. 
85 
In the later years of his life, Tumlir's writing can be said to be focused on the analysis 
of adverse consequences of America's protectionist trade policies on the constitutional structure. 
He viewed the rise of protectionism in the 1970s and 1980s as the most dangerous element which 
undermined the United States constitution. See Tumlir, supra note 60; Jan Tumlir, PROTECTIONISM: 
TRADE POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES (1985). For an assessment of Tumlir's theme, see Robert Hudec, 
"The Role of Judicial Review in Preserving Liberal Foreign Trade Policies, " in Meinhard Hilf & Ernst- 
Ulrich Petersmann (ed. ), NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW pp. 503-518 (1993). 
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It would be naive to assume that the United States was unaware of the 
legal manipulations on the part of Taiwan, or to assume that Taiwan was doing 
everything in accordance with the spirit of law. On the contrary, when legal 
manipulations are working to the interests of American multinationals, it is better 
to put aside law. Most important of all, on the face of it, the arrangements fit 
quite well into the concept of "progressive liberalisation". The question of 
whether this further encourages undemocratic practices in Taiwan is therefore 
only of marginal significance, because the American multinationals do not care. 
As a matter of bilateral trade negotiation, it is not a topic open for discussion 
anyway. 
Last but not least, the relaxation of banking and insurance regulations was 
carried out since the mid-1980s. Even until today, the objective of liberalisation 
is yet to be achieved. Note that the whole process covers the martial rule and 
the democratization era. Here, as has been demonstrated, as part of the 
liberalisation effort, the way the government handled the United States with 
regard to the opening of its service market has not changed a bit. An 
undesirable development is that the public, though not appreciated by its 
aggressive unilateralism, seems to be on the side of the United States. This, as 
explained, is largely due to the growing needs of society for more and better 
banking and insurance services. The reluctant, slow, and bureaucratic manner 
of the government, albeit sometimes with good cause (e. g. prudential reasons), 
thus generates public dissatisfaction and resentment. The point is that this 
immediately creates the effects of demoralising and de-legitimatizing the authority 
of the government. The positive efforts of lifting martial law, and re-electing 
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parliamentary members have been cancelled out by the highly unwelcome but 
immovable bureaucratic practices. Here, it is necessary to repeat that all this 
is due to the rampant powers of the party-executive inherited from the 
authoritarian corporatist era. 
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CHAPTER 6. THE IMPOSED LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS: TAIWAN'S IPR 
PROTECTION SYSTEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapters 4 and 5 we analyzed the various legal changes conducted by 
the Taiwan government under the United States pressures. It has been shown 
that complex legal manipulation for the purposes of avoiding trade retaliation and 
maintaining the state's control over the economy was found to be necessary, 
though, more often than not, inappropriate. In addition, the legal changes were 
conducted mostly within the framework of administrative law and through some 
piecemeal amendments to the laws. In other words, legal changes were many, but 
not systematic. This, of course, is not the limit of United States pressures. As 
a matter of fact, past experience has also demonstrated that the United States 
was keen to establish a systematic legal framework for maintaining market order 
in Taiwan. The most important aspect of which is perhaps the "reformation" of 
Taiwan's intellectual property (IPR) regime. 
In this chapter, we examine Taiwan's IPR regime, which has been 
overhauled to an enormous extent either directly or indirectly due to the United 
States Special 301 threats since the mid 1980s. The reform, as we used to call 
it, covers two main stages, namely, legislative amendments, and institutional re- 
construction. Both of them involved large amounts of resources. The reason for 
the United States exerting pressures on Taiwan is understandable: since the 
1980s, products that require strong IPR protection have contributed a growing 
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share of United States exports by manufacturers. ' Overseas counterfeiting and 
piracy thus constitute a fear to the dynamic efficiency of the United States 
economy and to the technological hegemony of American companies. This, 
together with the growing trade deficits of the United States and the alleged 
losses of American multinationals` have made legal protection of American 
intellectual property in foreign countries one of the main concerns of the United 
States. 
On the part of Taiwan, as a matter of face-saving, the imposed reform is 
justified by claiming that the "backwardness" of Taiwan's IPR laws is 
incompatible with modern trends. 
3 It is argued that if Taiwan is to become an 
industrialised nation, its intellectual property laws should also be "upgraded". 
Accordingly, Special 301 threats are in Taiwan's long-term interests. This official 
standing, evidently in line with American thinking, excludes many unsettled 
issues regarding the basic rationale of IPR and its relationship with the economic 
development of developing countries. 
4 Yet, as Taiwan needs the support of the 
I 
For instance, in 1984, worldwide revenue of United States software firms was US$ 18 
billion. In 1992, the revenue of United States software packages alone amounted to US$ 47.6 billion, 
and its share of world market was 44.7%. It is estimated that around 20% of its total revenue came 
from overseas users. In addition, the software industry has also become important in terms of 
employment. In 1983 the software industry employment was 247,000. By 1993, the figure jumped to 
435,000. Generally speaking, United States hi-tech exports have increased since the 1980s. See United 
States Department of Commerce, U. S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 1985 pp. {27-I}, {27-4}-{27-5) (Jan., 1985); 
U. S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 1994 pp. {28.6}-{28-8} (Jan., 1994); and Franklin R. Root, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE AND INVESTMENTS pp. 34-35 (1990). 
2 
See Chapter 3C, n. 43, and accompanying text. 
3 
Lin, Ruey-long, "Protection of Intellectual Property in the Republic of China, " 8 Chinese 
Y. B. Int'l L. & Aff., pp. 120-121 (1989-1990); Chen, C. V., "The Legal Protection of Industrial and 
Intellectual Property Rights on China Taiwan, " Proceedings of the Manila Symposium on Counterfeiting 
and Infringement and Licensing, p. 1 (1984). 
4 
For instance, Robert Sherwood, after conducting a comprehensive survey of recent 
contributions, suggests that there is still no satisfactory empirical study to support that there 
exists a clear link between economic development and IPR protection in the 
developing country 
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United States in joining GATT, it would be politically wiser to agree on Western 
nations' "high standard" IPR laws as enshrined in the TRIPsS than to share 
sympathy with Third World nations. 
6 In a certain sense, this justifies the 
accommodative policy. 
Again, what is often neglected is the fact that the whole process of the IPR 
reform under the shadow of American threats is conducted by Taiwan almost in 
the absence of public participation. This is partly due to the imminence of 
Special 301 threats which allows no compromise to the USTR's demands, and 
partly due to the continual existence of authoritarianism. Thus, as far as their 
contents are concerned, they are "imposed" laws and institutions in the sense 
that they are "imported" from foreign nations with a certain degree of coercion. 
As such, the whole process constitutes the most painful experience in Taiwan's 
setting. This view reinforces the conclusion of a United Nations report made in the earlier years 
regarding the relationship between patent and economic process. Another commentator, Arvind 
Subramanian, even claims that the relations between IPR and R&D (research and development) 
is a 
Western myth, which is only true in certain countries. Robert M. Sherwood, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT pp. 75-82 (1990); United Nations, THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN THE TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1964; Arvind Subramanian, "TRIPs and the Paradigm of the GATT: 
A Tropical, Temperate View, " 13 World Economy, pp. 516 (1990). 
In an III report of which I was a co-author, it has been made clear that 
for Taiwan to join 
GATT successfully, Taiwan's IPR laws must be reviewed according to the international conventions 
(The 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886; The Convention of Paris 
for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883; Universal Copyright Convention of 1952; and 
TRIPs) 
and relevant American laws. In other words, a "high standard" has to be adopted as 
far as joining 
the GATT is concerned. III, Yiu Wo-kuo Tzu-Hsun-Kung-Vieh Chih-Huei -Tsai -Chan- 
Chuan Ying-Yiung Tsien- 
Kuang Fen-Hsi Wo-Kuo Tsan-Chia GATT, TRIPS Kuei-Yueh Suo Ying Tsai-Chu Chih Tan-Pan Tso-Lueh Chi Fa- 
Kuei Hsi u-Cheng Chien-Vi (POSSIBLE STRATEGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING AMENDMENTS 
TO RELEVANT LAWS 
IN JOINING THE TRIPS OF GATT) (1991). 
b 
Generally, the opinion of Third World countries is that IPR should not 
be related only to 
trade matters but also the social, economic, industrial and technological needs of 
the country 
providing the protection, in the context of that country's broad range of other social goals 
which 
its use of intellectual property rights seek to promote. According to 
this view, a rigid and 
excessive protection of intellectual property rights might impede access of 
developing countries to 
the latest technological developments and hence restrict their effective and 
broad participation in 
international trade. For Third World nations' viewpoint of IPR, see Peter Gakunu, 
"Intellectual 
Property: Perspective of the Developing World, " Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L., pp. 358-365 
(1989); T. 
Ademola Oyejide, "The Participation of Developing Countries in the Uruguay Round: 
An African 
Perspective, " 13 World Economy, pp. 427-444 (1990). 
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legal history. Worse, the reform also supports the revival of the omnipotence of 
the authoritarian corporatist state which, on the one hand, intends to maintain 
a strong control over society while, on the other hand, pretends that Taiwan is 
marching towards a free market economy characterised by receding government 
intervention and a better legal environment. The outcome of such an inherently 
conflicting mentality is the lack of a set of coherent theories behind the laws. 
As a result, the IPR laws and regime of Taiwan, I argue, achieve neither the 
"high standard" nor the "low standard", but no standard at all. All these reflect 
more the attributes of an authoritarian corporatist state than an improvement in 
the IPR regime. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts: IPR legislative reform and 
institutional reconstruction. Legal details are discussed in relation to certain 
events which led to their existence. In addition, as the IPR regime covers too 
wide a scope, discussion and analyses have to be selective. On the whole, 
however, focus is placed on the influence of the American hegemony and 
effectiveness of the legal imposition. Finally, it is argued that legal imposition 
made in the shadow of a hegemony does not guarantee its successful operation 
in the future, but is most likely to be another set of perfunctory laws and 
institutions. Worse, it strengthens the present authoritarian corporatist 
framework, and thus provides another means for the state to exercise control 
over society. 
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B. IPR LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE 
Since the 1980s, under the "system of fear" or the "blunt-instrument" 
approach (in this case, Special 301 of the United States Trade Act) adopted by 
the United States, Taiwan has been engaging in a large scale IPR legislative 
reform. The three basic IPR laws, namely, the Trademark Law, the Patent Law, 
and the Copyright Law have been amended several times,? while new law or draft 
bills such as Cable TV Law, Integrated Circuit Layout Protection Law, Industrial 
Design Protection Law, and Trade Secret Protection Law have been promulgated 
or are at different legislative stages. 
8 
7 
The Trademark Law was promulgated on 6 May, 1930, and amended in 1935,1940,1958,1972, 
1983,1985,26 May, 1989, The Patent Law was promulgated on 29 May, 1944, subsequently amended in 
1959,1960,1979,1986, and recently revised and promulgated in 28 December, 1993; the Copyright law 
was promulgated on 14 May, 1928, subsequently amended in 1944,1949,1964,1985,1990, and 
comprehensively revised and promulgated on 10 June, 1992. For English text of these laws, see 2 
MAJOR LAWS OF THE ROC ON TAIWAN (Chinese and English Bilingual Edition, Taiwan) pp. 1361-1388,1320- 
1360, and 1389-1413 respectively. Overall, these three basic IPR laws have been amended eight times 
due to the Special 301 threats. For Contributions in English concerning Taiwan's IPR protection 
efforts in the 1980s, see Liu, Paul C. B., "A Review of the Intellectual Property Laws in Taiwan: 
Proposals to curb Piracy and Counterfeiting in a Developing Country, " Brigham Y. U. L. R., pp. 619-642 
(1988); "Copyright Update: Draft Law: Rental of Pirated Items; Software Protection, " East Asian 
Executive Reports, " pp. 18-19 (1984); Elson Pow & Lee, John S., "Taiwan's Anti-counterfeiting 
Measures: A Hazard for Trademark Owners, " 72 The Trademark Reporter, pp. 157-161 (1983); Donald H. 
Shapiro, "Trademark Law Finalised-- Minus a Few Teeth, " East Asian Executive Reports, p. 24 (Feb., 
1983). 
8 
The Cable TV Law was promulgated on 11 Aug., 1993. The initial drafting of the Integrated 
Circuit Layout Protection Law was commissioned by the Executive Yuan to the institute for Information 
Industry (III) in 1989. Then, the National Bureau of Standard of MOEA took over the drafting 
responsibility. In 1991, a second draft was prepared. With regard to industrial design, a public 
hearing was held in June, 1991. A draft bill was distributed and discussed at the 
hearing. As to 
trade secrets, the MOEA is still researching the feasibility of enacting a special statute. 
See 
LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE, Cable TV Law, No. 163(2), p. 1088 (1993); and BOFT, THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF 
I. P. R. PROTECTION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN pp. 20-26 (Nov., 1992). For more about Cable TV 
Law, see p. 162. 
158 
Here, instead of presenting in detail all those legislative changes, 9 I intend 
only to point out two grossly neglected consequences which are, nonetheless, 
relevant to our study. They are, namely, the triviality of bilateral negotiations 
which led to some legislative changes, and the pressure of Special 301 on the 
legislative branch of Taiwan. 
1. Legislative Amendments: Trivial but Exclusive 
Bilateral negotiations regarding IPR are conducted on an issue-by-issue 
basis. Each year, according to the information provided by the United States 
multinationals, the USTR would list the priority issues and set up deadlines for 
Taiwan to follow according to the Special 301 mandate. Certain specific issues 
are brought up because they are the most concerned issues encountering the 
United States multinationals in that very year. Therefore, what the Taiwanese 
team receives during the course of negotiation has always been some specific, 
and trivial legal issues which often required only minor amendments. Consider 
some of the United States demands in the 1989 IPR consultation: (a) reversal of 
the burden of proof in trademark and copyright infringement cases; (b) extension 
of patent's protection period to twenty years; (c) amendment of Art-62-3 of the 
Trademark Law concerning the forfeiture of counterfeited goods; and (d) more 
9 
See Appendix III (Table 5) for the legislative changes in the past decade. As there are 
already too many English contributions discussing the relationship between the United 
States and 
Taiwan's IPR laws, I see no reason to repeat their one-sided viewpoints. See, 
for instance, Andrew 
C. Stone, "Legal Aspects of Copyright Protection Between the United States and the Republic of 
China, " 9 Chinese Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., pp. 197-223 (1989-1990); Mitchell A. Silk, "Legal Efforts of 
the United States and the Republic of China on Taiwan at Controlling the Transnational 
Flow of 
Commercial Counterfeit Goods, " 5 Chinese Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., pp. 90-124 (1985); Edward S. Yambrusic, 
"The Status of U. S. Copyright Relations with Taiwan, " Intl J. Leg. Info., p. 
5 (1985); Edward Han, 
"Protection from Commercial Counterfeits in Taiwan for United States Firms, " 16 Law & Polly Int'l 
Bus., pp. 654-655 (1984). 
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severe criminal punishments for IPR infringers. 10 
more than few Articles in the relevant laws. 
appeared in the annually-held IPR negotiation. 
None of these issues involved 
Yet this kind of issue often 
Legal changes were not confined only to substantive provisions in the TPR 
laws. To ensure that IPR laws could be fully utilised, special provisions were 
promulgated to give privileges to foreign companies upon the request of the 
United States, which otherwise would have been barred from access to the courts 
of Taiwan. For instance, Article 66-1 of the Trademark Law reads, 
"(f )oreign juristic persons or entities, not limited to those 
recognised (by the government of Taiwan), may also file a complaint, 
initiate a private prosecution or institute a civil suit in respect of 
matters referred in this Chapter". 
Note the so-called recognition of foreign juristic persons or entities means the 
provision of some basic documents regarding the name, nationality, total capital 
stock and articles of incorporation to the competent authority (MOEA). 
11 It is 
a standard prudential requirement for foreign companies to do business in 
Taiwan. According to a Judicial Yuan interpretation, failure to obtain recognition 
would result in the loss of legal status under the procedure law. 
12 Yet, it turned 
out that in the early 1980s, several unrecognised American companies whose 
lo 
BOFT, Wuo-Kuo 78 Nien Tuei-Wai Mao-Yi Tsu-Shang Tan-Pan Chi-Yiao (A SUMMARY OF ROC'S 
EXTERNAL TRADE CONSULTATION IN 1989) Title I (5), pp-19-21 (1990). [Hereinafter 
1989 Consultation Report] 
11 
Article 370-377 of the Company Law. 
12 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 533,1931. 
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trademarks were counterfeited in Taiwan were denied their legal capacities to file 
private prosecutions in Taiwanese courts. 
'3 The United States was aggravated 
by the courts' decisions, and so it made a request in the 1983 bilateral 
negotiation demanding a clear law regulating unrecognised companies' right to 
sue in courts regarding all IPR cases. Similar provisions also appear in the 
Patent Law [Art. 88-1] and the Copyright Law [Art. 102]. 
The immediate consequence of the triviality of IPR talks was that the 
Legislative Yuan was forced to make small scale IPR amendments almost every 
year. Moreover, they enjoyed the priority of examination over other draft bills. 
That is to say, in order to dissolve trade threats, the Legislative Yuan had to 
re-arrange its agenda of examining and discussing bills. This has, to a certain 
extent, caused a re-allocation of legislative resources which unavoidably squeezes 
out other bills of purely domestic nature. Take a look at the following statistics. 
There were in total 583 draft bills either initiated by the Executive Yuan, the 
Examination Yuan or the Legislative Yuan up until 1994.14 The significance of 
some of them could hardly be overridden by IPR laws. For instance, no one 
would doubt the importance of the draft Consumer Protection Law, but it had 
been pending in the Legislative Yuan for more than eight years since the mid- 
13 
The landmark case is the Apple Computer, Inc., U. S. A. v. Lee et. a1, Taipei 
District Court, 
Criminal Judgment (No. 71-Tzu-870,897), 28 Jan., 1983; and Apple Computer, Inc., U. S. A. v. 
Lee et. 
al, Taiwan High Court, Criminal Judgment 72 Shang No. 806,14 March, 
1983. For a detailed discussion, 
see Michael M. Hickman, "Protecting Intellectual Property in Taiwan -- 
Non-Recognised United States 
Corporations and their Treaty Right of Access to Courts, " 60 Washington 
L. Rev. pp. 117-140 (1984); 
Chiu, Hungdah, "The Right of American Corporations to Bring Suit in China, " 
in China Times (Chung-kuo 
shih pao), p. 3, (24 Feb., 1983). 
14 
Many of these bills were initiated by those old legislators who 
had either retired or died. 
See Central Daily News (Chung-yang jih pao) p. 2,12 Oct., 1994. 
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eighties and was only just passed in 1994.15 Equally important are the draft 
Environmental Protection Law, and the draft Soil Pollution Prevention Law, both 
of which share the fate of the draft Consumer Protection Law. However, during 
this period, IPR laws were repeatedly amended several times in piecemeal form. 
The exclusionary effects of American legislative demands debunk the argument 
that through the use of trade pressures, the United States is "helping" Taiwan 
to modernise its laws. For the sake of argument, one may cynically suggest that 
in order to have these important laws passed, it would be better to invite the 
United States to exert some pressure on Taiwan. As a matter of fact, with 
domestic supporters like Dr. Tsai, Ing-wen, who even claims that IPR law 
amendments are more important than constitutional reform, 
16 it is not surprising 
to find that IPR amendments are given priority in the Legislative Yuan. 
Collaterally, the American-directed legislation has put the Legislative Yuan 
of Taiwan in pace with American negotiation strategy. Depending upon the 
circumstances (crucially the size of America's trade deficits and other domestic 
economic conditions), the pace may be fast or slow. The Legislative Yuan would 
then have to adjust its steps accordingly. Even if one assumes that the 
Legislative Yuan of Taiwan has the final say in the contents of the laws, it is, 
nonetheless, operating in the track pre-determined by the United States. 
lý 
"Consumer Protection Law Enacted in Taiwan, " East Asian Executive Report, p. 
9 (15 Feb., 
1994). 
16 
Dr. Tsai says, "(i)t is difficult, if not impossible, to tell the 
law-makers and perhaps 
the public that IPR protection is a more important issue than constitutional reform 
and therefore 
should be given higher priority. " Dr. Tsai has been the legal consultant of 
the BOFT since the late 
1980s. Tsai, Ing-wen, "The Accession of the ROC to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, " 
Soochow U. L. Rev. p. 294 (1992). 
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Members of the Legislative Yuan, of course, were not happy with the 
situation of constantly subjecting to the will of the United States. Especially to 
those new legislators elected after the lifting of martial law, they resented the 
weak performance of their negotiating teams, and the hegemonic mentality of the 
United States. For instance, in examining the draft Cable TV Law in 1993 -- 
another promise made under the threats of the United States -- a legislator of 
the opposition party openly criticised the Executive branch as "extremely 
incompetent"; 17 while another female legislator accused the United States as 
"imperialist". 18 Indeed, the setting of its own deadline for Taiwan to comply 
without even considering whether the Legislative Yuan in session was too 
hegemonic. 19 
However, resistance on the part of Taiwan's Legislative Yuan proved to be 
futile, and very often fatal. The defiance of the United States-Taiwan Copyright 
Agreement of 1988 by the Legislative Yuan in 1993 is perhaps the best example 
of showing how an independent exercise of legislative power could be punished 
and buried by the United States. 
17 
Opinion of legislator Chen, Kwai-mieu. LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE, supra note' 8, p. 
1035. 
18 
Opinion of legislator Chou, Chun. Id. p. 1056. 
19 
For instance, on 23 June 1993, a group of Taiwan's legislators visited Washington 
D. C. to 
exchange opinions about IPR protection. The USTR expressed its wish that the 
Cable TV Law be enacted 
before 30 July 1993. In other words, the United States implied that there was still more than a month 
to go, and that should be enough. What the United States did not 
know, or did not care to know, was 
that the Legislative Yuan ended its session on 16 July every year. So the deadline of enacting 
the 
Law became, in effect, 16 July 1993. See id., p. 1043. 
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2. The Defiance of the Copyright Agreement of 1993 
The event dates back to 1989 when as an expedient measure to avoid trade 
retaliation by the United States government, Taiwan gradually agreed to sign an 
AIT - CCNA4 Bilateral Copyright Agreement (hereinafter Copyright Agreement). 
9 O 
As the Copyright Agreement involved the granting of too many rights to 
Americans, which, nonetheless, could not be found in the then Copyright Laie 
of Taiwan, it was frozen in the Legislative Yuan. It was not until 1993 that, as 
part of the commitment to the United States - Taiwan Trade Agreement of 1992, 
the Legislative Yuan of Taiwan reluctantly put it in the agenda for ratification. 
In order to show its awareness, the Legislative Yuan held two public 
hearings in January 1993. Academics, legal practitioners, American 
representatives from AIT, government officials and representatives from the 
private sector were invited to express their opinion on the Copyright 
Agreement. 21 Eventually, on 18 January 1993 the Legislative Yuan ratified the 
Copyright Agreement but reserved some eight provisions on the grounds that 
they violated the spirit of the ROC Constitution, the United States-Taiwan FCN 
Treaty, and the Copyright Law. 
22 The reasons the Legislative Yuan provided 
20 
"Taiwan Fails to Appease Washington, " Financial Times, p. 6 (9 May, 1989). 
21 
Central Daily News (Chung-yang jih pao), p. 7 (20 Jan., 1993). 
22 
The text of the Legislative Yuan's reservation is collected in Executive Yuan, 
Ti 5 Tzu 
Pao-Hu Chih-Huei-Tsai -Chan- Chuan Tsieh-Tiao Huei-Pao Huei-Yi 
Tzu-Liao (Materials Regarding the 5th 
Coordination Report on IPR Protection) (unpublished materials for internal circulation) pp. 
27-34 (29 
Jan., 1993). 
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fully demonstrated their delicate thinking and their understanding of the whole 
issue. 23 
It should be noted that as the matter involved serious economic and 
political consequences, the Legislative Yuan's resolution should not be regarded 
as a deliberate challenge to the United States, but rather a result of careful and 
rational consideration intending to balance different interests. As a matter of 
fact, a strong sense of compromise can be found. This is evident in the 
statement made by the Legislative Yuan, 
"the Joint Examination Committee (of the Legislative Yuan), after 
examining the Copyright Agreement, thinks that it involves too many 
issues, and that upon the suggestion of Legislator Mr. S. S. Lin, after 
his discussion with the Diplomatic Committee (of the Legislative 
Yuan), this Committee agrees to ratify the Copyright Agreement with 
certain reservations according to the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties of 1966. The main reasons are that the Copyright 
Agreement violates the American Constitution, the United States-ROC 
FCN Treaty, and the municipal laws of this country. If the 
23 
The eight provisions in question and the reasons for their reservations are: (1) Article 
1, section 1 and 6, the extension of protection to copyright owners who succeed their copyrights from 
a third country. This exceeds the Berne Convention and is therefore deemed unacceptable. (2) Article 
1, section 4, the extension of protection to subsidiaries or affiliates of a juridical person located 
in a third country. The Berne Convention remains silent on this issue. Moreover, as the U. S. does 
not offer same protection to ROC nationals and that it is not likely that the U. S. courts would apply 
this Agreement simply because it is not a self-executing agreement, there is no point for Taiwan to 
ratify it. (3) Article 2, section 1, the inclusion of "sound recordings" in the "literary and 
artistic works". Berne Convention does not protect sound recordings, and as a matter of world trend, 
sound recordings should be protected by the so-called "neighbouring rights". While the then 
Copyright Law did not have provisions regarding neighbouring rights, it should be reserved until the 
new Copyright Law had passed. (4) Article 8, the definition of the right of "public performance" 
is 
different from the term as defined in the Copyright Law. As a matter of legal consistency, 
it would 
be more appropriate to follow the latter. (5) Article 9, section 1, the scope of the right of 
broadcasting includes the public communication by loudspeaker or any other analogous 
instrument 
transmitting, by signs, sounds or images, the broadcast of the work. The 
level of protection of ROC 
nationals' works is lower than that of Americans'. It is a sheer "unequal treaty" and violates 
Article 141 of the ROC Constitution which emphasised "diplomatic equality and reciprocity". 
(6) 
Article 10, the scope of the right of recitation is different from the term as 
defined in the 
Copyright Law. The reasons for its reservations are same as (5). (7) Article 
14, the prohibition 
of "parallel importation". The Berne Convention says nothing of parallel 
importation. Moreover, 
as the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiation has not reached a concrete solution to the 
issue, parallel 
importation of genuine work should not be made illegal. (8) Article 16, section 
2, the retrospective 
protection of U. S. works. Retrospective protection of works long 
deemed as "public domain" violates 
the Berne Convention [Art. 181, general principles of law and even the U. S. Constitution. 
Id. pp. 35- 
37. Translated by the author. 
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Copyright Agreement is passed without reservations, it will generate 
many problems in the future; on the other hand, if it is rejected (in 
total), United States-Taiwan bilateral relations may be affected, trade 
retaliations according to the American Special 301 may also come 
about. Therefore, the best way to deal with it is to reserve those 
inappropriate articles in the Copyright Agreement, apd to explain 
those controversial points in favour of this country. " 
Had it not been an issue concerning the United States trade interests, this 
scarcely-seen rational performance of Taiwan's parliament would certainly have 
received approbation from the United States. Unfortunately, the United States 
government did not accept such a result and warned that it would impose trade 
retaliations without further investigation according to section 306 of its Trade 
Act. 25 To make matters worse, the United States International Intellectual 
Property Alliance claimed that it lost US$ 669 million in Taiwan in 1992 through 
piracy, and thus demanded sanctions against Taiwan. 
26 Yet, in order to give 
Taiwan one last chance, an ultimatum demanding the reservations be withdrawn 
by the Legislative Yuan before 15 April 1993 was sent. 
27 Earlier, the MOEA had 
also warned that, apart from imposing trade retaliations, the United States was 
likely to bring issues such as the sale of F-16 fighting jets and Taiwan's 
application to join GATT into the annual United States-Taiwan trade negotiations 
should the Legislative Yuan fail to endorse the Copyright Agreement. 
28 So, 
negotiations with the USTR re-started again. The message from the United States 
24 
Id. Translated by the author. 
25 
Central Daily News (Chung-yang jih pao), p. 7 (22 Feb., 1993). 
26 
"U. S. Fury Over Piracy by Taiwan, " Financial Times, p. 7 (1 April, 1993). 
27 
Central Daily News (Chung-yang jih pao), p. 7 (14 March, 1993). 
28 
Central Daily News (Chung-yang jih pao), p. 2 (18 February, 1993). 
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was clear: the reservations made by the Legislative Yuan should be withdrawn 
and the relevant part of the Copyright Law amended before 15 April, 1993.27 
In April 1993, having recognised the rigidity of the situation, the 
Legislative Yuan eventually agreed to remedy its decisions. But a constitutional 
issue now emerged. How can a law or treaty which had passed the third reading 
in parliament be "rescinded"? According to Article 57 of the Constitution, the 
Executive Yuan may request the Legislative Yuan to re-consider its resolutions, 
statutory or treaty bills should it deem difficult to execute. Yet one of the 
conditions is that the request must be made within ten days after its 
transmission to the Executive Yuan. Unfortunately, the ten days requirement had 
already expired by the time Taiwan agreed to comply with the United States 
demands. Thus it was not possible for the Executive Yuan to invoke Article 57 
of the Constitution. On the other hand, though it might seem possible for the 
Legislative Yuan to initiate an amendment to the treaty bill, procedurally it would 
take much longer than the American deadline would have allowed. To solve such 
an impasse, a consultation among the high level KMT members in the Executive 
and the Legislative Yuans was held. A consensus was made after the meeting: 
the Executive Yuan would, among others, initiate an emergency proposal of legal 
amendment to the Legislative Yuan concerning the eight reservations, thus 
bypassing the procedural deficiency. 
29 
United Daily News (Lien-ho pao), p. 4 (10 April 1993). 
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On 21 April 1993, through a successful mobilisation of KMT legislators, the 
Legislative Yuan passed the amendment of the Executive Yuan. 30 The eight 
provisions in the Copyright Agreement reserved by the Legislative Yuan were 
lifted. Pre-occupied by the strong "mission" of dissolving the crisis, all the 
legal reasoning and opinions previously provided by the academics and domestic 
interest groups in the public hearing were forgotten. It was certainly a serious 
blow to a parliament which had just started to learn the meaning and exercise 
of legislative control. International law scholars claim that it has become a 
nascent rule of international law which requires that international economic norms 
be accepted and ratified by states in accordance with their constitutional and 
legal requirements to be effective in relation to such states. 
31 This rule, 
however, was deliberately and substantially neglected by the United States when 
it was imposing its IPR protection standards on Taiwan. 
C. THE INSTITUTIONAL "REFORM" 
1. Coordination of the Judiciary 
The attitude of the Judiciary toward IPR protection has always been crucial 
when foreign interests are involved in concrete trial cases. This was true even 
when Taiwan was still under martial rule. The reason is that judges in Taiwan 
enjoyed unimaginable power in the investigation and sentencing process. Thus, 
30 
China Times (Chung-kuo shih pao), p. 3 (22 April, 1993). 
31 
Palitha T. B. Kohona, "The Implementation of International Economic Agreements 
Within 
Municipal Legal Systems and Its Implications, " 65 Washington Uni. L. Quart., p. 857 (1987). 
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if the courts were not fed with sufficient information or "advice" to deal with 
certain kind of cases, their "un-cooperative" attitude or inadvertence could ruin 
the national goals. 
Having recognised the significant role played by the Judiciary and the 
need to yield specified results, the highest authority of Taiwan has employed 
without hesitation the corporatist practice of consolidating the Judiciary by 
giving guidelines and special training to judges. Coordination of the judiciary 
appeared in the form of some "letters" from the highest judicial organs, namely, 
the Judicial Yuan and the MOJ. 
32 
The first letter appeared in 1981 when the Judicial Yuan issued 
"precautionary items" to all levels of the courts regarding the sentencing of 
cases concerning IPR violations. 
33 Then, a more detailed instruction appeared 
on 7 October 1982. On that day, the Secretary General of the Judicial Yuanj4 
circulated a letter requesting that legal proceedings be expedited, proper 
penalties imposed on trademark, patent and copyright infringers, and, when 
32 
The Ministry of Justice is a component of the Executive Yuan. It has the power to 
supervise the Procuracy of the Supreme Court and direct the prosecutors in performing their duties 
at all levels. 
33 
Yen, Ching-chang, Chung-Mei Ching-Mao Tan-Pan Yiu-Kuan Fa-Lu Wen-Ti Chih Yien-Chiu (A STUDY 
OF THE LEGAL ISSUES REGARDING US-TAIWAN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS) p. 481 (1988). 
34 
According to Article 77 of the Constitution, the Judicial Yuan shall be in charge of civil, 
criminal and administrative cases and cases concerning disciplinary measures against public 
functionaries. One should not be confused by this Article and draw the conclusion that the 
Judicial 
Yuan entertains civil and criminal litigations. In fact, the Supreme Court and various 
lower levels 
of court are responsible for trying cases. Moreover, since judicial independence 
is guaranteed in 
the Constitution, the Judicial Yuan is barred from intervening in lawsuits. This seems to leave the 
Judicial Yuan almost nothing to do, apart from some judicial administration affairs. 
Today, the 
Judicial Yuan mainly serves as the nominal leader of the judiciary. However, under certain 
circumstances, it also provides legal opinions and advises on some important 
legal issues to all 
levels of courts. 
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necessary, special judges appointed to handle IPR cases. 
35 This action won the 
praise from the United States in the 1983 IPR negotiation. 36 In 1983, the 
Judicial Yuan further approved the Plan for Strengthening the Function of Trials 
and for Preventing Such Crimes as Trademark Counterfeiting so as to Protect the 
Development of the National Economy, originally drafted by the Taiwan High 
Court. 37 This Plan instructed the trial judges to consider the following factors 
when hearing IPR cases: (a) the far-reaching effect on national economic 
development resulting from damage to the nation's foreign trade reputation; (b) 
the damage directly or indirectly done to both the domestic and foreign injured 
parties; (c) the illegal profits obtained by the defendants; and (d) the damage 
to consumers. 
38 For the next few years, this Plan became the most authoritative 
guideline for handling IPR cases. Then in 1992, five years after the lifting of 
martial law, when Taiwan was put in the "Priority Watch" list by the USTR, the 
Judicial Yuan issued another two similar letters further demanding trial judges 
to impose the heaviest penalty on IPR criminals. 
39 
The MOJ also took similar action to guide the prosecutors, the most 
notable of which appeared in 1992. The guidelines are summarised as below: 
35 
Letter from the Judicial Yuan to the Ministry of Justice, (74) Mih-Tai-Ting(2) Tze-No. 
01098,14 Feb., 1985; See also BOFT, POSITION PAPER ON THE PREVENTION OF COUNTERFEITING, p. 9, 
(Sept-1983). 
36 Yen, supra note 33, p. 481. 
37 
MOJ, A COLLECTION OF CRIMINAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS (Hsing-shih hsing-cheng ling-han hui- 
pien) pp. 121-122. [Hereinafter Criminal Administrative orders]. 
38 
Id. 
39 
BOFT, PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN, p. 6 
(1992). 
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(a) instruct all prosecutors urging them to plead for severe penalties when handling IPR infringement cases and, when the crime is a serious one, to plead the court to impose the heaviest penalty, where legally appropriate. With respect 
to an appealable judgment, the prosecutor shall carefully review the judgment 
and appeal the case when he/she considers the penalty imposed is not severe 
enough or the application of law in that particular case is not appropriate; 
(b) instruct all prosecutor to consider the adverse impact of counterfeiting 
activities on our economic development when indicting an infringer; 
(c) instruct all prosecutors, when pleading for a jail sentence of less than six 
months, to also plead for the concurrent imposition of a fine so as to allow the 
use of a higher amount in computing the fine converted from tb jail sentence, 
should the defendant opt to convert the jail sentence to a fine. 
It should be noted that the contents of these letters issued by the Judicial 
Yuan and the MOJ have become more specific and detailed each time. At the 
beginning, the letters required only the "awareness" of trial judges and 
prosecutors when handling IPR cases, thus still, in theory, giving them plenty 
of room to interpret and apply the laws; the recent development is that heaviest 
penalty should be imposed and executed in all IPR infringement cases, thus 
implying that guilty judgments are preferred. In reality, this has amounted to 
a strong presumption of guilt. The concern about due process is lost, for every 
IPR trial procedure is given a political mission -- to show to the United States 
Taiwan's determination to fight against IPR violations. 
It might be contended that as these letters do not have any legal binding 
force on judges and prosecutors, and that the Constitution expressly protects the 
independence of the judiciary [Art. 80], their effects should not be exaggerated. 
The weakness of this argument is that it ignores the structural factor of 
40 
See BOFT, AN ACTION PLAN FOR PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA ON TAIWAN p. 31 (1992). 
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Taiwan's judicial system. Although not legally binding, these letters do have de 
facto effects on prosecutors and judges, simply because the promotion, transfer 
and discipline of judges and prosecutors are in the hands of their superiors, 
that is, the Judicial Yuan and the MOJ. 41 In other words, their lives and future 
in the judicial world would be considered "finished" if they dare act contrary 
to those instruction letters. It is precisely because of this structural factor 
which makes the letters of the Judicial Yuan and the MOJ so powerful. 
How and why, as one might further ask, did the practice of giving letters 
to judges and prosecutors come into the IPR reform? As has been briefly 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the answer lies in the very authoritarian corporatist 
political arrangements created in the martial rule era. The issuance of this kind 
of "precautionary item" was but one of the judicial practices invented by the 
KMT government. Its main objective was to provide a clear guideline to judicial 
officials when applying various kinds of laws in cases involving bigger social 
implications. 42 Its corporatist, state-control motivation and consensual nature 
was obvious. Thus, when United States pressures were considered a crisis, this 
practice was conveniently and justifiably employed to meet "international needs". 
The most intolerable thing about these letters is their imposition on the 
trial judges and prosecutors. Why should the judges be told to impose the 
41 
See Chapter 2B, n. 24 and accompanying text. 
42 
For instance, special guidelines have always been given to courts and prosecutors regarding 
serious offenses such as homicide, robbery, kidnapping and possession of firearms. The guidelines 
normally require the establishment of special courts to expedite criminal proceedings and to 
impose 
heavy penalty. See for instance, Fa-yuan pan-li chung-ta hsing-shih an-chien su-shen su-chieh chu-yi 
shih-hsiang (Precautionary Items Regarding the Courts' Expeditious Proceedings in Handling Serious 
Offences); collected in Criminal Administrative orders, supra note 37, pp. 116-117. 
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heaviest penalty if the law has provided otherwise? Are national economic 
development and trade matters supposed to be the concerns of the court when 
deciding criminal punishments? What about the weight of equality and justice? 
Why should individual defendants' right to a possible lighter penalty be deprived 
due to a reason for which he was not totally responsible? All these are 
questions that could easily be raised to challenge the government, but are, 
unfortunately, equally easy to forget and ignore. 
Enshrined in the practice of issuing these letters is the deep distrust of 
the judiciary, the fear that they would be out of control, and the worry that 
judges do not have adequate knowledge of the adverse impact of not meeting the 
United States demands. This, needless to say, is authoritarian mentality. 
Though, as court decisions are not open to public, it is not sure how much these 
kinds of letters have influenced judges and prosecutors in Taiwan, available 
statistics reveal that courts' guilty decisions regarding IPR infringements have 
increased steadily since 1986. 
YEAR 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
COURTS' "GUILTY" 
JUDGMENTS 
430 476 618 810 755 
Table 1. Courts "Guilty" iuagmencs megara-ing lrn 1I11L1! lSCL1CLL 4QJCJ 
Source: BOFT, THE PROTECTION OF IPR IN THE ROC ON TAIWAN p. 15 (1991). 
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Note the number of "guilty" judgments in 1989 is significantly high because 
during that year the United States had exerted historic pressures on Taiwan to 
improve its IPR environment. 
43 
In addition, according to a MOJ report, IPR instances of offenders being 
allowed to commute their sentences to fines are decreasing. 44 Even more 
amazing is the fact that the government admitted that between the period of 
November 1992 and May 1993, there were 942 IPR cases which could have been 
given rulings not to prosecute, but were prosecuted nevertheless. 
45 And this 
was regarded as an achievement in IPR protection. The corporatist mentality and 
anxiety of the government can be exposed in a clearer way by quoting the words 
of a ministerial-level official addressed to the United States-Taiwan IPR 
Consultation of 1989, "... (c) with regard to the coordinative measures of the 
judiciary: our country has an independent judiciary, but our government, 
through the use of different methods, is still trying its best to remind the 
judicial organs of the importance of intellectual property protection. "4°(Emphasis 
added) 
43 
Taiwan was enlisted as one of the "Priority Watch Countries" by the USTR in the Spring of 
1989. As this was the first time the United States applied its Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988 to Taiwan, Taiwan reacted in a very cautious and accommodative manner. See 1989 Consultation 
Report, supra note 10, Title 9, p. l. 
44 
MOJ, Chung-Hua-Min-Kuo Pao-Hu Chih-Huei -Tsai -Chan-Chuan Chih Nu-Li Yu Cheng-Chiu 
(ROC'S 
Efforts and Achievement IPR Protection) (unpublished material) pp. 5-6 (Aug., 1993). 
45 
Id., p. 6 
46 
Quoted from the speech by Mr. Siew, Vincent C., the then Vice-chairman of the Council 
for 
Economic Planning and Development, in "A Report on the Sino-U. S. Intellectual Property 
Protection 
Consultation, " in 1989 Consultation Report, supra note 10, p. 4. 
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Ironically, these letters are welcome by the United States"? -- a nation 
which is so proud of its judicial independence and the quality of the judiciary. '8 
The reason is not difficult to comprehend: it indicated the reaching of consensus 
among different branches of the Taiwan government to cooperate fully with the 
United States. And it was precisely what the United States had wanted for. One 
can hardly imagine how the Judiciary branch could achieve a greater degree of 
autonomy if the Executive branch, backed by a hegemony, continued to send 
instructions to judges and prosecutors. 
2. "Improvement" in Enforcements 
It is widely believed by IPR scholars that the most important component 
of IPR protection lies in a strong enforcement regime. Robert Sherwood, for 
instance, claims that, "(a)ny regime for safeguarding intellectual property fails 
if effective enforcement is not practical". 
49 To achieve effective enforcement, 
he suggests that, "enforcement under the advanced regime is practised in three 
ways: through private action, criminal action, and border monitoring measures. "53 
While it seems quite superfluous to emphasise the significance of effective law 
47 
For instance, in the 1983 IPR consultation, the United States openly praised the 
"precautionary items" issued by the court and the MOJ. See Yen, supra note 33, p. 481. 
48 
For instance, according to professor Bartholomew, "(p)robably no other portion of the 
American governmental scheme has so impressed the world of political science as has the judiciary. 
Here the Constitution is at its best from the viewpoint of originality. Here the Founding fathers 
made one of their great contributions- wittingly or not- to the science of government. The 
establishment of an independent judiciary to determine in an objective manner disputes arising out 
of the federal system of states and central government was as much a stoke of genius. " Paul C. 
Bartholomew, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW p. 129 (1978). This "stoke of genius" is certainly not to 
be appreciated in Taiwan when American interests are involved. 
49 
Sherwood, supra note 4, p. 34. 
50 
Id. p. 35. 
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enforcement, Sherwood does point out that IPR enforcement requires civil, 
criminal and administrative actions. In fact, "advanced regimes" such as the 
United States provide enforcement of these three kinds. Here, to ensure that 
IPR laws would be effectively enforced, so as to fulfil what USTR Carla Hills has 
suggested, "good legislation must be accompanied by good enforcement to ensure 
real results", 
51 "improvements", particularly administrative measures, have 
been carried out energetically in several ways. 
For analytical purpose, improvements in enforcement is categorised into 
three main efforts: (1). establishing new governmental organisations; (2). 
introducing a new enforcement system; and (3). carrying out ad hoc sweeping 
enforcement actions. 
(1). Establishing New Governmental Organs 
Although no causal relationships could be found between the "quantity" of 
enforcement organs and the "quality" of enforcement results, it is part of the 
bureaucratic culture to express its determination to improve enforcement actions 
by establishing new organs. Take the latest IPR protection network in Taiwan 
as an example, apart from the Prosecutor's Office (MOJ), the Investigation Bureau 
(MOJ)52, the Directorate General of Custom (MOF)53 and the Government 
51 
"U. S. -Taiwan Reached Pact on Copyright, Patents, 
Ending Unfair-Trade Inquiry, " Wall St. 
J., p. 5F (8 June, 1992). 
52 
The Investigation Bureau is a component of the Ministry of Justice which is empowered to 
investigate serious IPR crimes. 
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Information Office (GIO)54 which had already been assigned more IPR enforcement 
actions, a new cabinet level unit named "Inter-Agency Coordination Task Force 
for IPR Protection" was organised in 1992 to coordinate and supervise all 
enforcement actions. An Anti-counterfeiting Committee (MOEA) was established in 
1981 to eliminate counterfeiting and facilitating coordination in resolution of IPR 
complaints by foreign firms. In addition, an IPR Enforcement Task Force of the 
National Police Administration was established in 1989 to further coordinate its 
enforcement efforts with the Anti-counterfeiting Committee. 55 In 1992, the Fair 
Trade Commission was established to administer matters, inter alia, in respect of 
dilution of trademarks and false or misleading "places of origin". Finally, even 
the Institute for Information Industry (III), a quasi-governmental organisation 
under the supervision of the MOEA was authorised to carry out software 
checking in private factories. 
56 
Obviously, these new organs were created more to ease international 
tensions than to provide a better IPR environment. Yet, their expedient and 
perfunctory nature has not only resulted in fiscal burden, 
57 but also raise 
53 
In charge of inspections of alleged infringements of patents and trademarks by local 
exporters before their products are exported to their foreign destinations. 
54 
In charge of audio-visual works protection, in particular, the legislation of Music 
Television (MTV) operations. 
55 
BOFT, THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN, 
pp-4-7 (1992). 
56 
"Taiwan: Software Export Inspection System Aimed at Detecting Unauthorised Copies, " East 
Asian Executive Report, pp. 14-15 (15 March, 1994). 
51 
For instance, according to a classified official report of Taiwan, the government of 
Taiwan 
put approximately 4,000 personnel and spent NT$ 500 million (equivalent to 
12.5 Million Sterling 
Pounds) in IPR enforcement actions. BOFT, 1993 Nien Chung-Mei Chih-Hui -Tsai -Chan-Chuan 
Tan-Pan Pao- 
Kao (A REPORT ON THE 1993 CCNAA-AIT TRADE TALKS ON IPR PROTECTION) p. 73 (1993). [Hereinafter 
1993 
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doubts as to their statutory bases. According to Art. 5(III) of the Standardisation 
Law of the ROC, matters relating to the organisation of the institutions of state 
shall be regulated by law. The establishment of these new organs under 
different ministries should, therefore, have their foundations on laws enacted by 
the parliament. Though the Organic Law of the Executive Yuan states that the 
Executive Yuan, upon the resolutions of the Executive Yuan Council and the 
Legislative Yuan, may establish, abolish or merge its ministries, commissions or 
other organs, [Art. 6] surprisingly the establishment of these organs which 
involved the allocation of so much national resources and the authorization of 
police power did not arouse much debate either in the Executive Yuan or the 
Legislative Yuan. The government seemed to have taken for granted that these 
organs are necessary (for the sake of dissolving American pressures), and 
necessity justified their legality. Equally controversial is the role of the III in 
enforcement work. The III was basically a research, promotional and educational 
organisation on information industry, and was not designed as an enforcement 
organ. Now enforcement power was suddenly given to those employees who had 
not received any training in law and enforcement, and who were not even civil 
servants. Obviously, this was an expedient measure of the government -- an 
expediency in gross disregard of law. 
An immediate result caused by the lack of consideration in the 
establishment of these organs is that they further complicate the institutional 
structure of the government. Lack of coordination, overlapping functions, and 
Trade Talk Report] 
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confusing names have, in fact, contributed more to the degradation of 
enforcement quality and waste of national resources. 58 The reasons for this are 
simple. As a matter of bureaucratic culture, bureaucrats are keen to refer work 
and responsibility to others who also assume jurisdiction over the same subject 
matter. Moreover, a sudden and tremendous increase in the number of 
enforcement personnel means that most of them, if not all, lack professional 
training and legal knowledge. A natural consequence is that these poor quality 
enforcement agencies would only perform their functions in a time of crisis; as 
a result, counterfeiting and piracy are still popular in Taiwan. 
(2). Introducing New System 
When United States pressures accumulate to a degree that the government 
of Taiwan can no longer dissolve them through the existing system, something 
new has to be invented. The Monitoring System for the Export of Products 
Related to Computer Programmes (Monitoring System) is such a creation which is 
not merely new to Taiwan, but also the first (and still the only) one in the world. 
The Monitoring System was established upon the request of the United 
States in the 1992 IPR consultation59 and started its operation on 1 Nov., 1992. 
$8 
For instance, persons seeking counterfeiting remedies could make their claims in the 
following organs: (1) The Anti-Counterfeiting Committee of the Ministry of Economic Affairs; 
(2) The 
National Police Administration of the Ministry of Interior; the Prosecutors' Office; or (4) bring 
a criminal suit directly in the criminal court. See BOFT, THE PROTECTION OF IPR IN THE REPUBLIC 
OF 
CHINA ON TAIWAN pp. 6-7 (1991). Apart from (4) they are only slightly different in their 
functions. 
Obviously, the intention of the government was to provide more remedial channels for the victims. 
59 
III, PROTECTION OF IPR IN THE INFORMATION INDUSTRY IN THE ROC p. 14 (1993). 
179 
Its objectives are to inspect those export products that contain computer 
software (e. g. computer hardware, videogame cartridges and compact disc etc. ), 
making sure that their software components do not violate the Copyright Law. 
The inspection work is done by the Customs Office and the government-financed 
Institute of Information Industry (III). 60 They normally conduct on-site 
inspection at plants before the exportation of such goods. If any shipment of 
goods is found to have copyright problems, some 30% of the goods of that 
shipment will be subject to further examination. Export permits will be rescinded 
and copyright owners will be notified if preliminary examination shows that the 
goods are suspected of infringing copyrights. On the other hand, manufacturers 
who avoid inspections will be "disciplined" by the BOFT. 61 
After a year's operation, it was said that the system had achieved, quoting 
the words of the BOFT, "a considerable amount of success". 
62 According to an 
assessment made by the MOEA, from 1 Nov 1992 to 30 May 1993, a total of 72,506 
export shipments were inspected. 436 shipments were thought to have problems 
and samples were taken for inspection. Of the 436 shipments, comparisons of 
samples was carried out on 341 shipments, of which 16 were found to be 
suspected of infringements and copyright owners notified. In seven of these 
cases the copyright owners took no action at all; in eight cases the copyright 
bC 
"Software Export Inspection System Aimed at Detecting Unauthorised Copies, " East Asian 
Executive Report, p. 14 (15 March, 1994). Noted that the III is not only government-financed, its 
head (Chief Executive) is also a retired general. Yet just another attribute of corporatist 
politics. 
61 
1993 Trade Talk Report, supra note 57, p. 73. 
62 
Id. at 115. 
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owners expressed no wish to make any further investigation into the matter and 
in one case the copyright owner and the exporter reached a private settlement 
through conciliation. 63 
Whether these figures represent "a considerable amount of success" is 
arguable, but it certainly has created many problems. According to a public 
hearing conducted in the Legislative Yuan on 26 February 1994, government 
officials and representatives from Taiwan's computer industry expressed their 
discontent with the system. 
64 First, they claimed that the operation of such a 
system had no proper legal basis. Since no existing law authorised such an 
inspection, and that enacting a new law would take too long a time, the 
government, as a matter of expediency, applied the Commodity Examination Law 
of 1976. But, interestingly, the legislative purpose of the Commodity Examination 
Law was only to ensure the quality of commodities, not to fight copyright piracy. 
In other words, it was simply unconvincing and even unlawful to ground the 
operation of such a system on the Commodity Examination Law. 
Second, as a world pioneering system, there was no law instructing the 
Custom officials in detail to carry out inspection works. Under imminent 
pressures, however, the government of Taiwan had no time to design procedural 
rules. On the other hand, no foreign law could be found for reference. This 
necessarily created implementation difficulties for the Customs Office. To remedy 
63 
Id. 
64 
"American Nintendo v. Special 301, " public hearing held in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan, 
(26 February, 1994). (Hereinafter Legislative Hearing) 
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the situation, the Customs Office had to make its own rules through 
administrative discretion. However, because the system involved the rights and 
obligations of people, the operation of the system should have been guided by 
law, 65 and not administrative discretion. Thus, the result was a further 
expansion of administrative powers and more complaints by the companies 
involved. A law-abiding Customs officer complained with anguish in the public 
hearing by saying, "let the Americans be known that no matter how creative or 
constructive the system maybe, we (the Customs Office) cannot create law. "66 
Third, it was said that the government should not provide intervention 
other than judicial remedies to copyright infringements cases. Indeed, violation 
of copyright cases belong to private law disputes, and under no circumstances 
should the government spend taxpayers money to provide extra service to 
copyright owners, let alone foreign ones. Representatives from the competent 
authorities, legislative members, and private computer associations thus urged the 
government to abolish the system. 
67 
Last but not least, the cost of maintaining such a system was extremely 
high. During the first year, the government spent US$ 5 million in establishing 
and operating the system. It is expected that an annual amount of US$ 4 million 
65 
Art. 5 subsection 2 of the Standardization Law states that matters relating to the rights 
and obligations of people should be regulated in a law. And according to Art. 4 of the same 
law, 
"(l)aws are those bills passed by the Legislative Yuan and promulgated by the President. " 
66 
Legislative Hearing, supra note 64. 
67 
Id. 
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will be spent in the next four years. 68 On the other hand, only three United 
States companies have provided a total of fourteen samples to the Taiwan 
government for comparisons during the first year operation. This means that 
most of the American companies did not make use of the system after all. In 
other words, the cost was disproportional to the results, and that only few 
United States companies benefited from the system. Having recognised these 
facts, during the 1993 trade talks, the government of Taiwan moved to draw a 
"sunset clause", stating its period of operation. 
69 
The United States government rejected such a proposal for two reasons. 
First, it claimed that although only three United States companies made use of 
the Export Monitoring System, as one of them was Microsoft -- one of the biggest 
software companies in the world, its reliance on the system proved that the 
system truly worked. Second, the existence of the system has had its inherent 
deterrent effect. 
70 Therefore, the United States representative concluded that 
it was too early to talk about the abolition of the system. 
In brief, the software export monitoring system, while its legal basis 
remains unsound, and its operation is guided by administrative discretion, will 
continue to exist as a special enforcement regime at a high cost and for the 
68 
1993 Trade Talk Report, supra note 57, p. 7. It was estimated by UNCTAD that Bangladesh 
would need approximately US$ 1.3 million for the first year, and approximately US$ 1.15 million 
in 
subsequent years to strengthen its national capacity for the TRIPs agreement of the Uruguay Round. 
Compared with Taiwan, this certainly is not a big sum. See United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Investment, THE OUTCOME OF THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT -- SUPPORTING PAPERS TO THE TRADE 
AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1994, p. 202. 
69 
id. 
70 
Id. p. 46. 
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benefit of only few United States companies. More, it is not sure whether it will 
be a temporary or permanent establishment for only the United States has the 
final say in its future. 
(3). Carrying Out Special Enforcement Actions 
One of the best ways to show the government's determination in protecting 
foreign IPR was to carry out some very sweeping enforcing actions in times of 
imminent trade threats. With the help of the local media, these special 
enforcement actions were broadcast to the world. A positive international image 
was thought re-established as soon as these large scale enforcement actions had 
been carried out. 
For example, a large scale sweeping action was taken in the spring of 1993 
when the United States threatened Taiwan with the use of Special 301 trade 
retaliation. From the period 22 February - 28 February, a special enforcement 
action targeting copyright infringements was carried out on the whole island. 
The result was said to be fruitful, 838 suspects (562 cases) were arrested and 
45,547 video tapes forfeited. 
71 These statistics were then presented to the USTR 
officials during IPR negotiations as proof of Taiwan's efforts in fighting IPR 
offenses. 
11 
Central Daily News (Chung-yang jih pao), p. 7 (3 March 1993). 
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It should be noted that enforcement action of this calibre is not uncommon 
practice in Taiwan. During the martial rule period, it was a way of maintaining 
order and security of society, particularly in the period before the Chinese New 
Year ' (around February). Hundreds of suspects were arrested and illegal 
property confiscated during each action. Then, according to the media, society 
was said to be "cleansed" and "everyone" was satisfied with the result. The 
police was rewarded and civilians clapped their hands with joy as if the whole 
nation had wanted it for a long time. Here, again, the goal of maintaining social 
order was said to have been shared by the public at large without even 
questioning how it was achieved. If one is to look into its nature, it hardly 
needs any explanation to conclude that it was the common practice of 
authoritarian governments to maintain social order and to suppress dissidents. 
Nevertheless, it is only half right to say that these special actions of the 
government did not have legal bases. In fact, the Martial Law and the Regulation 
for Control of Hoodlums authorised these actions. 
73 However, after the lifting 
of martial law in July 1987, it became extremely doubtful as to whether the police 
can still exercise such a power of large-scale arrests and investigations. The 
72 
Though not a religious belief, the Chinese believe that if they can live harmoniously 
during the New Year period (the first fifteen days of the year), they will have calm and safe days 
in the whole year. A reflection of this ideology from the government is the carrying out of special 
actions against certain offenses (e. g. larceny, kidnapping, fraud) and arrest of some un-welcome 
persons (e. g. the so-called gangsters, hoodlums, and criminal suspects etc. ) 
73 
According to the Martial Law, the Taiwan Garrison Headquarters, which was responsible for 
national security in Taiwan, may carry out a "security preservation inspection" at any appropriate 
time. During such inspection the police may take to the station for further investigation any 
suspicious persons found on the streets. Moreover, according to the Regulation 
for Control of 
Hoodlums, the police may conduct a "sudden inspection" (tin-chien) of an individual's property 
without obtaining a search warrant, so long as the person is considered as a 
hoodlum. See, Tao, 
Lung-sheng, "Reform of the Criminal Process in Nationalist China, " 19 Am. J. Comp. L., pp. 747-765 
(1971). 
185 
phenomenon is that the police still occasionally carry out special campaigns to 
deal with special problems, regardless of their ill-founded bases. Needless to 
say, this practice of the government is employed intensively for IPR protection 
purposes. 
An argument against this kind of enforcement action is that it violates the 
rule of law. First of all, it shows that the government lacks consistency in 
enforcing laws. As a matter of fact, after so many years' experience, the public 
has already recognised that the so-called special campaigns are simply expedient 
measures aimed only at achieving certain short-term results. Therefore, after 
such intensive action, it is generally believed that there will be a so-called "legal 
holiday" in which law is set aside and people can do whatever they please again. 
This is particularly true with regard to trademark and copyright anti- 
counterfeiting actions. Counterfeited watches, sports wear, software and other 
luxuries reappear in the streets not very long after the police ends its 
campaign.? May be this is one of the reasons why the United States has 
become more anxious (and thus ruthless) about the determination of the Taiwan 
government in fighting counterfeiting. Yet, on the other hand, this legal short- 
termism corrupts the people's general belief in the legal system. How much 
worse could it be if people have their own version of law which is different from 
what it means to be? 
74 
lt is not difficult to ask people living in Taipei to tell you where and when to buy 
counterfeits or pirated goods. For instance, for computer software, go to the Kwang Hwa market. For 
watches, Yuan Huan and Wan Hwa districts have more. In February 1994, my friend and I visited a 
"company" situated in the Wan Hwa area. We were shown different models of "Rolex" counterfeits with 
prices ranging from NT$ 200 (5 Sterling Pounds) to NT$ 180,000 (4,500 Sterling Pounds). 
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Moreover, in order to cope with the policy, sweeping actions have to 
achieve some kind of measurable results. This would mean legal procedures 
which guarantee due process are often neglected. In addition, a sudden increase 
in criminal suspects surely gives extra burden and special difficulties to the 
courts. The courts simply cannot digest so many cases without lowering their 
quality of judgment. As such, it is doubtful whether the accused could have a 
fair trial at all. This certainly is not a good development when Taiwan is said 
to enter the era of full democracy based on the rule of law. Ironically, the 
United States often took into consideration the results of these enforcement 
actions as a factor to decide whether Taiwan deserved trade retaliations. 75 This 
system of measuring the enforcement progress of Taiwan leaves the government 
of Taiwan no choice but to carry on special campaigns. Re-establishing people's 
confidence in law is not to be mentioned at least in matters that concern IPR 
protection. 
D. FINAL REMARKS 
From the above discussion, several points must be stressed. First, 
Taiwan's IPR reform is typically an imposed system. As such, it bears the 
undemocratic attribute of imposed law. 
76 Second, the reform is a result of the 
application of the American "blunt-instrument" approach. So far, however, the 
75 
For instance, the 1994 NTE Report states, "... The improved statutory framework in 
conjunction with enforcement efforts appears to have helped decrease the amount of counterfeit 
goods..., " USTR, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS p. 257 (1994). 
16 
To this point, I agree with Okoth-Ogendo that legal imposition lacks democratic consensus 
from society. H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo, "The Imposition of Property Law in Kenya, " in Sandra B. 
Burman 
& Barbara E. Harrell-Bond (ed. ), THE IMPOSITION OF LAW p. 147 (1979). 
187 
result has proved to be a blunder. IPR laws were amended on ad hoc basis, 
regardless of whether the Legislative branch liked them or not; courts and 
prosecutors were instructed on how to handle IPR infringement cases; millions of 
dollars had been spent creating some legally ill-founded organs and system; 
sweeping enforcements took place only when trade pressures became imminent. 
All these demonstrated the failure of the IPR regime. As such, IPR laws achieved 
neither a "high standard" nor "low standard", but no standard at all. Naturally, 
the outcome was pandemonium. Counterfeiters knew when and where to sell their 
goods; courts were pre-occupied with the "obligation" to expedite the legal 
proceedings and to render guilty judgments. Even the bureaucracy complained 
about the very system it helped to create and enforce. Sherwood claims in a 
strong tone that "(e)nforcement of the law changed the culture, and quite 
efficiently at that, " and that "(e)nforcement is not a matter of vendetta or 
revenge. In the case of the new traffic signal it becomes a teaching device., , 77, 
Assuming he is right, then the phenomena of partial and selective enforcement 
in Taiwan certainly gives us a different mindset: the very principle of justice 
enshrined in the laws seems to be in the process of being forgotten. 
Third, this observation should not lead to the conclusion that IPR laws are 
not important for Taiwan. On the contrary, they are extremely important in the 
sense that they are necessary in keeping a fair market order, and in advancing 
innovation. The message intended to be conveyed is that legislative efforts 
conducted under foreign economic pressures through one-sided bilateral 
77 
Sherwood, supra note 4, p. 196. 
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negotiation cannot be an appropriate way of establishing an IPR regime because 
the laws thus made are pre-occupied with external political factors, which are 
likely to render the laws precarious and partial in their enforcement. In other 
words, if the creation and operation of a law or institution does not consider the 
reaction or acceptability of society, but, to use Lon Fuller's words, a one-way 
projection of authority, 
78 then a stereo-type image that it is just another 
bureaucratic manipulation is unavoidable. 
78 
Lon Fuller, THE MORALITY OF LAW p. 209 (1969). 
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PART III. POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
CHAPTER 7. IMPACT OF AMERICAN PRESSURES ON THE BUILDING OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters, we have discussed how Taiwan has adjusted its 
trade policies and laws to resolve American economic pressures. Specific issues 
regarding commodity trade, trade in services, and intellectual property protection 
were provided in detail to demonstrate the policy and legal changes on Taiwan. 
Apart from economic impacts which were mostly cost inefficient, massive legal 
manipulations were also in evidence. On the whole, a general argument is that 
Taiwan is forced to mobilise its party machine to meet the needs of the United 
States. Through the use of the almost unchecked regulatory powers devised and 
developed in the authoritarian corporatist era, the power of the party-state 
remains enormous. It is also shown that the United States was not unaware of 
the corporatist arrangements of Taiwan, but as a matter of economic interests, 
it indirectly endorsed these actions. In fact, on some occasions, the American 
government explicitly criticised Taiwan's legislative and judicial organs for their 
independent exercise of powers. 
So far, our analyses and evaluation appeared to be piecemeal and 
unsystematic. As a result, grasping the whole picture of the distortive and 
corrosive effects of the United States trade and economic pressures might prove 
difficult. This chapter intends to link the arguments together by drawing on 
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constitutional and administrative theories. Through this, we shall understand 
how American trade and economic pressures have systematically rejected Taiwan's 
democratic process and law, and why Taiwan's effort to establish constitutional 
democracy may result only in a return to the old form of authoritarianism. 
First of all, in order to achieve an easier understanding, it may be helpful 
to illustrate the penetrating power of American pressures by means of a diagram. 
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The above diagram shows how United States government pressure flows to 
different branches, organs and eventually to the individuals of Taiwan. Bearing 
in mind, however, that in the authoritarian era, the government was under the 
full control of the ruling party KMT. As an authoritarian corporatist state, the 
KMT was inseparable from the government. Therefore, this diagram shows only 
the "competent authorities" that are affected by United States pressures, and 
tells nothing of the real political configuration of Taiwan. 
This chapter deals with the consequences on the process of 
democratisation. Arguments are presented in four aspects, namely, democratic 
policy-making, separation of powers, the issue of delegated legislations and 
judicial protection of individuals. The central argument being that, in order to 
resolve American pressures, a domestic political cycle was formed. This political 
cycle is characterised by the re-emergence of the party-state and the 
suppression of the legislative and the judicial functions. As a result, it works 
at the expense of the emerging constitutional democracy. 
B. RESOLVING AMERICAN ECONOMIC PRESSURES AND THE TRANSITION TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY -- THE INCOMPATIBLE PROCESSES 
1. Policy-making and the Role of the Legislature 
To ensure that the government is of the people, by the people and for the 
people, democratic constitutions have assigned the Legislative branch two clear 
functions: to make decisions by majority vote (laws) and to supervise and control 
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the ways in which such decisions are carried out by the Executive branch. ' 
Parliament is expected to function "creatively" and produce political and 
legislative decisions that are not programmed. 
2 This notion of the role of the 
legislature is found in almost all modern constitutions, including the ROC 
Constitution. Article 63 of the ROC Constitution states, "(t)he Legislative Yuan 
shall have the power to decide by resolution upon statutory or budgetary bills 
or bills concerning martial law, amnesty, declaration of war, conclusion of peace 
or treaties, and other important affairs of the States, " Accordingly, the 
Legislative branch, through the enactment of and amendment to laws, makes 
policies or endorses the policies of the Executive branch. Clearly, the role of the 
Executive assumed by the Constitution is not as dominant as it is in reality. The 
Executive should be told what to do or what direction to seek the objective the 
Legislative branch finds desirable. As to its supervisory function, Article 57(2) 
of the Constitution clearly states that if the Legislative Yuan does not concur in 
any important policy of the Executive Yuan, it may, by resolution, request the 
Executive Yuan to alter such a policy. The Executive Yuan may request that the 
Legislative Yuan reconsider. If, however, two thirds of the members of the 
Legislative Yuan still uphold the original resolution, then the Premier of the 
Executive Yuan should either abide by the same or resign from office. 
This design of the Constitution fully recognised the significance of 
legislative debate. Legislative debate which requires the participation of 
I 
Jan Tumlir, PROTECTIONISM: TRADE POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES p. 43 (1985); Edwin 
R. A. 
Seligman & Alvin Johnson, 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES pp. 357-358 (1937). 
2 
Gianfranco Poggi, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE p. 139 (1978). 
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legislative members in the discussion of policies ensures that policies are not 
made in secret and to the disadvantage of the people. True, the policies thus 
made may not always be right, but as noted by a member of the British 
parliament, A. Posonby, the people will then "suffer for their own folly and pay 
for their own mistakes". 3 Indeed, it is impossible for any government to 
guarantee that it will not make mistakes, but to suffer from one's own choice at 
least provides, using the words of Montesquieu, 4 the largest degree of 
"tranquillity of mind". 
This basic notion of the function of the legislature is indeed the essence 
of democratic policy-making. In the case of Taiwan where the Legislative Yuan 
has long performed the function of rubberstamping the policies of the Executive 
Yuan, a revival of its original functions and status has to be the most significant 
part of the entire democratic process. Otherwise it is simply meaningless to re- 
elect the Legislative Yuan members without giving them the substantive power 
to make policies and laws. 
However, the cumulative impact of the various United States-Taiwan trade 
and economic arrangements has shunted the Legislative Yuan away from this 
effective centre of the nation's political life, leaving in control the Executive 
branch, or more precisely, the party-executive. Ironically, the continual 
weakening of the constitutional functions of the Legislative Yuan took place when 
3 
Cited by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "National Constitution and International Economic Law, " 
in Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed. ), NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW p. 9 (1993). 
4 
Cited by Philip Norton (ed. ), LEGISLATURES p. 25 (1990). 
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Taiwan was on its way towards what Huntington called a "direct transition from 
a stable authoritarian system to a stable democratic system". 5 
In what follows we will show the process of how the legislative function is 
undermined by the United States-Taiwan trade negotiations and agreements, and 
how the Executive Yuan which is the first frontline of American economic and 
trade pressures has gradually replaced the Legislative Yuan to become the only 
policy-making organ. The whole process begins simply. There are routine 
bilateral trade negotiations between the two countries. During the course of 
negotiations, the American side uses its trade weapons according to its trade 
laws. Unable to resist American pressures and threats, the Executive branch of 
Taiwan makes certain promises (either in the form of bilateral agreements or 
memoranda) most of which are prepared by the United States negotiating team 
in advance. Naturally, the United States would thus expect Taiwan to honour 
them. However, what is wrong is that some of the promises are evidently ultra 
vires (for instance, the promise to amend certain laws within a particular period). 
The Legislative Yuan is, therefore, infuriated and refuses to endorse. Yet, the 
deadline set forth by the United States (normally of a few months) for compliance 
is approaching. This means that trade retaliation is becoming imminent. 
In the circumstances, the ruling KMT enters the picture. Through its 
Leninist style party machine, a mobilisation order is given. This includes 
compelling those KMT legislators to accept the fact. The mentality of the party- 
5 
Samuel P. Huntington, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATISATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY p. 43 
(1993). 
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executive is understandable -- to secure its own prestige and to cloak its fear 
of offending the United States. Accordingly, voices from the legislators (whether 
they be newly elected or otherwise) are considered relatively insignificant. 
Sometimes, however, the mobilisation does not work well in the Legislative Yuan, 
especially for those newly elected legislators who are really conscious of their 
power and constituency interests. Indeed, regular elections have taught them 
the lesson that the interests of the voters should be catered for if they ever 
want to be re-elected. The party-executive realises this and understands that 
it would be foolish to put the KMT legislators into some kind of dilemma between 
state (party) policy and national (and constituency) interests. Thus, it becomes 
the job of the party-executive to use whatever means to convince the legislators 
to endorse those bilateral trade arrangements. The most commonly used strategy 
is to threaten the legislators that if they do not bow to American pressures, 
trade retaliation will follow immediately and damage Taiwan's economy. The 
message is that the Legislative Yuan is to be responsible for all the possible 
consequences. As a country which is only famous for its economic achievements, 
the threat is too important to be true. So the Legislative Yuan receives not only 
pressures from the United States, but also threats by its own government. 
In addition, a structural factor which more or less "legitimises" the threats 
of the party-executive should be noted. That is, for over four decades, most of 
the well-educated elites (the so-called technocrats) have been concentrated in the 
party-executive. Their experience and professional knowledge have told the 
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legislators that it would be unwise not to listen to them. 6 Indeed, compared with 
the legislators, the intellectual quality of the elites and even the bureaucrats are 
much better. All these have culminated in the fact that the Legislative Yuan is 
given no other option but to pass the bills drafted by the Executive branch and, 
because of the shortage of time, legislative debate for state policy and law has 
to be curtailed significantly. More accurately, policies and laws are, in fact, 
made exclusively outside the Legislative Yuan. Accordingly, as a matter of 
domestic politics, the Executive Yuan dominates everything. 
Up to this stage, as a matter of comparative law, it can be argued that the 
situation is not that pessimistic for the legislatures in Western democracies also 
suffer from a decline. As early as the 1920s, Lord Bryce argued that there was 
evidence to indicate some decline from the admiration of and confidence in the 
representative government in England and the United States; while in other 
English-speaking overseas democracies, the level of legislatures was never high. 
7 
Gianfranco Poggi also notices that the creativity of the parliamentary process of 
the Western democracies is diminishing. 8 True, but at least the legislatures in 
these countries still possess an important function: to check and overturn the 
decisions of the Executive should they be found unacceptable. Yet, even this is 
not possible in Taiwan. The case of ratifying the Copyright Agreement is an 
6 
For a study of the role of Taiwan's elites in politics, see Li Cheng 
& Lynn White, "Elite 
Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the 
Theory of 
Technocracy, " China Q. No. 121, pp. 1-35 (March 1990). 
7 
Norton, supra note 4, pp. 47,50. 
8 Poggi, supra note 2, p. 141. 
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example. 
9 The reservation of eight provisions of the Copyright Agreement was 
a deliberate correction of the Executive Yuan's inappropriate, illegal and 
unpopular decision to bow to the United States. However, this unprecedented 
democratic move received not applause, but a serious blow from the United 
States. As a result, the Legislative Yuan was forced to eat its own words and 
endorsed the American version of the Agreement. The defeat not only signified 
the victory of the United States, but also the failure of the Legislative Yuan to 
revive its status as a check to the government. Worse, the event has given the 
impression that the Legislative Yuan is as weak as it was in the authoritarian 
era. Now, consider also the impact on public opinion of such a parliament. No 
doubt, public confidence in the legislature was totally devastated. 
In the circumstances, the Legislative Yuan can never be expected to 
perform its functions properly. Democratic transformation has, therefore, from 
the very beginning, opened a large loophole with regard to economic and trade 
policy-making. 
2. Separation of Powers and the Corporatist Government 
The very replacement of the functions of the legislature immediately raises 
the issue of separation of powers under the constitutional democracy and its 
relationship with the party. Before continuing our analysis, however, an 
important notion needs to be introduced. According to Samuel Huntington, 
9 
See Chapter 6B, 2. 
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"Implicit in the concept of democracy, however, are limitations on power. In democracies elected decision 
makers do not exercise total power. They share power 
with other groups in society. If those democratically 
elected decision makers become, however, a facade for 
the exercise of much greater power by a 
non democratically chosen group, then clearly that 
political system is not democratic... It is also, however, 
easy for critics of a government, whether from the left 
or the right, to allege that elected officials are simply 
the 'tool' of some other group or that they exercise 
their authority only on the sufferance of and within 
severe constraints set by other some other group. Such 
allegations are often made, and they may be true. But 
they should be judged to be true until they have been 
demonstrated tobe true. That may be difficult, but it is 
not impossible-'110 
Two important messages are conveyed in Huntington's words. First, 
democracy does not allow concentration of political power. Second, it is possible 
that a formally democratic government becomes the tools of other groups, and 
thus becomes undemocratic. With regard to the former, the idea basically 
resonates with that of the American Constitution which advocates the exercise of 
separated powers (namely, the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary). The 
latter is more problematic, not only in terms of the process of demonstration, but 
it also leaves the even more difficult question of what such a government is. 
Indeed, it is not difficult to develop a broad argument that democracy may 
be toppled by an external force, or that there is no democracy because power 
is still concentrated in a few hands. In the case of Taiwan, the case appears to 
be more intriguing. On the face of it, Taiwan passes the minimum standards for 
democracy: fair elections, a certain degree of political freedom, and a Western- 
10 
Huntington, supra note 5, p. 10. 
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based Constitution that adopted the notions of the separation of powers. Yet, as 
Huntington has suggested, the true and ultimate yardstick remains whether there 
is really a separation of powers; for when we come to the substance of 
democracy, the issue of institutional re-construction has to be encountered. 
Scholars and commentators have already noted that the biggest challenge in 
Taiwan's democratic process is the separation of the Leninist style KMT from the 
state and the establishment of democratic institutions. " Institutional challenge 
thus involves the abrogation of the leading role of KMT, and further, the revival 
of the constitutionally designed system of separated powers. On the contrary, 
if it is proved that the party remains a strong actor in the state's policy-making, 
then the so-called democratisation is nothing but an explanatory myth because 
political powers are not transferred to the properly elected government, not to 
mention separation of powers. 
I do not suggest that this is an easy process. On the contrary, it involves 
plenty of self-denying efforts on the part of the Executive, and self- 
consciousness on the part of the Legislative and the Judiciary. Precisely 
because of this difficulty, undue foreign influence must also be avoided. 
Unfortunately, the United States trade and economic pressures proved to be that 
undesirable force pulling Taiwan back to the old form of authoritarian political 
structure, thus burying the realisation of separation of powers. 
11 
Id., p. 117; Cheng Tun-Jen, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime 
in Taiwan, " 41 World 
Politics, p. 495 (July, 1989); Chang, Parris H., "The Changing Nature of 
Taiwan's Politics, " in 
Dennis Fred Simon & Kau, Michael Y. M. (ed. ), TAIWAN: BEYOND THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE p. 34 (1992); and 
"Eye on Asia: KMT must end Leninist Style and Become a Modern Party, " 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 
p. 30 (15 Apr., 1993). 
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This can be argued from two aspects. First, as mentioned above, Taiwan's 
response to the United States demands, whether in the form of policy or legal 
changes, often requires mobilisation of different branches of the government and 
society. And the one which gives the ultimate mobilisation order is the KMT. 
Needless to say, mobilisation involves high degrees of cooperation, coordination 
and consolidation, and this can only be achieved by appealing to the strict party 
edict. To put it simply, it is the political discipline of the KMT, not law, 
12 that 
mobilise the government to take uniform actions. This implies that the Legislative 
branch should endorse the KMT's decisions and the Judiciary enforce the laws 
to achieve certain measurable results from society. The reason that mobilisation 
could be successfully carried out by the party-executive is, of course, due to the 
deeply rooted one-party system established in the authoritarian era. Effective 
mobilisation ensures efficiency because of its coercive power over society and 
individuals. This, in turn, as a feed back, supports the continual survival and 
operation of the strong Leninist style KMT even when Taiwan is on its way 
towards democracy. Professor Hayek clearly points out that the difference 
between a democratic society of free men and a totalitarian one lies in the fact 
that in the former governmental power applies only to that limited amount of 
resources that is specifically destined for governmental purposes; while in the 
latter it applies to all resources of society including the citizens themselves. 
13 
When one considers that guilty judgments regarding IPR are made into statistics 
12 
Ironically, the National Mobilisation Lawof 1942 could reluctantly serve as the statutory 
basis for mobilisation in the authoritarian era. But the Law is no 
longer valid after the ending 
of the Period of Suppression of Rebellion in 1990. That means there 
is no law authorizing the 
Executive to mobilise the society. 
13 
F. A. Hayek, "The Division of Democratic Powers, " in Andrew Levine (ed. ), 1 
THE STATE AND 
ITS CRITICS p. 254 (1992). 
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for the United States to examine Taiwan's IPR enforcement achievements, it is 
hard to deny that even individuals are used by the state. A reasonable 
speculation, as has been mentioned in Chapter 6, is that due process of law and 
defendants' rights are likely to be sacrificed in order to boost the statistics. 
Perhaps it is necessary to enquire further into the internal structure of 
the KMT in order to understand the undemocratic characters of the state. It 
should be noted that the so-called "High Level Party-government" lies in the 
Central Standing Committee the members of which are composed of representatives 
chosen either by the party chairman or the KMT Central Committee. As observed 
by Cheng, Tun-jen, the membership of the Central Standing Committee has not 
been opened to competitive election14 Nevertheless, it is the highest and most 
important decision-making body in Taiwan. According to a Western observer, "it 
forms an inner circle that has vast power in screening and approving all 
important government and party policies and the power of nomenclature -- 
naming political appointees to import government and party posts". 
15 Needless 
to say, United States-Taiwan trade issues must be passed by this Central 
Standing Committee before submitting to the Executive Yuan for formal 
approval. This strong KMT - weak government relationship suggests that the 
constitutional structure of separation of powers virtually does not exist. 
Therefore, one has reason to say that the government is a tool of the KMT. 
14 
Cheng, supra note 11, p. 496. 
15 
Constance Squires Meaney, "Liberalisation, Democratisation, and the Role of the 
KMT, " in 
Cheng, Tun-jen & Stephan Haggard (ed. ), POLITICAL CHANGE IN TAIWAN p. 112 (1992). 
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This leads us to our second point. That is, the way Taiwan reacts to the 
United States still reflects a perfect authoritarian corporatist model. The notion 
of authoritarian corporatism denotes that decision-making is based not on popular 
concern, but by some appointed elites chosen to represent the society. Policy 
is made on a "top-down" form according to the political philosophy and 
considerations of the leaders. Thus, more often than not, considerations involve 
more than economics. In other words, it is the party-state creature that decides 
the needs of society, and the future direction of state. The grand policy of 
"Internationalisation, Liberalisation and Institutionalisation" and the accommodative 
IPR policy were such products made by the ruling KMT. This decision-making 
structure, however, proves to be more vulnerable to American pressures, but 
easier to engage in changes. The reason is not difficult to comprehend. The 
ruling KMT, due to political and military concerns, is more sensitive and 
responsive to external pressures than the mass population. Thus, an imminent 
pressure in the eyes of the party-state may not necessarily be considered as 
that imminent by the general public. But decisions are often made before the 
public are ready to accept them. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the party-state will always make 
wrong decisions because of their over-sensitivity. Indeed, the rice agreement 
was a big policy failure, 
16 so was the extremely inefficient pro-American 
procurement policy, 
17 
and the unwise tactic of delaying the application of the 
16 
Chapter 4B, 2(1). 
17 
Chapter 4D. 
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new customs valuation code. 
18 However, the opening of banking and insurance 
markets did benefit society as a whole. What is so undesirable is that the 
process of digesting American pressures was conducted under the authoritarian 
corporatist framework which assumed absolute power over state decision-making. 
The constitutionally designed policy-making organ, the Legislative Yuan, is left 
behind, and indeed only serves, as in the old days, as a rubberstamp. One 
needs only common sense to tell that there is no separation of powers. 
3. Delegated Legislation 
As a matter of self-justification, a seemingly strong argument is made to 
justify the dominance of the party-state. That is, the regulatory situations of 
the modern world are too complex; governments are too large and so legislatures 
cannot possibly know enough to make the kind of decisions needed. Therefore 
it is better and, in fact, natural that the Executive dominates. This argument 
was originally made to support the proliferation of delegated legislations in the 
Western democratic countries; it was, however, delicately borrowed by the ruling 
KMT party as the theoretical basis for justifying the rubberstamping function of 
the Legislative Yuan during the authoritarian era-19 The employment of such an 
18 
Chapter 4F, 2(1) 
19 
For instance, in 1984 (before the lifting of martial law), Professor Chiu and Professor 
Fa, both Taiwanese scholars, maintained that it was the emergence of the welfare state, and 
the 
complexity of society as well as the limits of legislators that contributed the spread of 
delegated 
law-making. They made, however, no special analysis of Taiwan. Obviously, 
Taiwan was not a welfare 
state, the society (under authoritarian rule) was not complex, and 
legislators were not elected after 
all. But there were still numerous amounts of delegated legislations. 
Yet, by saying that Western 
nations have delegated legislations, they seemed to imply that Taiwan's 
delegated legislations, 
regardless of their legality, were, nonetheless, justified. In another 
book written in Chinese by 
a senior legislator, requirements for delegated legislations of various 
Western countries are 
discussed. But when Taiwan's law is concerned, nothing concerning the political-legal 
situation of 
Taiwan is mentioned. See Chiu, Hungdah & Fa, Jyh-Pin, "the Legal 
System of the Republic of China, " 
204 
argument is like saying since democracy cannot solve the problems of modern 
world, authoritarianism is thus justified. To a country which working towards 
democracy, this argument is not only unfit but also dangerous, for it has imposed 
an impression on the public that democracy cannot be efficient, and thus implies 
that it may not be a satisfactory system. 
Still, one has to be extremely careful in handling this kind of argument. 
For, even in a democratic polity, it is not necessarily a bad thing to have 
delegated legislations or grant the Executive discretionary powers to regulate the 
economy. When the subject matter is technical in nature, or requires emergency 
actions, or needs flexibility, 2 there is no reason to raise them in the parliament 
for debate. In practice, according to Professor Hudec, American past experience 
has shown that discretionary power can be a better tool to promote free trade 
than laws passed by the Congress. 
21 Moreover, Manuel Guitianan remarks that 
a successful operation of international economic policy requires rules as well as 
discretion. 22 His argument is that although a rule-based regime strengthens 
predictability, it lacks flexibility and adaptability and thus carries with it the 
seeds of its own destruction, unless observed with a measure of discretion. 
23 
in K. R. Redden (ed. ), 2 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA (Pacific Basin) p. 626 (1984); and Hung, 
Ching-tin, Wei-jen li-fa yan-chien chip pi-chia yen-chiu (A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS 
OF DELEGATION) (1982). 
20 
E. C. S. Wade & A. W. Bradley, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW pp. 625-626 (1993). 
21 
Robert Hudec, "The Role of Judicial Review in Preserving Liberal Foreign Trade 
Policies, " 
in Hilf, Meinhard & Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich (ed. ), NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC 
LAW p. 515 (1993). 
22 
Manuel Guitian, Rules and Discretion in International Economic Policy 
(IMF Occasional 
Paper, June, 1992). 
23 
Id., p. 43. 
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The significance of discretionary power is further emphasised by an 
administrative law scholar who states that the strongest need and greatest 
promise for improving the quality of justice for individuals lie in areas where 
decisions necessarily depend more upon discretion than upon rules and 
principles. 
24 These arguments suggest that in regulating international economic 
activities, an attitude in favour of delegated legislations and discretion is 
unavoidable. 
In the case of Taiwan, we are concerned with the problem of delegated 
legislation and discretionary powers in the context of a democratic process. As 
the issue involves a political transition from authoritarian corporatism to 
democracy, it is necessary that we have a general picture in mind about just 
what delegated legislations (and the entailed discretionary powers) mean under 
the authoritarian system. Only after this are we able to tell what possible 
direction and attitude are compatible with democratisation, and why American 
economic and trade pressures are so damaging to the whole process. 
First, however, it should be noted that the difference lies not in the form 
of law -- a law delegates the Executive to make administrative orders, rules, and 
exercise discretion, but rather in the way delegated legislation is used. D. J. 
Galligan has pointed out, albeit in a rather abstract manner, that "in the context 
of administrative discretion, corporatism has the effect of moving the focus of 
political power from the macro political system to the internal working of 
24 
Victor G. Rosenblum, "On Davis on Confining, Structuring, and Checking Administrative 
Discretion, " in Clark C. Havighurst, ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION: PROBLEMS OF DECISION-MAKING 
BY 
GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES p. 50 (1974). 
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corporate bodies, and to the agreements reached between them; the macro system 
is weakened, and may not be able to give administrative authorities the necessary 
direction and guidance. It may be able to do little beyond specify the problems 
that needed to be solved, while the only effective influence on administrative 
officials may come from the corporate bodies which have an interest in the 
matter. "25 Accordingly, at least two consequences, Gilligan argues, resulting 
from this weakening of macro political system can be seen: (1) that there may be 
a disjunction between the public interest and the corporate bodies; and (2) 
administrative discretion is more difficult to control . 
26 
Galligan's comment is indeed highly illuminating. In an authoritarian 
corporatist state such as Taiwan, the party-state is the largest and the strongest 
corporatist body. For more than four decades, policies were made and enforced 
by the part-state. Legally, to ensure that the government could act freely to 
achieve the policy goals, laws were enacted loosely to allow the bureaucrats to 
exercise wide discretion. Among Western scholars, Winn has an insight at this 
point. According to her observation, by enacting formal laws that are not always 
consistent with social realities, Taiwan's parliament tacitly sanctions the exercise 
of considerable discretion in their application. As such, Taiwan's law is a 
labyrinth, replete with ironies and inconsistencies. 
27 The case is most evident 
in the area of banking and insurance where a mere provision in the Banking Law 
25 
D. J. Galligan, DISCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL DISCRETION p. 354 (1986). 
26 
Id. 
27 
Jane Kaufman Winn, "Relational Practices and the Marginalisation of Law: Informal Financial 
Practices of Small Businesses in Taiwan, " 28 Law & Soc. Rev., No. 
2, pp. 202-203 (1994). 
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and the Insurance Law gives the competent authorities broad discretionary 
powers to regulate the industries. In addition, sometimes the goals were not 
expressly stated. For instance, an implied goal of the monopoly sale of tobacco 
and wine by the state-owned TTWMB was to limit and control the sales of 
cigarettes and wine through monopoly pricing, partly because they were 
hazardous to health. 28 These goals, whether expressed or implied, rationally 
sound or unsound, were carried out through the exercise of administrative 
discretion. Of course, as the goals were not made by a democratic government, 
there is reason to believe that public interests were not taken into account. 
This, to a certain extent, explains why public discontent was not aroused when 
the United States forced Taiwan to open its service industry. Moreover, as an 
authoritarian government, there was not the problem of procedural openness. In 
fact, it has been the bureaucratic practice to label everything as "national 
secrets" or "classified materials". To sum up, the mentality of the government 
of not subjecting to any check and control was obvious. Galligan's analysis is 
correct indeed. 
Moreover, these vague and wide delegated legislations were insulated from 
legislative or judicial control. The Standardization Law requires the 
administrative orders to be issued in accordance with prescribed authority or 
authorised by statutes to be sent to the Legislative Yuan [Art. 7]. In theory, the 
Legislative Yuan may instruct the responsible organ to conduct amendments to 
or abrogate the orders should it find they oppose, change or contradict the 
28 
Chapter 4C. 
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statutes. Yet, no publication before or after enactment, nor a hearing, formal or 
informal, is legally required during the whole process. 49 Accordingly, 
administrative discretion can be, and, in fact, was exercised under clandestine 
circumstances. The basic procedural requirement of transparency is lacking. 
Compared with the British, German, and United States systems, 'Q it is certainly 
easier for the Executive to conduct manipulation. Nor is the judicial control of 
administrative actions practical. Layers of laws, court precedents, and even the 
court personnel themselves have made judicial remedies unrealistic. As this 
touches the important issue of judicial protection, a detailed discussion will be 
left to the following section. Suffice it to say that unfortunately the 
authoritarian system of the past was a pervasive and rather systematic one which 
could not possibly let the courts challenge the Executive. 
Today, Taiwan has determined to march towards democracy, the issue 
becomes how to characterise, regulate and control delegated legislations, and thus 
administrative discretion. From some of the important scholarly works, we know 
that for the exercise of discretionary powers to fit into democratic principles, the 
principles of participation and adherence to precise rules and openness must be 
29 
Chiu & Fa, supra note 19, pp. 626-627. 
30 
It has been customary for a long time for British Parliament to preserve an oversight of 
delegated legislation by requiring that such legislation be laid before it in some form or another. 
The laying of an instrument is subject to affirmative and negative resolution procedure. 
The 
Statutory Instrument Act of 1947 sought to regularize these procedures and to ensure that the 
house 
had an opportunity of scrutinizing such legislation. However, in the majority of cases, an 
instrument is laid subject to negative resolution in which case it will obtain or more commonly 
retain the force of law unless it is rejected within a stipulated period of time 
by the House. 
Similarly, according to German law, the power delegated to the executive provides a 
"call back" 
mechanism giving the parliament the possibility to revoke any administrative measures 
taken by the 
executive within a period of three months. In the United States, the constitutional principle 
requires that the legislature itself must define policy to a certain degree of precision. 
See Wade 
& Bradley, supra note 20, pp. 630-634; Hilf & Petersmann (ed. ), supra note 
3, pp. 102-103,233,260 
(1993). 
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fulfilled. Galligan, for instance, strongly argues that within the theory of 
democratic societies, participation is considered of such importance that each 
person has a right of an abstract political kind to participate in decisions which 
directly and seriously affect his interests. 31 He further divides the form of 
participation into two kinds: (1) participation in the political process (including 
consultation), and (2) participation in the judicial trial. 32 He argues that only 
through this can the outcome be achieved positively and arbitrariness be ensured 
against. On the other hand, Kenneth Culp Davis insists that in order to reduce 
injustice to individuals from the exercise of discretionary power, "agencies 
through rule-making can often move from vague or absent statutory standards 
to reasonably definite standards, and then, as experience and understanding 
develop, to guiding principles, and finally, when subject matter permits, to 
precise and detailed rules. "33 He thus urges openness as a means for 
structuring discretionary powers. He sees openness as the natural enemy of 
arbitrariness and calls for open plan, open policy statements, and open findings 
and reasons in situations warranting informal discretionary action. 
34 
Admittedly, the suggestions of these two scholars are not easy to achieve, 
but at least they have pinpointed a correct approach if we really want to have 
a meaningful democracy. True, even in Western democracies, the problem of 
controlling administrative discretion with regard to foreign economic and trade 
31 
Galligan, supra note 25, p. 336. 
32 
Id. 
33 Cited by Rosenblum, supra note 24, pp. 50-51. 
34 
Id 
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policies are not enough. Tumlir and other scholars, for instance, have 
continually criticised the arbitrary and undemocratic nature of the United States 
administration in making and regulating foreign trade policy (see below). But 
this does not mean Taiwan should give up pursuing them. If democracy is the 
only answer to a better form of governance, one should not be satisfied with 
achieving the Western standards. Indeed, what we want is a democracy in which 
the people can express their wishes on all issues which concern the actions of 
government, and not just the easy part of it. 
So the job of the democratisation era in this arena is to substantiate the 
notions of participation and openness. Viewed from the significance of 
establishing a democratic tradition, it is the opinion of this writer that the first 
and the best thing to begin is to let the nation develop its own ideal kind of 
delegated legislations and discretion by encouraging legislative debates. The 
reason for this is simple, legislative debate contains the elements of both 
participation and openness. In practice, for instance, the Foreign Banks 
Regulations and the Insurance Guidelines could be submitted as draft bills to the 
Legislative Yuan for examination. Let the Legislative Yuan decide whether these 
two regulations are substantively sound, and contextually clear, what sort of 
guiding principles and rules are necessary, and what amount of discretionary 
power is appropriate. Indeed, economic efficiency may be at stake, and the 
Legislative Yuan may thus be jammed with draft bills. But this is not necessarily 
a bad thing, because it is a democratic phenomenon. And when all this economic 
inefficiency and heavy workload of the Legislative Yuan 
has culminated in a 
certain point, some solution will come out through 
democratic means. The result 
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may be that the Legislative Yuan may choose to curtail or further expand the 
discretionary powers of the Executive Yuan. No matter which result is achieved, 
at least the democratic principles of participation and openness are fulfilled. 
This, of course, would further guarantee clearer policies and rules to follow. 
What is really unhelpful for Taiwan's democratic process is to employ the 
Western argument that parliament is incapable of solving the ever-increasing 
state affairs anyway, and so reach the conclusion that it should be deprived of 
the power in the first place. This is authoritarianism because it shows no trust 
and respect to the Legislative branch. If this argument stands, then Taiwan will 
be transforming from an authoritarian state to a de facto authoritarian state 
because the Executive branch of the "democratic" government is still vested with 
too many unchecked powers. 
Sadly, looking back on the various policy and legal adjustments as a 
response to the United States, one has to conclude that this undesirable picture 
was exactly the phenomenon. In the process of meeting United States demands, 
one sees plenty of U-turn policy changes and a high degree of legal 
manipulation, all through the exercise of discretionary powers. Adjustments by 
means of administrative discretion or in the name of delegated legislations explain 
little to the public about the policy or internal economy but more about the 
pressures from the United States. Administrative orders and actions are made 
in an improvised and secret manner, filled with vague rules. In fact, even 
access to these administrative orders is not available easily, and the argument 
that the government cannot manage to solve these complex 
issues through 
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democratic legislative debates is so deeply implanted to the extent that any effort 
towards checking or curtailing the Executive powers is deemed unnecessary or 
unrealistic. This is probably the reason why, after so many years of 
democratisation, the government is still reluctant to improve the system of 
monitoring delegated legislation even by following either the British, German, or 
American system, no matter how unsatisfactory they may be. Obviously, the 
present system is too good and efficient to abandon. 
It may be contended that the enactment of the Foreign Trade Law in 1993 
was at least a positive development. It showed that the Executive branch was 
willing to establish a trade regime with a proper statutory basis, and bind itself 
by the law. Nevertheless, there is still the potential for Executive abuse due to 
the broad discretionary powers (one of which is the power to set export and 
import quotas) and, as a result, foreign trade remains basically a managed trade 
form characterised by a strong Executive. 
35 Admittedly, this result was partly 
due to the ignorance of the legislators who failed to notice the tricks enshrined 
in the Law. But a significant reason is based on the very realistic consideration 
that countries like United States are not likely to give up their protectionist 
trade measures through bilateral agreements. Accordingly, even those newly 
elected legislators who committed themselves to democracy had to agree that the 
Law be made this way. The way this writer called the "bilateralisation" of trade 
policy and laws. 
35 
Chapter 3C. 
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An authoritarian government does not exist by itself, it is the various 
attributes that constitute its authoritarianism. Enormous discretionary power 
which enabled the government to improvise is an important attribute. A refusal 
to look at the deeper roots of the problem could only achieve a superficial and 
even hypocritical democratic reform. 
4. Individuals' Rights Under the Constitutional Democracy 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Western constitutional laws is the 
emphasis on the supremacy of individual rights. In accordance with the 
principles of a limited government and of protection of individual freedoms, 
individuals are given the constitutional rights to sue against the government. 
This notion owes its root to Locke's notion of natural law that the fundamental 
rights of the people were recognised as being prior to government. 
36 The spirit 
of the United States Constitution reflects this Lockean idea of natural rights. 
37 
Even in the civil law countries where positive law seems to prevail, individuals' 
rights are guaranteed by the written Constitutions. With regard to Taiwan, as 
noted by some scholars, though it followed the civil law tradition, the United 
States Constitution has had strong influence on the making of ROC's 
36 
This writer draws Locke's theory of government and natural 
law mainly from Bertrand 
Russell, HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY: AND ITS CONNECTION WITH POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY pp. 584-616 (1946). 
37 
For an excellent discussion of the relationship between 
Locke's natural law ideas and 
American constitutional law and theory, see Richard Ross (ed. ), 
1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, THE POWERS OF CONGRESS, 
AND THE 
PRESIDENT'S POWER OF REMOVAL pp. 119-127,195-212 (1981). 
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Constitution. 38 There is no need to discuss the constitutional history of the ROC 
here as there are already too many contributions regarding this subject. 3'7 
Suffice it to say that the ROC Constitution is based on the Western notions of a 
constitutional democracy which values individual rights and implies limitations on 
government powers. 
Of course, there are laws to substantiate this constitutional right. In the 
realm of public law, individuals are allowed to bring suits against the state for 
damages resulting from the negligent or wrongful acts of the government 
according to the Administrative Litigation Law [Art. 1] and the State Compensation 
Law [Art. 1]. Moreover, individuals may petition for an interpretation from the 
Grand Justices Council40 if they have unsuccessfully litigated a lawsuit in which 
a constitutionally protected right is wrongfully infringed. 
'' Also according to 
an interpretation made by the Grand Justices Council, individuals can use the 
said interpretation as a just cause for bringing a re-trial. 
42 As a result, the 
38 
Ma, Herbert, "American influence on the Formation of the Constitution and Constitutional 
Law of the Republic of China: Past History and Future Prospects, " in Ma, Herbert (ed. ), SELECTED 
ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN COMMEMORATION OF THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATE CONSTITUTION 
pp. 39-55 (1987). 
nce, Chen, Sheldon S. D., "A Study on the Temporary Provisions of the 
39 
See for insta0 
Constitution of the Republic of China, " 13 Chinese Culture pp. 38-57 (Dec., 1972); Fa, Jyh-Pin, A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER NATIONALIST CHINESE AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(1980). 
GO 
For a history of ROC's Grand Justices Council, see Fa, Jyh-Pin, "Constitutional 
Development in Taiwan: The Role of the Council of Grand Justices, " 40 Intl Com. & L. Q., pp. 198-209 
(Jan., 1991). 
41 
Article 4 of the Law Governing the Council of the Grand Justices of the 
Judicial Yuan. 
42 
Interpretation No. 188. In this interpretation, the Council held that, unless otherwise 
set forth in the text of the interpretation, its interpretations should 
become effective on the date 
they were promulgated. Such interpretation should be applied 
in the immediate dispute at hand and 
similar disputes. Accordingly, a citizen could rely on the favourable 
interpretation to seek a 
retrial or extraordinary appeal in accordance with legal procedures. 
For a discussion of the 
significance of this interpretation see, Liu, Lawrence Shao-Liang, 
"Judicial Review and Emerging 
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function of the Grand Justices Council includes judicial review. 
Although there have been a number of cases where individuals have 
successfully brought claims against the government and the Grand Justices 
Council seems ready to review economic regulations, 43 there was not a single 
case challenging the foreign trade powers or relevant international agreements 
or administrative orders of the Executive branch. This cannot be regarded as 
normal considering the numerous trade agreements and administrative orders 
which have not only caused substantial economic losses to certain groups in 
society44, but also political unrest45. There must have been some reasons that 
made the legal system so inert in this respect. This writer believes that the 
reasons include legal as well as political ones. 
Legally, two constitutional provisions seem to imply that the government 
has the power to control and regulate the economy, and the principle of free flow 
of goods may not be applied to foreign economic and trade affairs. Article 
145(111) states that private citizens' productive enterprises and foreign trade 
shall receive encouragement, guidance, and protection from the state. Moreover, 
Constitutionalism: The Uneasy Case for the Republic of China on Taiwan, " 39 Am. J. Comp. L. p. 534 
(1991). 
43 
For instance, in recent years, the Council has made several interpretations striking 
down 
administrative actions. In Interpretation No. 210, the Council struck down the 
implementing rules 
for an investment incentive statute which limited the types of tax-free interest 
income by exceeding 
the statute's requirement. In Interpretation No. 218, the Council opined that a tax regulation 
of 
the Ministry of Finance governing the assessment of profit from the sale of property violated 
Article 
19 of the Constitution which stated that taxes be paid in accordance with 
legislation. See Liu, Id. 
pp. 535-536. 
44 
For instance, farmers in the rice agreements, tobacco and wine agreements, and steel 
workers in the VRA arrangements. See Chapter 4B, 3; 4C; and 4E. 
45 
Notably the turkey meat case. See Chapter 4B, 2(2). 
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Article 148 states, "(w)ithin the territory of the ROC, all goods shall be permitted 
to move freely from place to place". Viewing these two provisions together, it 
is possible to reach the logical conclusion that restraining the international free 
flow of goods belongs to the exercise of constitutional power of guiding or 
protecting private citizens. As such, all those United States - Taiwan economic 
and trade agreements (rice agreements, and various VRAs etc. ) easily escape 
judicial review. 
Of course, an opposite conclusion may be reached if the state holds a more 
liberal approach in interpreting these two constitutional provisions. That is, the 
extension and promotion of the concept of free flow of goods, and to eschew 
attempts to control and regulate directly the pattern and structure of economic 
activity. More, a judicial channel for remedying the state's wrong policies and 
laws could be opened. Unfortunately, the recurrent American economic and trade 
pressures does not allow that. In order to resolve pressures, the state is forced 
to take up its role as the omnipotent regulator of the economy. Thus, regardless 
of the fact that Taiwan has entered the democratisation era, and that there is an 
obvious need for improving the judicial protection of individuals against the 
state's policies and laws, such a liberal approach to the Constitution is still 
unlikely to be formed. 
In addition, an interpretation of the Grand Justices Council seems to reveal 
the fact that where government actions are based on discretionary powers, the 
Grand Justices Council is less inclined to strike them down on constitutional 
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grounds. 
46 As mentioned before, The Executive's foreign trade and economic 
affairs rely largely on the exercise of discretionary powers. In fact, even the 
recent Foreign Trade Law endorsed this Executive par excellence. Accordingly, 
it seems logical that the Grand Justices Council is reluctant to touch foreign 
trade and economic issues. This attitude of the Grand Justices Council is 
consistent with some of the Administrative Court decisions which have the status 
of precedent. 
A series of court decisions made before the 1950s have conferred the 
administrative organ enormous discretionary powers. 
47 For instance, in a 
decision made in 1935 (shortly before the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War), the 
Administrative Court held that anything which is not restricted by law belonged 
to the discretion of the Executive officialdom. As such, an exercise of discretion 
may only raise the issue of "appropriateness", but not "legality". Accordingly, 
the right of claim under Article 1 of the Administrative Law (which states that 
individuals may sue the government for damage arising from its "illegal" action) 
does not exist-48 Taiwanese scholars call this "free discretion" (tzu-yao tsai- 
f j, ), a concept said to be adopted from German administrative law. 
49 liang; - 
46 
In Interpretation No. 214, the Grand Justice Council upheld several banking 
decrees halting 
the further establishment of credit co-operatives, noting that they were within 
the discretion of 
the Executive Yuan. 
47 
22 Pan 1; 22 Pan 3; 22 Pan 4; 24 Pan 73; 31 Pan 62; 36 Pan 39; 43 
Pan 14; 45 Pan 31. These 
cases are collected in A Complete Book of the Six Laws (Hsin-pien 
liu-fa chuan-shu) in abstract form. 
The law book only excerpts the most important part of the courts' opinion 
and put them after the 
relevant articles of the Administrative Litigation Law. 
Facts of the cases are omitted. 
48 
Hsing 24 Pan 73. Translated by the writer. 
49 
Oong, Yuei-sheng, Lun pu-cheau-ding-fa-liu-kei-Wien yu 
hisn-sheng tsai-liang chih kuan-hsi 
("The Relationship between Unidentified Legal Concept and Administrative 
Discretion, ") in Oong, Yuei- 
sheng, Hsin-cheng-fa yu hsien-dai fa-chih kuo-cha (ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW AND MODERN RULE OF LAW NATION) 
p. 63 (1979). Mr. oong was a former Grand Justice and a 
law professor of National Taiwan University. 
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According to this concept, the administrative organ does not exercise its 
discretion through direct conferment by the legislative organ, but according to 
its "inherent power" for the pursuit of public interests. 50 An equally important 
precedent made in the same period also asserts that the damage as stated in the 
Law is limited to only direct ones, and does not include indirect ones. 51 The 
impact of these precedents are far-reaching. They not only permit the Executive 
to exercise wide discretionary powers without statutory authority and without 
being subject to the review of the court, but also give individuals extra burdens 
to prove the existence of direct causality between the state action and damages. 
In the case of a clear delegation of power (for instance, Article 47-1 of the 
Customs Law), or the so-called "regulatory discretion" (fa-kuei tsai-liang; 
52 though it is possible to sue the government for ultra wires according to 
Article 1(II) of the Administrative Litigation Law, the possibility of making a 
successful claim is low. The reason for this is straightward. Following the civil 
law tradition, the courts expect accurate statement of right of claim from the 
plaintiff, and formal documentation as evidence -- practices that made the courts 
as bureaucratic as the Executive branch. As such, it is simply too difficult to 
prove that the government had acted ultra wires. Probably just another 
emulation, this is exactly the practice of the Japanese court. 
53 
50 
Id. p. 64. 
51 
Hsing 28 Pan 38. Translated by the writer. 
52 
Oong, supra note 49, p. 63. 
53 
Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Douglas S. Arnold, "Judicial Review of international 
Law Decisions: 
A Comparative Study, " in Hilf, Meinhard & Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich (ed. 
), supra note 3, p. 500 (1993). 
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Tumlir has persistently argued that, in the United States, it was the 
Carolene Products case54 that created a judicial "double -standard" which 
culminated in an acquiescence in the administrative power unconstrained by 
specific guiding standards. 
55 In the case of Taiwan, the result seems to be the 
same without the emergence of such a landmark precedent. 
Politically, perhaps due to the adverse international political situations, 
Taiwan is more eager to enter into more treaties and international agreements of 
whatever purpose with foreign countries in order to prove its de jure status. 
Indeed, nothing shows the de jure existence of the ROC more clearly than 
entering a formal treaty with a foreign nation. Under this conception, denying 
the effect of a treaty or an international agreement on constitutional grounds 
would seem rather offensive, both to the state's policy and the foreign 
counterpart. As most of these international treaties and agreements are largely 
economic ones, it is logical that the court and the Grand Justices Council remain 
silent on this issue. 
54 
United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144-155; 32 L. ed. 1234-1243 (1937). The 
case involved the protection of public health to prohibit the transportation of "Milnut" -- a 
compound of condensed skimmed milk produced by the Carolene Products in interstate commerce. Carolene 
Products argued that the statute -- the Filled Milk Act -- went 
far beyond the power of Congress, 
and hence constituted an invasion of the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Supreme 
Court, 
however, opined that prohibition of substitute food product thought to be injurious to 
health is a 
matter for the judgment of the legislature and not that of the courts. The Supreme 
Court also 
announced that henceforth the Supreme Court would exercise less stringent review over economic- 
regulatory legislation than over laws touching political rights. The Supreme Court would 
limit its 
scrutiny to ascertaining whether it permitted or precluded "the assumption that 
it rests upon some 
rational basis". 
55 
See Jan Tumlir, "Economic Policy as a Constitutional Problem, Fifteen 
WincoCt Memorial 
Lecture pp. 15-16 (1984). 
220 
In addition, as pointed out above, an important attribute of a corporatist 
state is that a large part of state activity is displaced from the legal arena and 
occurs within the corporatist structures. Thus, when an international agreement 
is signed, say for instance a VRA memorandum on cotton, it is up to the 
competent authority to allocate the limited quotas to the domestic exporters. Any 
objections or disputes are settled within the domestic realm by the bureaucracy 
through corporatist arrangements such as informal consultation and mediation. 
In other words, an individual exporter may challenge the fairness of the 
government's allocating the quota, but not the legality of the VRA agreement on 
constitutional grounds. 
In sum, in the so-called democratisation era, judicial protection for 
individuals in the area of foreign trade policies and laws is still lacking due to 
various legal and political reasons. From a more pragmatic viewpoint, the 
phenomenon is the price of maintaining a dominant Executive for the purpose of 
resolving American trade and economic pressures in a convenient and expedient 
way. 
A yet further implication is that the Judiciary is placed in a subordinate 
position under the Executive. This is due to the fact that the United States has 
always expected a cooperative manner from Taiwan. Indeed, one only needs to 
glance at the United States National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade 
Barriers to tell the American's "expectations" on the performance of Taiwan's 
courts with regard to IPR protection. To put it the other way, the United States 
government does not expect any rulings of Taiwan's courts contrary to 
its 
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notions of IPR protection -- severe criminal punishment and heavy civil 
compensation. This message is clearly received by the Executive branch of 
Taiwan. As such, the party-executive of Taiwan, having received enough 
pressures and threats, must respond "positively" -- which means directing the 
courts to fulfil the United States needs. As a matter of expediency, the old 
practices of issuing "precautionary letters", instructions, and guidelines are 
employed. I have already discussed the damaging effects of these practices on 
the Judiciary. 56 Here, two further points can be added. First, there is the 
tendency to subject the Judiciary to the Executive permanently. If the Judiciary 
has opened the door for the party-executive interference in one aspect, there is 
no reason to believe that it will resist interference in other aspects. Second, 
there will be never be a day when the people will trust the Judiciary as it has 
shown itself so vulnerable to the party-executive. Professor Yash Ghai has 
succinctly pointed out that when confidence in the independence and impartiality 
of the Judiciary is impaired, a basic source of legitimacy of the legal system 
disappears. 57 In the end, the constitutionally designed function of the Judiciary 
is bound to be totally eradicated, and this process of degrading the Judiciary 
is seen in our great democratisation era. 
56 
Chapter 6C, 1. 
51 
Yash Ghai, "The Rule of Law, Legitimacy and Governance, " 
in Yash Ghai, Robin Luckham S 
Francis Snyder (ed. ), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW: A THIRD WORLD READER p. 
254 (1989). 
222 
C. CONCLUSION -- THE FORMATION OF A POLITICAL CYCLE 
In response to American pressures, there is an institutionalised political 
cycle at work. For the sake of clarity, it is shown in a diagram below. 
---------------- -----------------------------4----------------------- 
"measurable progress" 
l competent ---º--- 
authorities 
i 
U. Q. A. -+-- 
competent 
authorities 
of the 
Executive 
Yuan 
-00-- 
KMT 
"High Level 
Party- 
government" 
TAIWAN 
------#---- Judicial ---º- - 
iobilisation branch 
1 
Legislative ---º--ý 
branch 
This political cycle is built on the old authoritarian system under which the 
party-state takes control of everything ranging from policy and law making to 
the control of enforcement works. It relies largely on the mobilisation order of 
the KMT, and the manipulation of KMT bureaucrats (technocrats) to achieve 
the 
goals. As such, the constitutionally designed government organs are absorbed 
into this cycle. Instead of exercising their powers according to 
the Constitution, 
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they perform the functions of "tools" of the party-executive. Thus, this political 
cycle not only strengthens the status of the KMT, but also frustrates the 
institutional re-construction of separating the party from the state, and the 
establishment of separated powers. As a result, it works at the expense of 
constitutional democracy. 
A significant outcome of this political cycle is that laws and regulations 
become highly manipulative. This is characterised by the lack of transparency 
of the administrative law-making process, and the symbolic existence of legislative 
and judicial control of delegated legislations. On the other hand, as the pressure 
from the United States government has always been imminent and immense, it 
provides no opportunity to review whether this "model" of response is 
constitutionally justifiable. In fact, the reverse seems to happen. That is, since 
the model proves to be efficient at resolving American pressures, laws must be 
made to facilitate the exercise of powers by the party-state. And when there are 
laws (albeit vaguely and badly made) which sanction the behaviour of the party- 
state, the issue of its constitutionality is officially undermined because those laws 
are "made" by the properly elected legislatures. 
In addition, individuals' rights under the constitutional democracy are 
insignificant as far as resolving American pressures is concerned. For, more 
often than not, they are "impediments" to the KMT government 
in showing its 
enforcement results to the USTR. Layers of court precedents and practices 
have 
not only buried the right to judicial review in this regard, 
but have also made 
the court part of the bureaucracy whose job becomes using 
judicial powers to 
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'mobilise" the citizens. Therefore, one sees not evolution toward constitutional 
democracy as many political scientists have claimed, but a trend to the old form 
of authoritarianism sugar-coated in the beautiful rhetoric of democracy. 
n- 
CHAPTER 8. TAIWAN IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Facing American pressures is not a pleasant thing, especially for a 
government which is so proud of its past achievements in economic and political 
developments; its vulnerability to hegemonic trade weapons is a negation of its 
positive image as well as national confidence. Accordingly, seeking solutions 
which could resolve conflicts with the United States and thus end the constant 
humiliation by the United States becomes an urgent matter. One way of 
achieving this is to integrate further into the international economy, and thus 
become an important part of the new international economic order. Such is not 
only the view of the government, but also the mission of Taiwan's scholars and 
international lawyers. This is evidenced by the numerous articles published in 
both international and Taiwan's journals. 
I 
In this chapter, we shall analyze two most important proposals. They are, 
namely, establishing an United States-Taiwan Free Trade Area, and rejoining 
GATT. These two issues are of particular significance because they have been 
considered and implemented seriously by Taiwan, and have received responses 
See for instance, James V. Feiner, "Taiwan and the GATT, " in Silk, Mitchell A. (ed. 
), TAIWAN 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW pp. 45-66 (1994) ; Wang, Lei, "Separate Customs 
Territory in GATT and Taiwan' s 
Request for GATT Membership, " 25 J. World Trade, No. 5, pp. 5-19 (1991). Tsai, Ing-wen, 
"The Accession 
of the Republic of China to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)", Soochow University 
pp. 277-300 (1992); Qin, Ya, "GATT Membership for Taiwan: An Analysis in International 
Law, " 24 N. Y. 
Uni. J. Intl L. & Pol., pp. 1059-1105 (Spring 1992); Judith 
H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "The GATT 
Uruguay: Its Significance for U. S. Bilateral Trade with Korea and Taiwan, 
" 11 Mich. J. Int'l L., 
pp. 307-325 (Wirst. 1990). For United States- Taiwan Free Trade Area, see 
Tsiang, S. C., "Feasibility 
and Desirability of a U. S. -Taiwan Free Trade Agreement, 
" Industry of Free China, Vol. LXXI, No. 2, 
PP. 1-8 (1989); and Richard V. Allen, "Establishing a Free 
Trade Area with the ROC, " in Roger A. 
Brooks, THE U. S. - REPUBLIC OF CHINA TRADE RELATIONSHIP: 
TIME FOR A NEW STRATEGY pp. 60-71 (1988). 
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from the United States. They also represent the efforts and willingness of 
Taiwan to participate in the international economy. Note as the original objective 
of these two proposals was mainly economic, and partly diplomatic (achieving some 
kind of de facto recognition), the scope of their impact on the democratic process 
and law were not obvious. In other words, the concern bore no relevance to the 
bigger problem of the undemocratic political cycle. Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that these two proposals are purely economic initiatives, they do have their 
constitutional, legal as well as political implications on Taiwan. As such, they 
deserve special attention. In this chapter, focus is placed on their relevance in 
the context of Taiwan's democratic process and law, to see whether Taiwan's 
integration into the world economy can resolve American pressures on the one 
hand, and thus dissolve the malign political cycle triggered by United States 
aggressive unilateralism on the other. 
The general observation is far from optimistic. The argument is that a 
further adherence to a declining economic hegemony, as it would be in the case 
of establishing an United States-Taiwan FTA agreement, would only subject 
Taiwan to more informal control by the United States. On the other hand, 
rejoining GATT (WTO), in which the United states has always been the most 
important promoter as well as violator, can by no means end America's 
unilateralism. As a result, they are not able to solve the bigger problem of the 
impairments to Taiwan's constitutional democracy and law. 
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B. ESTABLISHING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN FREE TRADE AREA (FTA) 
According to the official definition of the United States, an FTA is an 
agreement between two or more countries to remove trade barriers among 
themselves, but to maintain separate barriers with respect to nonmember 
countries. 
2 The idea of concluding free trade agreements with America's trading 
partners originated in the mid-1980s when the Republican government was 
increasingly dissatisfied with the deficiencies of the GATT mechanism. 3 
Therefore, it was regarded as a "Secondary Strategy" for liberalisation. ' Since 
then, the United States has concluded free trade agreements with Israel (1985), 
Canada (1988; 1994), and Mexico (1994). 
5 From this perspective, Taiwan's desire 
for an FTA at the same time with the United States was nothing but another 
episode. However, the proposal of United States-Taiwan Free Trade Area was 
never taken seriously by the United States, though an official assessment (see 
below) had been made after Taiwan expressed its willingness. As far as Taiwan 
is concerned, the door to negotiate such an agreement is still open. 
Arguments for and against the establishments of United States-Taiwan FTA 
are not lacking, 6 but perhaps the most comprehensive and authoritative one was 
conducted by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) in March 
2 
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS p. 137 (Jan., 
1987). 
3 
Id., p. 125 (Feb., 1985). 
4 
Id. 
1994 NTE REPORT, pp. 27,137. 
6 
See supra note 1. 
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1989.7 According to the ITC report, the advantages of concluding an FTA 
agreement were that it would: (1) avoid an "issue by issue" or "piecemeal" 
approach to handling trade disputes; (2) provide both sides with greater 
predictability and less acrimony in the bilateral trade relationship through 
comprehensive consideration of trade issues and establishment of a dispute 
settlement process for future trade issues; (3) help rectify the trade imbalances; 
(4) grant the United States the exclusive benefit of Taiwan's tariff reductions; 
(5) improve United States access to Taiwan's market at a relatively low cost in 
concession by the United States because Taiwan already enjoyed a high level of 
access to the United States market; (6) serve as a model for other bilateral FTAs 
in the region, and provide the United States with an important economic foothold 
in the region to the benefit of United States trade with other economies of east 
Asia; and (7) provide a necessary forum for bilateral trade negotiations with 
Taiwan since Taiwan is not a GATT member and cannot participate in that forum. 
The disadvantages were that it would: (1) be unnecessary since the current 
approach is already effective in persuading Taiwan to make tariff cuts and 
liberalise its market; (2) not end bilateral disputes because there will always be 
contentious bilateral trade issues to be dealt with, with or without an FTA; (3) 
allow Taiwan the opportunity to seek an exception to Section 301 sections, or, at 
a minimum, Taiwan would want special treatment regarding the antidumping and 
countervailing duty provisions of United States trade laws; (4) require a very 
long and difficult process for Taiwan's implementation of negotiated changes, 
7 
United States International Trade Commission (USITC), THE PROS 
AND CONS OF ENTERING INTO 
NEGOTIATIONS ON FREE TRADE AREA AGREEMENTS WITH TAIWAN, THE REPUBLIC 
OF KOREA, AND ASEAN, OR THE 
PACIFIC RIM REGION IN GENERAL: REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE 
ON INVESTIGATION NO. TA-332- 
259 UNDER SECTION 332 OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930 (March, 1989). 
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because the Taiwan economy would require significant structural reform; (5) 
provide the United States with very little expanded market access in Taiwan 
because of the relatively small size of Taiwan's market; and (6) contain 
exemptions of certain significant sectors, insisted upon by both the United States 
and Taiwan. Taiwan, because of structural adjustment problems, would most likely 
try to exclude sectors of interests to the United States such as agricultural 
products and services. Similarly, there could be pressure for the exclusion of 
some United States sectors, such as textiles and footwear, from an FTA. The end 
result would be that few important sectors would be left for inclusion in the 
agreement. 
8 In addition, there is also a disadvantage that the ITC report had 
discussed in detail but not stated in its conclusion: Taiwan's real motivation could 
be to seek de facto diplomatic recognition. 9 
Note that the considerations of the United States are based mainly on two 
things: comparison with the advantages and disadvantages of bilateral 
negotiations based on its trade laws; and political reasons. Though the ITC 
confirms the benefits of establishing an FTA with Taiwan, it seems to imply that 
the present system is not that unsatisfactory after all. In fact, it is clear that 
the ITC, as an enforcement organ, had to stick to the section 301 trade policy 
only just passed by the Congress. In other words, it is not to be blamed 
because it was not in a position to challenge the law. But it is unconvincing to 
argue that Taiwan's market was too small for the United States, and was thus not 
8 
Id., vi-vii. 
9 
Id. pp. {I-2}-{l-4}. 
230 
worthy of establishing an FTA. Israel was in every way smaller than Taiwan, but 
it was the first country to conclude an FTA with the United States. In addition, 
the ITC seemed to imply that the "piecemeal" "issue by issue" approach of 
handling trade disputes with Taiwan, albeit not good enough, was better than an 
FTA because it would be difficult for Taiwan to implement a structural change. 
This is not persuasive for, as this thesis has demonstrated from political and 
legal aspects, Taiwan could not be worse off than under the present approach. 
More, the ITC suspects that Taiwan's proposal for an FTA contained strong 
political motive (gaining some kind of diplomatic recognition). In other words, 
it implies that Taiwan is trying to bypass America's "one China" policy by 
establishing closer trade relations. This further suggests that under the present 
situation, it is politically justifiable to maintain the present bilateral negotiation 
model based on United States trade laws. This excuse simply sounds too 
expedient and unpersuasive. Bearing in mind that the Taiwan Relations Act has 
already treated Taiwan as a country for the purposes of United States laws 
[Section 4], Yet, it has caused grave frustration to Taiwan which has tried so 
hard to democratise its political system and establish the rule of law to show to 
the world that it is a modern sovereign nation in the Western sense. 
While disagreeing with the reasoning of the ITC, perhaps the failure of 
creating an United States-Taiwan FTA is not an unfortunate case for Taiwan when 
viewed in the context of Taiwan's national and international situations. 
The argument is that though an FTA could avoid piecemeal 
handling of 
trade issues, it by no means implies that Taiwan would 
be exempted from 
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America's unilateral pressures. On the contrary, the reverse seems to be the 
case, for it may be argued that a closer trade relations with the United States 
are likely to subject Taiwan to greater American influence. The problem lies in 
the unequal strength between the two countries. On the one hand, Taiwan is 
politically, militarily, and economically a dependent of the United States. But as 
far as the United States is concerned, Taiwan's significance is mainly trade -- 
something that can be compromised or even sacrificed for other reasons (political, 
strategic etc. ). So, with or without an FTA, Taiwan would have to behave softly 
toward the United States anyway. This may be the real reason why America did 
not take the issue seriously after all these years. 
In addition, an FTA with the United States would actually mean certain 
discriminations against third countries. Note that Taiwan is not a member of any 
significant international political or economic organisation, an FTA would only pull 
Taiwan further away from international society, and thus expand, using the words 
of Professor Diner, 
10 the "informal control" of the United States. The result is, 
therefore, not only economic dependence, but a further loss of ability to shape 
policies in other aspects and to a greater extent. The implications on Taiwan's 
democratisation is that this closeness to a hegemony would inevitably limit the 
degree of participation in the policy-making of state affairs by the people. 
For 
a country which has just started to practice democracy, this 
is certainly not 
10 
Professor Diner's theory is based on the refined notion of imperialism which 
defines modern 
imperialism as an outflow of value due to a productivity 
differential between two societies involved 
in a capitalist process of exchange. Accordingly, the traditional, suprahistorical, 
and timeless 
concept of expansion of territorial state, or an empire 
is discarded. Modern imperialism is thus 
based on the penetration of capitalism dominated by the United 
States. The "empire" created is called 
an Informal Imperia, and the control over the Third World 
is called informal control. Dan Diner, 
"Imperialism, Universalism and Hegemony: On the Relationship 
Between Politics and Economics in the 
World Community, " 39-40 Law and State, pp. 7-38 (1989). 
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appropriate. Here, it may be argued that this is not necessarily undesirable, for 
surrendering part of national sovereignty for mutual cooperation and benefits is 
actually something to be applauded. Not always; Professor Robert Gilpin has 
sharply pointed out that in times when the hegemony is suffering from a decline, 
one has reason to believe that it will be less willing to subordinate its own 
interests to its allies, and tend more and more to exploit its status for its own 
narrowly defined purposes. 
11 Indeed, the ever-increasing aggressive 
unilateralism of the United States is a reflection of the continual shrinkage of its 
concern with the international society, and the growing of a self-seeking 
mentality. 
C. REJOINING GATT 
On 18 Sept., 1992, Taiwan formally applied for accession to the GATT under 
the name of the customs territories of Taiwan, Pescadores (Peng-hu Islands) and 
Quemoy (Kingmen and Matsu Islands). 
12 This was a courageous move considering 
that Taiwan was forced to withdraw its membership in 1950 due to its loss of 
political control over the Mainland, and had its observer status terminated in 
1971 following its expulsion by the United Nations. This time, however, Taiwan 
re-appeared as a NIC with strong economic strength and spotless international 
trade records. The application looked optimistic in 1991 when the United 
States 
President Bush declared that he would fully support Taiwan's application, and 
11 
Robert Gilpin, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS p. 
345 (1987). 
12 
GATT Focus, No. 109, p. 6 (July, 1994); "Taiwan's GATT 
Application: Working Party Formed, 
East Asian Executive Report, p. 8 (15 Dec., 1992). 
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urge other countries to take the same position. 13 Presently, the application is 
still pending because of China's insistence that it should obtain the membership 
before Taiwan. 14 
It is generally believed that if Taiwan becomes a GATT (WTO) member, the 
biggest advantages are that it will benefit from the MFN treatment and the 
dispute settlement mechanism. 15 The former would help diversify Taiwan's export 
markets, thus reducing its trade reliance on the United States. This would 
further slash its trade surplus with the United States -- the central concern of 
13 
On 19 July, 1991, President Bush sent a letter to Senator Baucus, which stated, "... I 
share your interest in Taiwan's accession to the GATT. As a major trading economy, Taiwan can make 
an important contribution to the global trade system through responsible GATT participation. The 
United States has a firm position of supporting the accession of Taiwan on terms acceptable to GATT 
contracting parties. The United States will begin to work actively with other contracting parties 
to resolve in a favourable manner the issue relating to Taiwan's GATT accession... " Cited by Chiu, 
Hungdah, "Taiwan's Membership in the GATT, " 10 Chinese Yb. Int'l L. & Aff., p. 204 (1990-91). 
According to Chiu, the reason that Bush would take such a big step was, however, due to political 
reason. It was in fact a trade-off by Bush in exchange for the Congress' support for renewing China's 
MFN status. Traditionally, American Congress has been extremely friendly to Taiwan and hostile to 
China. Later, Bush did act on what he had promised. He vowed to impose sanctions if China did not 
agree to support Taiwan's membership to the GATT. See "Bush Takes a Tougher Stance -- Foreign Trade: 
Human Rights Cast Shadow Over Talks with United States, " Financial Times, p. 111, (16 June, 1992); 
Sharon Lockwood, "Taiwan's Accession to GATT: A Washington Perspective, " 28 Colum. J. World Bus., 
pp-96-99 (Fall 1993). 
14 
GATT Focus, No. 94, p. 8 (Oct., 1992); "Survey of Taiwan (7): Under Washington's Eye -- 
Trade, " Financial Times, p. 39 (10 Oct., 1989); "Taiwan's Bid to Join GATT Hands World Trading Body 
a Hot Potato, " Financial Times, p. 3 (5 Jan., 1990). Chinese (PRC) scholars have different viewpoint 
on Taiwan's application. See Feng, Yushu, "Taiwan and GATT: The Political, Legal and Economic 
Issues 
Raised by the Possibility of Taiwan Joining GATT, " 13 World Economy, pp. 129-143 (1990); and 
Qin, Ya, 
"GATT Membership for Taiwan: An Analysis in International Law, " 24 N. Y. Uni. J. Int'l L. & Pol., 
PP. 1059-1105 (Spring 1992). Mr. Feng's article, which strongly denies the necessity of Taiwan 
joining 
the GATT, is basically an interpretation of the official position of the PRC government. 
On the other 
hand, Mr. Qin's work is more practical and analytical. He argues that there 
is no point in not 
letting Taiwan become a member of GATT, considering Taiwan is such a 
big economic entity, and that 
joining GATT does not necessarily bear any political implications such as 
"Two Chinas" or an 
independent Taiwan. 
15 
Perhaps it is most appropriate to cite Dr. Tsai's words 
because she is both a university 
professor in Taiwan as well as a long-term legal consultant of the 
BOFT. Her opinion thus more or 
less represents the stance of the Taiwan government. Dr. Tsai says, 
"(t)he validity of multilateral 
treaty is not rested upon the existence of mutual diplomatic recognition 
among the signatories... 
When Taiwan becomes a (GATT) member, it will receive most-favoured-nation and 
national treatment from 
other members, despite the absence of diplomatic recognition which 
is normally required in a 
bilateral context... Taiwanese exporters have been the victims of excessive 
abuse of administrative 
measures of foreign governments, which in certain ways amount 
to non-tariff barriers. Except for 
taking judicial action in the importing country to rectify such practices, 
there is little remedy 
available in the international context. GATT membership will enable 
Taiwan to make use of the 
multilateral dispute settlement mechanism of the GATT. " 
See Tsai, supra note 1, pp. 232-294. 
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the hegemony. On the other hand, by resorting to the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, Taiwan may no longer need to negotiate on a bilateral basis with the 
United States, thus eliminating America's trade threats. Assuming, for the time 
being, that this is true, then logically, all the negative impacts of America's 
unilateralism on the democratic process and law of Taiwan are likely to come to 
a stop. Taiwan will then have the opportunity to concentrate on realising 
constitutional democracy without meeting any obstruction from the United States. 
However, this expectation sounds too good to be true. First of all, whether 
Taiwan can diversify its market depends more on the market demands than the 
MFN treatment. Due to its huge consumption power, the United States is still the 
largest market in the world. Based on the established commercial ties between 
the two countries, an increase in the market demand in the United States is 
likely to increase its imports from Taiwan. 
16 Bearing also in mind many of the 
GATT members are debt-ridden nations, the only big markets left in the world 
are the EU and Japan. In other words, the MFN treatment is beneficial to Taiwan 
because it can be applied to EU and Japan. To date, however, even the United 
States has problems opening the EU and Japan's markets, 
17 
not to mention 
Taiwan's chance of diversifying its market substantially to these two trading 
blocs. As a result, the MFN treatment may not mean so much as 
imagined. 
16 
For instance, Taiwan has increased its exports to the United 
States due to its economic 
recovery in recent years. According to BOFT, the United 
States is still Taiwan's largest trade 
partner in 1994, with Taiwan enjoying a trade surplus of US$ 
6.3 billion. Then, in the first four 
months of 1995, exports to the United States increased another 
13.8%. Central Daily News (Chung-yang 
jih pao), p. 7 (24 May, 1995). 
17 
For instance, just recently, the USTR has decided to take unilateral 
actions (100% punitive 
tariffs) against Japanese cars because of Japan's protectionist 
policy with regard to foreign cars. 
"Car wars: Mr. Kantor's Outrageous Gamble, " The Economist 
(London), p. 81 (20-26 May, 1995). 
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With regard to the dispute settlement mechanism, the future also seems 
gloomy. Whether GATT (WTO) becomes an internationally binding instrument, and 
thus foresees a retreat of America's unilateralism on countries such as Taiwan, 
depends on the attitude of the United States. That is, the United States must 
commit itself to the new trade rules of GATT reached in the Uruguay Round. 
More importantly, it should abstain itself from using the trade weapons according 
to its trade laws. Theoretically speaking, this requires what the "Leadership 
Theory" called "a hegemony with a liberal commitment". 18 
It should be noted that the United States has not made any commitment to 
the GATT that it would not use its trade weapons any more. On the contrary, 
it has been the official view of the United States to treat its trade laws 
(weapons) as complementary to the multilateral framework. 
19 Even in the Post- 
Uruguay Round era, the United States still regards bilateral negotiations as 
extremely important in opening markets, settling disputes, and protecting United 
18 
According to the Leadership Theory or the Theory of Hegemonic Stability, an open and 
liberal world economy requires the existence of a hegemonic or dominant power. 
"The hegemony itself 
must be committed to the values of liberalism or its social purpose and 
domestic distribution of 
power must be favourably disposed toward a liberal international order. " 
Only with this commitment 
that other states would accept the rule of the hegemon because of 
its prestige and status in the 
international political system. see Gilpin, supra note 11, pp. 72-73. 
19 
For instance, the United States Administration's 1985 policy statement 
noted that 
bilateral negotiations are no substitute for multilateral negotiations, 
but that "such agreements 
could complement our multilateral efforts and facilitate a 
higher degree of liberalisation, mutually 
beneficial to both parties, than would be possible within the multilateral 
context". See supra note 
2, p. 137. Then in May 1989, Carla Hills, the then USTR, stated that, 
"Super 301 and Special 301, like 
other trade tools at our disposal, will be used to create an ever 
expanding multilateral trading 
system based upon clear and enforceable rules. " Recited 
from Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick- 
(ed. ), AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND 
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM p. 232 
(1990). In sum, the United States has never limited 
its trade policy to GATT activity. When necessary 
and appropriate, the United States has sought to complement the effective 
functioning of the GATT 
with Plurilateral, bilateral, and unilateral undertakings. 
See Bello, Judith H. Bello & Alan F. 
Holmer, "The GATT Uruguay: its Significance for U. S. Bilateral 
Trade with Korea and Taiwan, " 11 Mich. 
J. Intl L., p. 307 (Wint. 1990). 
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States trading rights. 
20 In addition, bilateral negotiations are often where new 
trade issues are first discussed or tested. ° Accordingly, as noted by Bello and 
Holmer, although the United States has agreed to use WTO dispute settlement 
procedures, it retains domestic legal authority to disregard this obligation when 
such disregard is warranted in the national interest. 22 Thus, Special 301 is still 
there, while Super 301 was revived in 1994 by President Clinton. 23 In other 
words, GATT (WTO) membership does not guarantee the disappearance of America's 
trade threats. To make matters worse, viewed from the rather reluctant attitude 
of the United States in approving a former Italian trade minister as the director- 
general of the WTO, one has reason to suspect that the American government has 
created for itself a perfect excuse to oppose any deals or trade disputes rulings 
that it does not like. 
24 This would mean the weakening of the WTO at the 
outset, and the return to the massive use of its aggressive unilateralism. 
The real problem is that it is difficult for the United States to give up its 
traditional "power-minded" approach towards other countries -- especially to 
small countries. With this approach, GATT rules will be applied only when they 
coincide with the American interests, and discarded when they do not. A very 
undesirable development is that when this approach has become an element 
in 
20 
See supra note 2, p. 231 (Feb., 1995). 
21 Id. 
22 
Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "The Post-Uruguay 
Round Future of section 301, " 25 Lsw 
& Poly Int'l Bus. pp. 1307 (1994). 
23 
Super 301 was renewed on 3 March 1994 
for another two years. See Wall St. 
J., p. 3 (4 March, 
1994). 
14 
"The WTO: A Rocky Start, " The Economist 
(London), pp. 122-123 (25 March-31 March, 
1995). 
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economic or foreign relations, there is no ending point to its exercise. Worse, 
it will be relied upon to achieve other purposes. The most recent example is 
perhaps the trade sanctions imposed by the United States on Taiwan because of 
"its lack of progress in eliminating its illegal trade in tigers and rhinoceroses" 
in 1994.25 Originally the complaint that Taiwan was one of the biggest buyers 
of tiger bones and rhino horns was raised by a private environmental protection 
organisation in Europe. 
26 But as Taiwan was not qualified to become a member 
of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) 
27 due to political reasons, and that European countries were 
reluctant to take actions against Taiwan, the job fell to the United States. So, 
upon the advice of the CITES -- in which Taiwan was never given a fair forum 
to speak, 
28 the Clinton Administration announced trade sanctions according to 
the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act. 
29 
In order to demonstrate the required "measurable, verifiable and 
substantial progress" in wildlife protection, the IPR protection story was 
25 
"President Announces Trade Sanctions Against Taiwan for Illegal Trade 
in Endangered 
Species, " Office of the Press Secretary, the White House (11 April, 
1994). 
26 
The whole story can be dated back to 1993 when the Environmental 
Investigation Association 
(EIA), United Kingdom branch presented a film about the trade and storage of rhino 
horns in China, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan. EIA strongly criticised Taiwan as one of the 
largest buyers of rhino horns 
in the world. Central Daily News (Chung-yang jih pao), p. 7 
(5 Sept., 1993). 
27 
CITES was signed in the United States in March 
1973, and entered into force in July 1975. 
The Convention aims at establishing world wide control over all 
trade in endangered wildlife and 
wildlife products. Ursula Wasserman, "Washington Wildlife 
Convention, " 14 J. World Trade, pp. 362-366 
(1980). 
28 
As Taiwan was not a member of CITES, it was not allowed 
to attend any of its meetings. 
However, due to the fact that Taiwan was a target this 
time, it was given an opportunity to 
participate in the 1994 annual meeting of CITES held 
in Israel, but in the name of a Non-governmental 
Organisation (NGO). Central Daily News (Chung-yang jih pao), p. 
7 (30 March, 1994). 
29 
22 U. S. C. A. ý 1978. 
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repeated. The KMT government immediately took special enforcement measures 
to crush the illegal trade in tiger bones and rhino horns, and also symbolically 
prosecuted some of the sellers. 
30 In the Legislative Yuan, the KMT mobilised its 
legislators to pass an amendment to the Wildlife Conservation Law, 31 while the 
Executive Yuan promised to establish more enforcement organs and personnel. ', 
All these "achievements" were then presented to the United States in the hope 
that it would withdraw the trade sanctions. In a nutshell, there is no need to 
repeat the undemocratic practices and the brutal enforcements arising from these 
special actions as they are exactly alike to those IPR protection efforts. 
This case shows that the United States is keen to use its aggressive 
unilateralism to deal with Taiwan, because it knows that, according to past 
experience, Taiwan will bow to it. In other words, when a system works, there 
is no reason to forsake it. Worse, such a power-based relation is deliberately 
used by other countries and even private organisations. Western countries have 
persistently criticised United States trade unilateralism, but then it seems that 
they are more willing to forget their criticisms and take advantage of America's 
30 
As soon as the U. S. President announced the sanction against 
Taiwan, the competent 
authority, the Council of Agriculture of Taiwan immediately planned a special enforcement 
action to 
ban illegal trade in wildlife. From 19 April to 30 April 1994, with the 
help of the police, a 
manpower of more than 2,100 had been mobilised to carry out the action on 
the island. The result 
was said to be fruitful: of the 5,623 Chinese medicine shops being searched, 
15 of them were found 
selling rhino horn powder (total weight 349 g. ), 22 sold tiger 
bone (total weight 4,420 g. ). In 
other words, 0.66 % of the medicine shops were found to 
have sold illegal wildlife products, a 
percentage very much lower than the March Campaign (6.5%). 
See Central Daily News (Chung-yang jih 
pao), p. 7 (5 May, 1994). 
31 
Central Daily News (Chung-yang jih pao) p. 7 (28 Sept., 
1994). 
32 
They include: (1) to establish a Wildlife Protection 
committee; (2) to raise the so-called 
"Wildlife Protection, Investigation and Supervisory Group" 
(established in early 1994) to cabinet 
level; and (3) to increase the number of "wildlife police" 
(organised in early 1994 with a total 
number of six) by another one hundred and thirty personnel. 
See Central Daily News (Chung-yang jih 
Pao), p. 7 (16 April, 1994). 
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approach when certain things arise. Nothing can be more hypocritical than to 
rely on something which is constantly condemned. With this kind of hegemonic 
mentality, one cannot be optimistic about Taiwan's prospect even if it joins GATT 
or other international trade agreement. 
There is one more potential area of uneasiness with regard to the United 
States approach towards Taiwan. As a liberal society, the United States has 
many kinds of production (and consumption) which may not be readily acceptable 
by other countries. What causes concern is the marriage of these productions 
to the "blunt-instrument" approach of its trade laws. Just imagine what the 
situation will be like if Taiwan is forced to legalise and import handguns (already 
popular in the United States thanks to the promotion of the United States 
National Rifle Association) under the section 301 pressures? Though the issue 
is hypothetical, one has reason to believe that it is not impossible if America's 
trade deficits with Taiwan remains high, and its domestic economy keeps on 
worsening. 
In sum, those who believe that joining GATT would solve Taiwan's trade 
problems with the United States have simply misplaced their attention. 
The 
centre of the problem remains whether the United States is willing to give up 
its 
"blunt-instrument" approach which is so deeply-rooted in its trade 
laws. 
"-4 o 
D. CONCLUSION 
In a very influential book, Alan Wolff writes, 
"(t)here is one other aspect of unilateral action worth 
mentioning. This is that a government, in the final 
analysis, has a responsibility to its people to protect 
national interests. In this regard, whether the interest 
is commercial, environmental, or of a foreign policy 
nature, it is an attribute of sovereignty that it may well 
believe that it must act regardless of international 
approval. True, it may have to pay a price for what 
others would see as rogue behaviour, although the 
GATT, like the Pope, has no army. Thus weighing the 
costs and benefits, any country, including the United 
States should not consider surrendering the option of 
acting unilaterally. Agreeing t? 3 submit to 
international 
rules must have some limits. " 
Wolff's words probably also represent the official conception of the United 
States government. His argument is straightforward; if international rules violate 
national interests, then every state has the right to disregard them and create 
rules of its own, because sovereignty is the highest and untouchable notion. 
Theoretically, this argument is based on the "dualist doctrine" of international 
law which suggests that municipal law and international law constitute two 
distinct and formally separate categories of legal systems. A state can decide to 
follow international rules or choose to disregard them. 
34 This doctrine, as 
pointed out by Antonio Cassese, was inspired by nationalism; it endeavoured 
to 
face the reality of international society, but at the same time 
insisted on relying 
33 
Thomas R. Howell, Alan Wm. Wolff, Brent L. Bartlett & R. 
Michael Gadbaw, (ed. ), CONFLICT 
AMONG NATIONS: TRADE POLICIES IN THE 1990s p. 533 (1992). 
34 
Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD pp. 
19-20 (1986). 
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on an "emergency exit" in case international law proved to be in harsh conflict 
with national interests. 
35 Here, one sees the danger of this view; the 
identification of sovereignty with power, indeed unlimited power and virtual 
omnipotence: any social objective announced by the government is attainable by 
virtue of the sovereign will behind it. 
36 When this view prevails, interaction of 
states simply becomes the patternless exercise of power, depending solely on the 
relative size of the nations in question. In concrete terms, it means that the 
relatively powerful state will impose its will on the powerless and force the latter 
to forsake international rules or to interpret them in a way the former seems fit. 
The result is not only a complete breakdown of the international legal system, 
but also an involuntary submission to the large state's power. Accordingly, this 
will work at the expense of the weaker nations. 
In addition, Wolff seems to suggest that all nations in the world can behave 
like the United States whenever they find their national interests being violated. 
Here, again, we face an unrealistic argument. Just imagine the consequences of 
Taiwan rejecting the GATT rules and acting on its own? Not only will it face 
trade sanction by the United States, but also a possible worldwide retaliation -- 
something Taiwan cannot sustain. Wolff's point certainly cannot apply to 
Taiwan. 
Note also the contradiction of suggesting the use of unilateralism 
by the United 
States and the right of other countries to reject international norms. 
For 
America's trade unilateralism to work, it must involve the accommodation 
of its 
35 
Id., p. 20. 
36 
The view of Sir Karl Popper. Cited by Jan 
Tumlir, "National Interest and International 
Order, " Fifteen Wincott Memorial Lecture p. 5 (1978). 
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counterparts, which means the surrendering of their right to reject. On the 
other hand, if the United States recognises (and thus respects) other nations' 
right to resist America's unilateralism, then its trade weapon simply would not 
work. 
The point to be emphasised is that as long as the United States holds the 
position Wolff suggested, the efforts of Taiwan -- the relatively powerless -- to 
integrate further into the international economic order is bound to be limited, for 
there is a hegemony which is too ready to preserve its own version of "national 
interests" at the expense of others'. 
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PART IV. CONCLUSIONS 
CHAPTER 9. LESSONS FROM TAIWAN: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
What conclusions may we draw from this study? And what does this study 
suggest about the prospects of Taiwan's democratisation and law? What lessons 
have we learned from it? This chapter seeks to summarise all the arguments that 
I have established, and to discuss some of the implications that the main theme 
of my argument has carried. 
From the economic viewpoint, almost all United States-Taiwan trade and 
economic arrangements violate the basic principles of free trade -- principles 
that these two capitalist nations unequivocally support. More often than not, 
they are counter-productive, and have beget other fundamentally flawed policies 
on the part of Taiwan. The economic consequences have also caused a 
transnational redistribution of resources. Many of the American domestic 
problems are exported to Taiwan through various kinds of bilateral agreements 
reluctantly made. Liberalisation or opening of Taiwan's market is associated with 
coercion on the part of the United States. When it has become a significant 
policy of Taiwan to accommodate American demands, economic efficiency 
is often 
not the point under consideration. 
From the legal trade policy viewpoint, the paramount goal of 
Taiwan's trade 
policies and legal measures is to secure the "friendly" relations 
with the United 
States. Trade frictions with the United States must be avoided at all 
costs. In 
244 
the circumstances, Taiwan's trade policies are made to secure and serve its 
future relations with the United States. However, as the making and 
implementation of these policies were conducted under American pressures, the 
whole process was filled with bureaucratic improvisation, broad and unchecked 
administrative discretion, and massive violation of laws and legal principles. 
Regulations in the form of delegated legislations proliferated without being 
subject to meaningful control; while even courts are required to yield certain 
expected performances which necessarily impair the legal system. As such, 
individuals' right of judicial protection under the Constitution is also 
compromised. 
From the domestic political viewpoint, commitments on the part of Taiwan 
means full support of the parliament and the courts. On many occasions, it 
ultimately requires the involvement of the KMT to mobilise the nation's resources, 
including the citizens. Government and society are, by necessity, unified and led 
by the "High Level Party-government" to take uniform actions. Eventually, a 
political cycle is formed to deal particularly with American pressures. This cycle 
is characterised by quick KMT-dominated "black-box" decision-making, and ad hoc 
mobilisation of the state -- all remains of authoritarian corporatism. It severely 
restricts the burgeoning democracy that comes out of the transition process, for 
the operation of which necessarily undermines the proper functioning of the 
Legislative branch. In sum, the political cycle is extremely hostile to Taiwan's 
democratisation. As a result, public discontent continues to generate; while the 
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United States is still dissatisfied with the Taiwan government's "protectionist" 
policy. 
1 In the end, it has become a government that pleases no one. 
The preceding consideration suggests that American pressures are 
undermining Taiwan's constitutional and democratic development. All these events 
and responses have made the Western-based Constitution of 1947 unworkable from 
both functional and institutional aspects. In fact, it has rendered the 
establishment of constitutional democracy a contradictory effort. Under these 
conditions, the government may still be regarded as effective in the sense that 
it is quick to respond to foreign pressures. But it is far from true to say that 
the responses are made in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of 
law. As a matter of fact, one can be sure to pass a judgment that Taiwan can 
never have a meaningful and functional constitutional democracy unless the 
United States abandons its present approach towards Taiwan. Professor Jadgish 
Bhagwati, when commenting on the retaliatory nature of the American Trade Act, 
says, "the United States trade threats can only be successful in countries where 
there is no proper democracy because the government need not worry about 
popular resentment at giving in to American bullying. "2 We may further 
elaborate his point here, by arguing that it is the United States trade threats 
that lead to the undemocratic practices of the government. 
1 
Even after so many years of accommodative policy, 
Taiwan is still regarded as a 
protectionist trading state, and is reluctant to meet GATT requirements. 
A United States official 
thus concluded that, "aggressive anti-protectionism 
is the best way for Taiwan to acquire the 
political capital that it needs to accede to GATT. " 
Sharon Lockwood, "Taiwan's Accession to GATT: 
A Washington Perspective, " 28 Colum. J. World Bus., p. 99 (Fall 1993). 
2 
"It's the Process, Stupid! " The Economist (London), p. 
89 (21 March 1993-2 April 1993). 
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The practice of responding to United States pressures thus suggests the 
revival of old authoritarianism in Taiwan, which is characterised by a strong 
party-state dominating both policies and law. Moreover, it is sanctioned by the 
United States for it always works in its interests, even at the expense of Taiwan 
and the situation is not likely to change even if Taiwan becomes a member of 
GATT (WTO). For the whole problem lies with the United States which presents 
itself as a victim of Taiwan's illiberal trade policies, laws and practices rather 
than as a beneficiary of unequal trade relationships. Although it is undeniable 
that in certain sense, Taiwan is democratising itself, it would be wrong to say 
that the policies of the government in Taiwan are leading towards constitutional 
democracy. 
Several implications can be drawn from my conclusion. First, my analysis 
and conclusions inevitably concur with the "globalist" approach to national 
development. The essence of globalism is that it emphases the interpenetration 
power of the supranational structure in shaping national destinies. 
3 The 
supranational level itself is, in turn, more strongly organised by powerful states 
and multinational corporations. 
4 In this thesis, I have demonstrated that the link 
between American economic pressures and the internal legal-political system of 
Taiwan does exist. The most notable point with regard to Taiwan is that, due to 
its special international political status and the intriguing relations with the 
United States, the supranational structure can be comfortingly narrowed down 
3 
Edwin A. Winckler, & Susan Greenhalgh, (ed. ), CONTENDING APPROACHES 
TO THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF TAIWAN pp. 22-23 (1988). 
4 
id. 
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to the United States and American multinationals. While there seems to be a 
theoretical problem in explaining why trade with the American hegemony prospers 
Taiwan, the insight of this theory lies in the impact of the supranational 
structure on law and politics on the island. Accordingly, we may further expand 
Stephan Haggard's viewpoint by suggesting that not only do external forces have 
significant influence on the shaping of national polic ,5 they also have vital 
consequences on national legal and political structures. 
This observation further implies that a wide spread of international 
capitalism works to the detriment of domestic democracy of the "latecomers". 
This, in turn, would mean that Francis Fukuyama's evangelistic perception of "the 
end of history"6 is nothing but a myth. For most of the countries in the world 
have not yet achieved democracy and economic development. Nor is the 
"modernisation theory", which suggests that by following the "path" of those 
industrialised nations, a Third World nation can eventually upgrade itself and 
become a modern state, accountable. True, past experience of other nations is 
precious, but it would be ridiculous to assume that the present world economy 
is friendly to the "modernisation" of developing states. 
As a matter of law, this opinion is not entirely new, for there is an 
international law theory which claims that international law is a system of power 
S 
Stephan Haggard, PATHWAYS FROM THE PERIPHERY: THE POLITICS 
OF GROWTH IN THE NEWLY 
INDUSTRIALISING COUNTRIES p. 21 (1990). 
6 
In his book THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN, Francis Fukuyama remarkably 
argues that 
liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout 
the world, and has constituted 
the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the 
"final form of human government", and as 
such, constitutes the "end of history". Francis Fukuyama, 
THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN p. xi 
(1992). 
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which operates against the developing and the underdeveloped nations. 
However, this observation is very different from traditional international law 
teaching in Taiwan where international law is said to be composed of fixed, 
recognised, and neutral principles and rules governing nation states. Here, I do 
not need to elucidate further the danger of holding this traditional approach: 
that it tends to separate international issues from domestic ones, and thus 
overlooks the significance of foreign influence on the national legal and political 
system. 
The current problem is not that we do not have rules, on the contrary, we 
have too many rules. Unfortunately, many of these rules are based on ill- 
founded or even unsettled legal principles and practices, most of them are either 
unilaterally created by big states for their own sake, or through unequal 
bilateral agreements. Worst of all, when these rules and principles are found to 
be insufficient, big states improvise or forget them. So do small states as a 
response to big states' demands. Today, America's aggressive unilateralism has 
become a significant part of international economic relations and, whether other 
countries like it or not, it co-exists with the multilateral trade framework 
(GATT/WTO). This means that conflicts of different scale (depending upon the 
size of America's counterparts) would arise and thus further push the fragile 
GATT/WTO into a corner. In a world of this kind, we simply cannot 
foresee 
7 
Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD p. 
119 (1986); Osvaldo Sunkel, 
"Transnational Capitalism and National Disintegration in Latin 
America, " in Yash Ghai, Robin Luckham 
& Francis Snyder (ed. ), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW: A THIRD WORLD 
READER p. 283 (1989). 
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"perpetual peace" as suggested by Immanuel Kant. B Instead, what we may 
reasonably predict is the survival of the natural impulse of the love of power 
which leads the strong to oppress the weak, and big states to interfere with 
small states, 
9 
something which is contrary to the United Nations Charter. `0 
8 
According to Kant's "perpetual peace", the establishment of democracies 
in the world is a 
natural tendency. Once established, democracies will lead to peaceful relations 
because democratic 
governments are controlled by the citizens and therefore will not enter 
into violent conflict that 
may subject the citizens to bloodshed and war. Georg Sorensen, 
DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATISATION p. 92 
(1993). 
9 
Bertrand Russell, ROADS TO FREEDOM pp-9-10 (1954). 
10 
The preamble of the Charter of the United Nations reads, 
in part, "WE THE PEOPLE OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS... determined to reaffirm our faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of 
nations large and small .... AND 
FOR THESE ENDS to practice tolerance and live together with one another 
as good neighbours... " 
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APPENDIX I. POLITICAL LIBERALISATION AND DEMOCRATISATION IN TAIWAN 
1982-1992 (Table 3) 
MAJOR EVENTS AND EFFORTS CONDUCTED BY THE KMT 
YEAR GOVERNMENT 
1982 Both Amnesty International and Freedom House reported gains 
in human rights and a liberalization of political atmosphere. 
1983 New electoral law was passed, but which still limited political 
campaigns. The opposition argued for the end of martial law 
and democratic politics. 
1984 Cabinet reshuffle leading to more native born Taiwanese 
ministers and younger officials. 
1985 Cabinet reshuffled again due to a major financial scandal 
caused by a KMT parliamentarian. 
1986 A civilian was appointed as Defense Minister. Democratic 
Progressive Party was formed and tolerated by the KMT 
government. 
1987 Lifting of the Emergency Decree (martial law), and the 
Replacement of which by the National Security Law, opposition 
political parties formed; political prisoners released; ban on 
newspaper registration repealed. 
1988 Reopening of new newspaper registration; enactment of the 
Law on Assembly and Parade. 
1989 Amendment to the Law on the Election and Recall of Public 
Officials; enactment of the Law on the Organisation of Civic 
Groups (which legalised the formation of new political 
parties); enactment of the Law on the Voluntary Retirement of 
Senior Parkamen tarians; 
1990 First Constitutional Amendment. 
1991 Ending of the Period of Suppression of Rebellion; Second 
Constitutional Amendment. 
1992 Second Constitutional amendments; comprehensive re-election 
of parliamentary members. 
Sources: Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz (ed. ), CONSTITUTIONS 
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: 
Taiwan Vol. XLX (1994). 
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APPENDIX II. MAJOR TRADE ISSUES OF UNITED STATES-TAIWAN BILATERAL 
NEGOTIATIONS 1982-1993 (Table 4) 
ISSUES 
YEAR 
1982 tariff reductions on agricultural products (beef, maize can, 
orange juice, apples, frozen chicken etc. ); Taiwanese rice 
exports and pricing; importation of petro-chemical products; 
American tariffs reduction on mushrooms; GSP on textiles; export 
of shoes to the United States and remedies; trademark and 
patent counterfeits. 
1983 general consultation on industrial property rights (copyright 
not included) and enforcements. 
1984 tariff reductions; custom valuation; GS P status review; remedies 
for steel imports under the United States trade law; importation 
of chemical products to Taiwan; trade dispute arbitration 
institution; pro-American procurement arrangement; trademark, 
patent, copyright protection; and unfair competition. 
1985 tariff reductions; implementation of Taiwan's new custom 
valuation system; opening of insurance and leasing markets; 
importation of American films; importation of certain chemical 
products; lifting of restrictions on animal offals; review of US- 
Taiwan Rice export agreement; importation of tobacco, wine and 
beer; enactment of fair trade law; patent and copyright 
protection. 
1986 VRA on machine tools and textiles; relaxation of limitations on 
foreign banks; pro-American procurement arrangement; 
importation for certain agricultural products (animal offals, 
pears, peach, peanuts); opening of insurance and leasing 
markets; simplification of custom inspection procedure; import 
quota on American films; labour welfare; and amendment to 
Patent Law, Copyright Law, and legislation of Fair Trade Law. 
1987 VRA on textiles; amendment to Patent Law, Trademark Law, 
Copyright Law, legislation of Fair Trade Law, and signing of 
U. S. -Taiwan Bilateral Industrial 
Property Right Agreement. 
1988 exchange rate adjustment (NT$ appreciation); amendment to 
Copyright Law; protection of MTV; specific patent issues (micro- 
organism patent, shift of burden of proof in Patent 
Law, 
enforcement etc. ), and enactment of Fair Trade 
Law, drafting 
Copyright Protection Agreement. 
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1989 tariff reductions; importation of American turkey parts and ducks; enforcemnt concerning VRA on machine tools; trade 
distorting practices on steel trade; enforcement details 
regarding VRA on textiles; strategic trade controls; protection of 
patent, trademark, copyright, semi-conductor chips and MTV. 
1990 tariff reductions; import licensing; commodity tax; standards, 
testing, labelling, and certification; government procurement; 
service sector (insurance, entry and distribution of foreign 
films); investment barriers; monopoly practices (production and 
distribution of alcohols and tobacco, telecommunication etc. ); and 
intellectual property protection; 
1991 tariff reductions; import licensing; commodity tax; standards, 
testing, labelling, and certification; government procurement; 
service sector (insurance, entry and distribution of foreign 
films); investment barriers (monopoly practices in the 
production and distribution of alcohols and tobacco, 
telecommunication etc. ); and intellectual property protection; 
1992 tariff reductions; import licensing; commodity tax; standards, 
testing, labelling, and certification; government procurement; 
service sector (insurance, banking, securities, maritime, motion 
pictures); copyright; cable TV regulation; integrated circuits; 
and trade secrets protection; enforcement procedure and 
efficiency. 
1993 tariff reductions; import licensing; commodity tax; standards, 
testing, labelling, and certification; government procurement; 
service sector (insurance, banking, motion pictures, contracting 
etc. ); investment barriers (monopoly practices of alcohols and 
tobacco, and telecommunication); copyright issues(particularly 
parallel imports), and cable TV. 
Sources: USTR, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 
(1986-1994); BOFT, Wo- 
kuo 78 nien dual -wei mau-i tsa-shang tan-pan chi-yau 
(A SUMMARY OF ROC'S EXTERNAL TRADE CONSULTATION 
IN 1989) (classified material, 1990); and Yen, Ching-chang, Chung-mei ching-mau 
can-pan yau-kuan La- 
1u wen-te chi yen-chiu (A STUDY OF THE LEGAL ISSUES REGARDING 
US-TAIWAN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS) (CEPD, 
Executive Yuan, ROC) (Taiwan, 1988). 
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APPENDIX III. TAIWAN'S IPR LEGISLATIVE CHANGES (Table 5) 
YEAR ENACTMENTS AND AMENDMENTS 
1985 Trademark Law: advertising or promoting the 
trademarked goods are deemed as trademark in 
use; protection of non-registered "well known 
foreign trademark"; granting non-recognised 
foreign companies' right to sue in the courts 
of Taiwan; establishment of special court; 
increase penalty for trademark counterfeits. 
Copyright Law: comprehensive amendments 
including the inclusion of Computer programs 
as subject matter of copyright; non- 
recognised foreign companies' right to sue. 
1986 Patent Law: expand the scope of patentable 
subject matter to include new species of 
animal, plants and micro-organisms; medical 
products; chemical products; and some process 
patents etc; shift of the burden of proof: 
i. e. a product identical with the product 
made by a patented manufacture process shall 
be inferred as having been manufactured by 
the same patented process; granting non- 
recognised foreign companies' right to sue in 
the courts of Taiwan; imposition of heavier 
punishments for patent infringements; 
establishment of special courts. 
1989 Trademark Law: redefining the "interested 
parties" of trademark; forfeiture of 
counterfeiting products. Copyright Law: the 
signing of Copyright Agreement. 
1990 Copyright Law: expand the scope of copyright 
violations; increase penalty for copyright 
infringements. 
1992 Fair Trade Law: protection against dilution 
of trademark, false indications, unrecognised 
U. S. companies right to sue. 
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1993 Copyright Law: prohibition of parallel 
importation; retrospective protection of U. S. 
motion pictures; extension of the duration of 
copyright. (e. g. 30 years for motion 
pictures); establishment of minimum monetary 
compensation for copyright infringement. (i. e. 
500 times the actual retail price of each of 
the infringed works); establishment of 
copyright intermediary (brokerage) 
organisation; Trademark Law: priority rights; 
relaxation of trademark licensing; increase 
fine penalty for violation of trademark 
rights; define service mark and its usage 
etc; Cable TV Law: new legislation. 
1994 Patent Law-- comprehensive amendment: 
priority right based on reciprocity; 
clarifying the patent right between employer 
and employee; defining the scope of "new 
utility model" and "new design"; delegate 
MOEA to make regulations for encouraging 
inventions etc. 
Sources: A Complete Book of Six Laws (Hsin-pien liu-fa chuan shu); LEGISLATIVE YUAN GAZETTE (1992- 
1993); MOEA, PATENT LAW OF THE ROC (May, 1994). 
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